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Preface
”..med tiden mognar en bra ekonom till en ekonomisk historiker".
(..given time a good economist matures into an economic historian]
Oiler (2006) citing Dahmen.
My interest in research first awoke when I started working with national ac­
counts at Statistics Finland. After a brief stint with regional accounts I was put in 
charge of capital stock statistics and somewhat later on also productivity statis­
tics. Taking part in the work of the balancing and summing-up team the marvel­
ous system of national accounts slowly unraveled itself to me. Early on my em­
ployer showed faith in me as a very junior employee was sent to participate as 
the Finnish representative in the OECD Canberra Group on Capital Stock Sta­
tistics. Sitting at the same table as giants of the field was really an eye-opening 
experience. My interest in the theory of capital and productivity was further 
deepened when I was fortunate enough to get docent Pirkko Aulin-Ahmavaara 
as a colleague and mentor. Co-operating with Pirkko was my first real exposure 
to the world of science.
As I realized that I wanted to pursue post-graduate studies I was fortuitous 
enough to get in contact with professor Riitta Hjerppe and docent Sakari 
Heikkinen; both eminent economic historians at the University of Helsinki’s De­
partment of Social Science History. Riitta personifies Finnish historical national 
accounts and it was hard to find a topic that she had not done already. Sakari’s 
skills in advising how to finish an article are extraordinary. I am honored by their 
friendship and inspired by their example. My greatest stroke of good fortune came 
when I met professor Matti Pohjola of the Helsinki School of Economics. Over the 
years he has been my co-author and supervisor. His professionalism and percep­
tive insights into what is relevant and what not holds me in awe to this day.
Professor Hannu Tervo and docent Magnus Lindmark were the pre-examin­
ers of my manuscript appointed by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Univer­
sity of Helsinki. They provided discerning observations and constructive criti­
cism. Docent Timo Alanko was kind enough to accept this thesis to be published 
in Statistics Finland's Research Reports Series. Other persons that have influ­
enced my work include: professor Bart van Ark, Jaakko Autio, asst, professor Jari 
Eloranta, docent Susanna Fellman, doctor Matti Hannikainen, Janne Huovari, 
Heli Jeskanen-Sundstrom, Ilja Kristian Kavonius, Arto Kokkinen, doctor Mika 
Maliranta, professor Jari Ojala, Lea Parjo, doctor Petri Rouvinen, Olli Savela, 
doctor Pekka Tiainen, Steinar Todsen, and many others far too numerous to list.
This doctoral thesis was written while being employed by Statistics Finland, 
Helsinki School of Economics, Pellervo Economic Research Institute and 
Eurostat. One year was funded by the Yrjo Jahnsson Foundation. The latter part 
of my research was done while partly employed by the EU KLEMS project "Pro­
ductivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach", funded by 
the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 6th
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Framework Programme, Priority 8, "Policy Support and Anticipating Scientific 
and Technological Needs".
My deepest gratitude and love goes to my beautiful wife Merja and our chil­
dren Vilma and Axel. I cannot forget my mother Marianne’s and my 
mother-in-law Marjatta’s extensive babysitting and dog sitting efforts over the 
years either. Thank you.
Luxembourg, November 2007
Jukka Jalava
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Abstract
This study examines Finnish economic growth. The key driver of economic 
growth was productivity. And the major engine of productivity growth was tech­
nology, especially the general purpose technologies (GPTs) electricity and ICT. 
A new GPT builds on previous knowledge, yet often in an uncertain, 
punctuated, fashion.
Economic history, as well as the Finnish data analyzed in this study, teaches 
that growth is not a smooth process but is subject to episodes of sharp accelera­
tion and deceleration which are associated with the arrival, diffusion and exhaus­
tion of new general purpose technologies. These are technologies that affect the 
whole economy by transforming both household life and the ways in which firms 
conduct business.
The findings of previous research, that Finnish economic growth exhibited 
late industrialisation and significant structural changes were corroborated by this 
study. Yet, it was not solely a story of manufacturing and structural change was 
more the effect of than the cause for economic growth. We offered an empirical 
resolution to the Artto-Pohjola paradox as we showed that a high rate of return 
on capital was combined with low capital productivity growth. This result is im­
portant in understanding Finnish economic growth 1975-90.
The main contribution of this thesis was the growth accounting results on the 
impact of ICT on growth and productivity, as well as the comparison of electric­
ity and ICT. It was shown that ICT's contribution to GDP growth was almost 
twice as large as electricity's contribution over comparable periods of time. Fin­
land has thus been far more successful as an ICT producer than a producer of 
electricity. Unfortunately in the use of ICT the results were still more modest 
than for electricity. During the end of the period considered in this thesis, Fin­
land switched from resource-based to ICT-based growth. However, given the 
large dependency on the ICT-producing sector, the ongoing outsourcing of ICT 
production to low wage countries provides a threat to productivity performance 
in the future. For a developed country only change is constant and history 
teaches us that it is likely that Finland is obliged to reorganize its economy once 
again in the digital era.
Keywords: growth, productivity, ICT, growth accounting, electricity, 
general purpose technology, capital, structural change
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Tiivistelmä
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Suomen talouskasvua. Tärkeimmäksi tekijäksi 
Suomen talouskasvun selittäjänä tutkimuksessa havaitaan tuottavuuden kasvu. 
Tuottavuuden kasvun moottori on teknologinen kehitys, erityisen tärkeitä ovat 
ns. yleisteknologiat kuten sähkö sekä tieto- ja viestintäteknologia (ICT). Talous­
historiasta - j a  myös tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidusta Suomea koskevasta aineis­
tosta -  tiedämme että talouskasvuun kuuluu sekä nopean että hidastuvan kasvun 
kausia. Tällaiset suhdannevaihteluita pidemmät taloudellisen kasvun vaihtelut 
liittyvät uusien yleisteknologioiden ilmestymiseen, leviämiseen ja häviämiseen.
Tutkimus vahvistaa aiemmat havainnot siitä, että Suomi teollistui myöhään ja 
että Suomen kasvuun liittyi huomattava talouden rakennemuutos. Kuitenkaan 
yksinomaan tehdasteollisuuden kehitys ei riitä kasvun selittäjäksi, ja rakenne­
muutos oli pikemmin talouskasvun seuraus kuin syy. Tutkimuksessa esitetään 
miten korkea pääoman tuottoaste yhdistyi matalaan pääoman tuottavuuskas­
vuun vuosina 1975-1990; tämä ratkaisee ristiriidan ns. tehottoman pääoman 
koulukunnan sekä niiden välillä jotka havaitsivat tietyillä toimialoilla kohtuullisia 
pääoman tuottoasteita.
Tutkimuksen päätulos on ICT:n kasvu- ja tuottavuushajotelma (käyttäen kas- 
vutilinpitoa, jonka avulla talouskasvu voidaan osittaa tuotantopanosten ja tekno­
logisen kehityksen osatekijöihin) sekä vertailu kahden yleisteknologian -  sähkön 
ja ICT:n -  käyttöönoton ja leviämisen vaikutusten välillä. ICT:n kontribuutio 
BKT:n kasvulle oli vertailukelpoisina ajankohtina kaksi kertaa suurempi kuin 
sähkön. Suomi onkin ollut huomattavasti menestyksekkäämpi ICT:n tuottajana 
kuin sähkön tuottajana. Valitettavasti ICT:n käytön suhteen tulokset olivat vaati­
mattomammat kuin sähkön osalta. Tarkastelujakson aikana Suomi muuntui al­
kutuotantovaltaisesta, luonnonvaroistaan riippuvaisesta maasta, vauraaksi maak­
si, jonka ICT-tuotanto on maailman huippuluokkaa. ICT-toimialojen suuresta 
merkityksestä johtuen ICT-tuotannon ulkoistaminen matalan palkkatason mai­
hin muodostaa uhan tulevalle tuottavuuskasvulle. Kehittyneen maan taloudessa 
vain muutos on pysyvää. Historian oppien perusteella Suomi joutuu todennäköi­
sesti jälleen kerran organisoimaan tuotantorakenteensa digitaaliaikakaudella 
uudelleen.
Avainsanoja: kasvu, tuottavuus, ICT, kasvutilinpito, sähkö, yleisteknologia, 
pääoma, rakennemuutos
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Introduction
1
Jukka Jalava
1.1 The enigma of economic growth
"Indeed, it can be said without exaggeration that in the long run probably nothing is 
as important for economic welfare as the rate of productivity growth.1,1
Economic historians and economists have long struggled with finding an explanation 
for economic growth. Why is it so that Western Europe was in 1000 Anno Domini 
lagging behind both Asia and Africa in Gross Domestic Product (GDP]2 per capita 
terms, took the lead by 1500 Anno Domini and kept pushing farther away from the 
rest of the world? Only West Europe’s own offshoots -  Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada and the US -  caught up with her and surpassed her in the late 19* and early 
20* centuries.3 According to table 1.1 the world’s total Gross Domestic Product per 
capita was only 1.4 times larger in 1820 than it was in Anno Domini 1. Yet GDP 
per capita in 2003 was almost 14 times that of year 1 while the population simulta­
neously increased nearly 28-fold. This is astonishing. W hat happened? Why did the 
great transformation take place during the two latest centuries?
W hat lies behind modern economic growth is truly the most important enigma 
of contemporary society.4 This topic has been intensively studied by both economic 
historians and economists. The usual suspects as drivers of economic growth include 
the accumulation of physical and human capital5, productivity and the impact of re­
search and development on productivity, international trade and the role of institu­
tions. The early studies of Colin Clark6, Robert Solow7 and Moses Abramovitz8 laid 
the foundation for a multitude of quantitative studies into economic growth, pro­
ductivity and structural change. A central property in Solow’s model was a negative 
correlation between output per capita growth and capital per labour growth. Due to 
capital’s decreasing returns to scale output per capita grows slower and slower as the
1 Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1989).
2 The concept of Gross Domestic Product, i.e. the value of goods and services produced during a 
year, is in itself an important tool necessary for comparisons of economic growth and develop­
ment. Landefeld (2000) coined GDP as one of the great inventions of the 20'1'century.
3 Maddison (2003).
4 Mokyr (1990b) argues convincingly that the answer to this question lies in Western Europe's 
superior technology. The constant struggle for economic and political dominance was a natural 
incentive for technological progress.
5 E.g., Easterlin (1996).
6 Clark (1940).
7 Solow (1956, 1957).
8 Abramovitz (1956).
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Table 1.1 World GDP, population and GDP per capita, 1-2003
. JtW WBMI U hA
GDP, billion 1990 USD (PPP) 105.4 120.3 694.5 5,336.7 40,913.4
Population, million 225.8 267.3 1,041.7 2,525.5 6,278.6
GDP per person 467 450 667 2,113 6,516
Compound avrraqe (jrowth, 1 Bill m tf-Jiij A -  - $ 0
GDP 0.01 0.21 1.58 3.92
Population 0.02 0.17 0.68 1.73
GDP per person 0.00 0.05 0.89 2.15
Source: Angus Maddison, http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/, downloaded on April 2, 2007.
amount of capital per labour input increases. So on the one hand the growth rate of 
a country’s economy slows down as its capital intensity increases, while on the other 
hand countries with lower capital-labour ratios grow faster than those with higher 
capital-labour ratios.
Production takes place by combining labour with capital at some technology. 
In addition to the accumulation of inputs also substitution between the inputs 
and substitution within inputs, that is, the change in their quality must be taken 
into account. In growth accounting the inputs’, i.e. labour’s and capital’s, quan­
tity and quality is deducted from economic growth by assuming constant returns 
to scale and weighting them with their income shares. The remaining unex­
plained factor or residual is often called multi-factor productivity (MFP). The re­
sidual captures technical change, logistical improvements, changes in corporate 
governance, economies of scale, the impacts of tax policy and economic policy, 
calculations errors, etc.9 Multi-factor productivity explains the lion’s share of 
level and growth rate differences in economic welfare between countries.
But what explains MFP? The most important factor behind multi-factor pro­
ductivity change is technical change. Especially significant technological leaps are 
general purpose technologies such as steam power, electricity and information 
and communications technology (ICT) all of which have over time contributed 
significantly to economic growth. A new technology’s impact is, however, not 
necessarily immediately seen in the productivity and growth figures.10 Already 
Joseph Schumpeter stressed that an invention’s and its economic application’s 
(which in Schumpeter’s terminology is an innovation) impact is discerned only 
when its diffusion has spread widely enough.11
W hat about the nature of inventive activity? Are inventions incremental by na­
ture, so that like a building where brick upon brick is laid finally the whole becomes
9 Gould (1972).
10 "We see the computer age everywhere except in the productivity statistics" was a famous quip 
made by Robert Solow in the 1980s (Solow, 1987). A decade later it was clear that the impact 
of computers and other information and communications technologies on US productivity 
growth was major. See also Crafts (2004a).
11 Schumpeter (1928).
14 Statistics Finland
larger than the sum of the parts? Charles Jones propagates the view that the accu­
mulation of knowledge leads to a virtuous circle where population increase leads to 
an increase in the stock of knowledge (which almost inevitably leads to industrial 
revolutions).12 Joel Mokyr on the other hand argues that: "...macroinventions are 
inventions that start the emergence of a new ‘technological species’ or ‘para­
digm’". The macroinventions are followed by a string of microinventions as the 
macroinventions often at first are crude but are successively improved.13 Paul 
David is along the lines of Mokyr as he states that: "... the evolution of 
techno-economic regimes [is] formed around general purpose engines".14 Also 
Timothy Bresnahan and Manuel Trajtenberg offer general purpose technologies 
(GPT’s) such as the steam engine, the electric motor and semiconductors as en­
gines of economic growth.15 Matti Pohjola defines technology, which is the 
knowledge of how to produce goods and services more efficiently, as the engine 
of economic growth.16 He mentions information and communications technol­
ogy as the present manifestation of technological revolutions.
In the traditional neoclassical model technical change was assumed to be 
completely exogenous, i.e. the model did not explain technical change which al­
most miraculously came as though it was the proverbial manna from heaven. 
Growth could be attained by capital accumulation through refraining from con­
sumption. There was also in Finland a strong belief in capital fundamentalism af­
ter the Second World War as becomes obvious when observing the Finnish in­
vestment ratio in figure 1.1.17 Unfortunately investments into fixed capital are 
not enough to ensure economic growth.18
Paul Romer19 found the neoclassical growth model to be unrealistic and he 
strived to endogenize technical change. His insight was that ideas, which are 
nonrivalrous, are fundamentally different from other goods. Hence the name endog­
enous growth implying that growth comes from within the economic system and 
not from the outside. According to him growth depended on -  in addition to the 
traditional input factors -  spillovers from private research endeavours that led to im-
12 Jones (2001) also points out the importance of the evolution of property rights as incentives for 
would-be inventors/innovators that thus are ensured more rents from their inventions and inno­
vations. North and Thomas (1973) do not see the first industrial revolution as the genesis of 
modem economic growth. They point out the importance of raising the private rate of return on 
developing new techniques and implementing these new techniques in the production process.
13 Mokyr (1997).
14 David (1990).
15 Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).
16 Pohjola (2002).
17 See also Pohjola (1996).
18 Yet it is no surprise that studies looking into the relation between e.g. machinery investment 
and growth find strong associations in success stories, i.e., in countries that are presently indus­
trialized and advanced (DeLong, 1992).
19 Romer (1986). In his production function the income shares of capital and labour did not sum 
to unity, since the social return to capital (a+p) used in the growth accounting was bigger than 
the private return to capital (a) familiar from the neoclassical growth accounting equations 
(see equation 1.2). Not all endogenous models have increasing returns, e.g. Rebelo (1991) is an 
example of an endogenous growth model with constant returns to scale technologies.
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Figure 1.1 The share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP in Finland, 1860-2004 (percent)
Source: Statistics Finland (2005a).
provements in the public stock of knowledge with increasing returns to scale.20 Also 
Robert Lucas had positive externalities in his model, but he connected them 
with investments in human capital.21 Romer modified his model to one in which 
companies invest in research and development (R&D) in order to be able to pro­
duce new products.22 This research and development activity increases the 
amount of available information and therefore makes life easier also for competi­
tors. In short: the more research and development done yesterday the larger is 
the stock of knowledge and the easier it is to do research and development today.
Small nations can avoid the plight of diminishing returns by specialising in 
products suited to their present stage of development.23 Along with goods and 
services information spreads (some studies have shown that a country’s trade 
partner’s stocks of research and development impact significantly the said coun­
try’s MFP24) and if large markets can be entered it is worth a small country’s 
while to engage in R&D investments. Presumably protectionism is bad for 
growth.25 The role of institutions is important.26 Especially ownership rights are 
crucial.27 It is hard to imagine investments or R&D expenditure taking place 
without guaranteed ownership rights. Robert Barro showed that the standard 
neoclassical Solow residual can be modified to allow for increasing returns,
20 Romer (1994).
21 Lucas (1988).
22 Romer (1990).
23 See also Romer (1987).
24 Helpman (2004).
25 Although it would seem that for a newly industrialized country it is wise to protect industries 
in their infancy. The difficulty is of course to lift protectionist measures when they are no lon­
ger needed. Otherwise maximum productivity growth will not be attained.
26 North and Thomas (1973).
27 Helpman (2004).
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spillovers or R&D.28 Thus the theories of exogenous growth and endogenous 
growth are complimentary and not rivals.
W alt Rostow’s29 model was an at-the-time prominent attempt at generalizing 
modern economic growth. He defined five stages-of-growth that all societies lin­
early pass through. The first category is the traditional society. A traditional soci­
ety is, according to Rostow, one which has limited production functions as well 
as pre-Newtonian science, technology and outlook. These societies can develop 
only up to a point. The second stage is the precondition for take-off.30 This is a soci­
ety that is transforming itself from the traditional kind using the fruits of modern 
science. Necessary preconditions include building up the infrastructure: roads, rail­
ways and ports, and in laying the stage for a shift from primary production and 
commerce to manufacturing. The third stage is the take-off. The take-off, or the in­
dustrial revolution, takes place when the threshold to steady economic growth is 
passed and growth becomes the norm.31 Rostow furthermore emphasizes the 
emergence of one or several manufacturing industries as spearheading this stage in 
combination with the necessary political and social changes. The fourth stage is 
the drive to maturity when the investment ratio ranges between 10-20 per cent 
and the structure of the economy changes continuously. The final stage is the age 
of high mass consumption. By now the economy’s leading sectors have switched to 
consumer durables and services. As tempting as the thought of the economy once 
and for all taking-off is, Rostow’s linear view on economic development based on 
British historical evolution is unrealistic.32
Alexander Gerschenkron also subscribed to the view that countries are in dif­
ferent phases of economic development.33 Gerschenkron differed from Rostow in 
the sense that he did not list a number of set preconditions that had to be fulfilled 
before growth could be achieved. His key insight was that: "... the development of 
a backward country may, by the very virtue of its backwardness, tend to differ 
fundamentally from that of an advanced country". An underdeveloped country 
has an advantage of backwardness as it can implement a multitude of technologi­
cal innovations at once when industrialising. And the more backward a country is 
the more take-off like will its industrialisation be with rapid industrial output 
growth. Similarly, more emphasis is on capital intensive investment goods than
28 Barro (1999).
29 Rostow (1960, 1971). The first edition appeared in 1960 and the second edition in 1971. A trans­
lation in Finnish was available as early as 1962 (Taloudellisen kasvun vaiheet, Porvoo: WSOY). In­
credibly the Swedish translation was published already in 1959 (Industrisamhallets 
utvecklingsstadier: ett icke-kommunistiskt manifest, Samhallsdebatten 15, Stockholm): before the 
original! Rostow's book was in its time very influential and was the cause for heated debate (e.g. 
Supple, 1963; Gerschenkron, 1963).
30 Rostow wrote that the investment ratio would in this stage be between 5-10 per cent. From 
figure 1.1 can be seen that Finland had higher investment ratios than predicted by Rostow's 
stages-of-growth theory already from the 1860s on-wards. This was also pointed out by 
Hjerppe (1999).
31 According to Krantz (2001) the interwar period was the time of the Finnish take-off.
32 It must be said in Rostow's defence that in Appendix B of the second edition of his book he 
added that growth is not mechanically assured after the initial take-off but that a country must 
repeatedly go through the process of take-off to ensure continued growth.
33 Gerschenkron (1952, 1962).
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consumption goods in the more backward cases. Undeveloped countries need help 
from financial institutions and the most underdeveloped nations need state inter­
vention as well as their agricultural sectors are unlikely to provide a growing mar­
ket for industry by creating a surplus. Gerschenkron’s concept of relative back­
wardness is influential to this day although it is difficult to quantify and put to sta­
tistical test as he did not give a formal analytical definition of the concept.34
Abramovitz further developed Gerschenkron’s idea of the advantage of back­
wardness.35 According to the definition of Abramovitz countries with a low level 
of productivity have a potential for rapid growth and catching-up with more 
prosperous countries. This potential is conditional on the country’s social capabil­
ity. That is, a country must be socially advanced to be able to reap the gains from 
the backlog of technology they can implement. When technological progress is 
achieved, it is accompanied with structural changes of the economy, meaning 
both changes in the shares of different industries and structural changes inside 
the same industry when unprofitable old technology firms are replaced with 
more profitable new technology firms. In his empirical work Abramovitz often 
identified a country's social capability with its technical competence -  which he 
proxied with years of education -  and qualitative indicators relating to political, 
commercial, industrial and financial institutions. In addition to this Abramovitz 
is of course known for his meticulous work on long-term economic growth. His 
seminal 1956 article, from which the characterisation of multi-factor productiv­
ity as "the measure of our ignorance" springs, was one of the first studies that em­
pirically showed (using US data) that when subtracting the contributions of the 
inputs from the output a significant residual remains.36
Simon Kuznets defined economic growth of nations as a sustained increase in 
product per capita or worker associated with population increase and structural 
change.37 Kuznets’ life work was the conscientious gathering of national income 
data for the US and other countries where he distinguished between data break­
downs by industry and by final use. Kuznets realized that the modern economic 
epoch is distinguished from earlier ones by the extensive application of science to 
economic production and social organisation and the thereby following high rate 
of growth. An epochal innovation was defined by him as one that gave a major en­
largement to the stock of knowledge and functioned as an engine of sustained eco­
nomic growth. This is evidenced by the fact that increases in per capita output 
largely can be explained by agricultural and industrial revolutions and therefore 
only to a limited extent by increases in inputs per capita. An outcome of the pro­
cess of modem economic growth is that the structure of the economy changes 
with a significant drop in the total economy share of primary production, an in­
crease in secondary production’s share and a marked boost in the share of services, 
as well as technological change affecting all sectors individually. In addition to the 
aggregate and industry level effects of modern growth there is also an international 
dimension with cross-border flows of people, goods and capital.
34 Prados de la Escosura (2005] is a recent empirical application.
35 Abramovitz (1986].
36 Abramovitz (1956].
37 Kuznets (1966],
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Joel Mokyr distinguishes between several types of economic growth.38 Smithian 
growth is growth that is achieved through successful commercial efforts. Northian 
growth is growth gained through more efficient allocation of resources thanks to 
institutional changes. Solovian growth is acquired by increasing the stock of fixed 
capital. It was only in the latter part of the 18th century, due to the advent of the 
first industrial revolution, that technological progress started its ascent to become 
the prime mover of sustained economic growth it is to this day. Technology equals 
knowledge and according to Mokyr39 the kind of growth driven by increases in the 
stock of human knowledge is Schumpeterian growth. Mokyr distinguishes between 
prescriptive and propositional knowledge. The former one relates to different tech­
niques how to produce (and also include GPTs). An example is the knowledge 
how to construct a mobile phone. The latter type of knowledge concerns the 
epistemic base on which the techniques are founded. Propositional knowledge 
concerns human knowledge of nature.40 An example is discovering human DNA. 
DNA has existed as long as life but it was only in the mid-20th century that we be­
came aware of it. Needless to say such a widening of our knowledge base makes it 
easier to create novel techniques. Occasionally it can be vice versa when a revolu­
tionary new technique widens our knowledge base.
Mokyr41 finds that macroinventions42 are especially important. He defines 
them as: "... technological breakthroughs that constitute discontinuous leaps in 
the information set and create new techniques". Richard Lipsey, Kenneth 
Carlaw and Clifford Bekar find that most GPTs are what they call "use-radical" 
("...an innovation that could not have emerged out of the technologies that pre­
ceded it in that specific use"; the example they give is the copying by hand of re­
ligious texts in monasteries’ scriptoriums, no matter how the use of quill and ink 
would have been perfected the printing press would not have developed 
step-by-step), which comes into existence when combining existing technology 
used for other purposes. The other alternative is "technology-radical"; i.e., a 
technology is produced which has no apparent "parents".43 Mokyr gives mechan­
ical clocks, hot-air ballooning and smallpox-vaccination as examples.44 Lipsey, 
Carlaw and Bekar define a GPT as a generic historical product, process or organi­
zational model which is distinguished as such right through.45 An example is the 
computer. No matter which generation it belongs to (see chapter 4.3) it can be 
distinguished as a device which can perform arithmetic or logical operations.
The concept of macroinvention also resembles Thomas Kuhn’s definition of a 
scientific revolution as a "...non-cumulative developmental episode[s] in which
38 Mokyr (2005).
39 Mokyr (1990b).
40 Mokyr (2006) suggests that his term propositional knowledge is what Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 
(2005) call general purpose principles: "...a scientific or technological principle that shares 
many of the characteristics of a GPT, with the important exception that it is not embodied in a 
distinct generic technology that is recognisable as such over its life-time".
41 Mokyr (1990a).
42 The terms macroinvention and general purpose technology are used interchangeably in this thesis.
43 Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005).
44 Mokyr (2006).
45 Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005).
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an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one".46 
Importantly these macroinventions make it possible to escape from the claws of 
diminishing returns.47 Macroinventions are followed by a string of micro­
inventions that actually account for most of the concrete productivity increases as 
the macroinventions are often at first crude but are successively improved. These 
terms are derived by Mokyr from a comparison with biology where a 
macromutation stands for the genesis of a new species and a micromutation for a 
smaller change in an existing species.48
1.2 The Finnish growth performance49
The cliometric50 research approach has never been firmly entrenched in Finnish 
economic history; with the exception of certain scholars and studies.51 The most 
notable exception is of course the Finnish historical national accounts research 
project.52 The research on Finnish historical national accounts produced series on 
Finland’s GDP growth from 1860 on. The lengthy research was done by scholars 
of Statistics Finland, the Bank of Finland and the Departm ent of Economic and 
Social Flistory at the University of Flelsinki and ended in the late 1980s when 
Riitta Hjerppe unified the twelve sectoral studies into consistent historical na­
tional accounts for Finland in monograph number thirteen.53 We thus have fairly 
detailed annual series for the balance of total supply and demand in current and 
constant prices since 1860, production and employment for the different indus­
tries, the structure of foreign trade according to commodities and countries, and 
so forth. The framework used is that of historical national accounting where 
growth at both national and industry levels is accounted for in the tradition of 
the seminal work of Kuznets.
The total population of Finland in the late 16th century was a mere 300,000, 
and grew to 450,000 by the end of the following century. The Finnish popula­
tion roughly doubled every fifty years from 1750 to 1950. Troughs in population 
growth were due to: the annexation of Finland into the Russian Empire in the 
early 19th century; a famine in the late 1860s; the Civil W ar in 1918; the Second 
World War in the 1940s; and finally at the turn of the 1970s as a result of emi­
gration. Finland is one of the larger countries in Europe in area with a total sur-
46 Kuhn (1996).
47 Smits (2003).
48 Mokyr [1990b].
49 This section draws on Hjerppe and Jalava [2006] and Eloranta, Garcia-Iglesias, Ojala and 
Jalava [2006],
50 The concept of cliometrics (a combination of history [clio] and measurement [metric]) was 
bom in the early 1960s in the United States as an academic joke. It soon became a leading 
strand of US economic history research [Jalava, Eloranta and Ojala, 2007a).
51 E.g. Jutikkala, Kaukiainen and Aström [1980); Ahvenainen, Pihkala and Rasila (1982); Vattula 
(1983). Jalava, Eloranta and Ojala (2007b) is a recent effort to use economic theory and econo­
metric methods on Finnish economic history research.
52 See Hjerppe (1999) for a retrospect of the Finnish historical national accounts project.
53 Hjerppe (1988). The series are updated in Hjerppe (1996).
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face area of 338,145 km2, but it is sparsely populated with 15 persons per square 
km and a total population of 5.2 million people.54
Finland was part of Sweden until 1809 and a Grand Duchy of Russia from 
1809 to 1917, with a relatively wide autonomy in economic affairs. Finland 
gained the status of an independent republic in 1917. Finland in the pre-indus­
trial period was an agrarian country, with a few small towns mosdy in the coastal 
area. Money came to the countryside from tar burning and a few water-powered 
sawmills, while the towns flourished by exporting the products of these activi­
ties; Finland was among the most important tar-producing areas in the world in 
the 18th century. Sailing ships built in the coastal area exported these items to 
the Baltic Sea area and western and southern European ports. The ships brought 
back necessities like salt and iron as well as a few luxuries like cloth, wines and 
spices. The era of merchant capitalism lasted in Finland from the early 17th cen­
tury until the 1870s. A transfer to industrial capitalism was evident from the 
middle of the 19th century onwards and continued for the next 100 years.55
Finland in the early 2000s is an industrialised country with a standard of living 
ranked the 13th highest in the world in the year 2005.56 One hundred years ago it 
was a poor agrarian country; with a GDP per capita less than half of that of the 
world leaders; the United Kingdom and the United States. Albeit the era of finan­
cial capitalism began in the early 20th century (and lasted until the mid-1990s57] 
Finland remained an agrarian country up to the period after the Second World 
War, and the forest industry was the dominant industry in manufacturing. This is 
to be expected as Finland has large forest areas of coniferous trees, and forests have 
been and still are an important factor in its economic development. Two thirds of 
Finland’s total area consists of forests and other wooded land. Other natural re­
sources are scarce. Finland embarked on the road to prosperity utilizing its forest 
sector, its hydropower potential and the rural labour reserve.58 By the turn of the 
millennium rapid economic growth combined with a diversification of the econ­
omy and the building of a welfare state made the country one of the wealthiest 
Western economies in the world and a clear case of absolute convergence (figure 
1.259]. Most of the convergence seems to have taken place after World War II. In 
Finland the industrialisation phase started late compared with Sweden and the 
EU15 average.60 The world’s most affluent nations became richer themselves, Fin­
land just grew even faster. Finnish GDP per capita reached parity with the UK, 
was above OECD and EU averages and was three quarters of that of the US in
54 Statistics Finland (2005a).
55 Ojala and Karonen (2007). In the system of merchant capitalism business was restricted by the 
Swedish mercantile legislation. Furthermore, it was concentrated in trading houses and iron­
works. In industrial capitalism, the Grand Duchy of Finland gained several regulatory privi­
leges, more liberal economic regulations, an own currency and a parliament that renewed its 
activities. This was a period of rapid industrialisation with the forest industry as spearhead.
56 IMF (2006).
57 Ojala and Karonen (2007). Financial institutions played a significant, commanding and 
co-ordinating, role vis-à-vis businesses during the era of financial capitalism.
58 Heikkinen and Hjerppe (1986).
59 See also Lindmark and Vikstrôm (2003).
60 Kokkinen, Jalava, Hjerppe and Hannikainen (2007).
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Figure 1.2 GDP per capita, 1870-2003 (logarithmic scale, 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars)
Source: Maddison (2003). 2006 update downloaded from www.ggdc.net/maddison/
on 17.8.2006.
2001.61 During recent decades, the Finnish economy has been characterised by 
adaptation to globalization and an enormous growth of high tech industries. Un­
fortunately all nations in the world have not been as fortunate as Finland. World 
total GDP per capita has continued growing but there has in the latest decades 
been a regrettable flattening of the curve.62
So how does the 20th century productivity growth look in retrospect for Fin­
land? The short answer is that growth can be said to have been labour-saving. 
We see two major developments: the productivity growth of capital, (Y/K), was 
almost zero in the long run, while the productivity of labour, (Y/L), grew. Fig­
ure 1.3 shows that in the Finnish non-residential market sector, the curve for 
capital productivity, (Y/K], is virtually horizontal. This means that the change in 
capital productivity was zero over the long run. Thus the property of the neo­
classical growth theory that postulates that the capital stock and real economic 
growth of the economy expand at the same rate and thus keeps the capital-out- 
pu t ratio constant is satisfied. The curve for labour productivity, (Y/L], on the 
other hand, has not been horizontal; indeed, quite the opposite. The ratio of cap­
ital to labour, (K/L], closely followed labour productivity since capital input per 
unit of labour increased steadily. The ratio of capital to labour, often called capi­
tal deepening, no doubt was influenced by the relative prices of the production 
factors since labour and capital cannot be used free of charge in production.
The rental prices, the costs of using one unit of labour or capital, are denoted 
by (w) and (r), respectively.63 The real wage, (w/p], series increased steadily fol­
lowing the change in labour productivity and the capital-labour, (K/L), ratio
61 Maddison (2003).
62 See also DeLong (1988); Pritchett (1997).
63 The rental price of capital, in the computations underlying figure 1.3, was calculated as the ra­
tio of nominal capital income to the real capital stock (see Antras, 2004).
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closely. It is understandable that, given the steadily increasing real wage, growth 
was labour-saving. Conversely, given the fact that growth was labour-saving, it 
was possible to continuously increase the real wage. The labour productivity gain 
seems mostly to have been used to finance the increased real wage. The rental 
price of capital was cheaper than the price of using labour, as is shown by the ris­
ing, (w/r], curve. The ratio of the price of using one unit of labour to the price of 
using one unit of capital, (w/r], increased until the 1990s. The real rental price of 
capital (the rental price deflated with the GDP deflator, (r/p)) more or less de­
clined until the 1990s. Thus substituting labour with capital has been relatively 
cheap especially after the Second World War. After the early 1990s depression, 
the share of capital in GDP increased, and there was a clear change in some of 
these relationships as the mid-1990s with Finnish EU membership saw a shift to 
maximisation of shareholder value. The real rental price of capital, (r/p], rose, 
capital intensity, (K/L], stopped growing and capital productivity, (Y/K], im­
proved. This could be related to the rise in the real interest rate, when after de­
cades of zero and sometimes even negative real interest rates there started to be a 
positive interest on capital in the 1990s.
While the view on Finnish economic performance that figure 1.3 presents us 
with is in broad terms in accordance with the neoclassical theory of a stable pro­
duction function64, two time periods in particular stand out. The interwar period 
and particularly the post-1990s recession era exhibit simultaneous labour and 
capital productivity growth. So in these two periods the general pattern is punc­
tuated by phases of both inputs’ productivities increasing.65
Figure 1.3 Productivity and related indicators in the Finnish non-residential market sector, 
1901-2003,1900=LN (100)
Source: Jalava, Pohjola, Ripatti and Vilmunen (2006),
64 Also according to one of Kaldor's (1957) stylized facts the growth rate of the capital-output ra­
tio should be without a trend as capital and output grow at approximately the same rate.
65 See also Marquetti (2003).
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1.3 Objective of study and methods
and sources used
To date the literature on growth and productivity has grown to enormous pro­
portions. This body of evidence virtually unanimously singles out the importance 
of technology -  i.e. the knowledge and ideas of how to turn raw materials into 
goods and services -  for productivity growth and in turn the importance of pro­
ductivity for economic growth. This much we know, although there remains 
much that we do not know for sure; causalities that we suspect but the mecha­
nisms of which we are not totally familiar with as yet. Neoclassical growth ac­
counting embedded in the national accounting framework while carefully and 
properly treating the data is the quintessential methodology for discerning the 
impact of a general purpose technology like ICT (and electricity) on the proxi­
mate sources of economic growth.66
The traditional Finnish historical national accounts approach did a laudable job 
in quantifying past historical economic developments, comparable to the efforts in 
Sweden and the Netherlands.67 The fundamental role of technical change was im­
plicitly acknowledged, but the main story told was one of growth and structural 
change. Pekka Tiainen did an independent effort, inspired by the work of Edward 
Denison68, which went a step further by also compiling the series on MFP by indus­
try and total economy from 1900 onwards.69 Unfortunately Tiainen stopped at the 
MFP figures; he did not decipher the causes behind the MFP growth.
Previous research on Finnish economic growth and structural change inspired 
by Kuznets neglected to outline the explicit and fundamental importance of pro­
ductivity.70 This is why the first research question of this thesis is to ascertain 
whether the classical view of structural change71 is sufficient in explaining the 
Finnish growth record? I look in particular at the role of manufacturing as the 
proverbial engine of growth. Unfortunately the previous Finnish economic his­
torical research, both the traditional one as well as the one influenced by 
Denison, ignored the impacts of macroinventions or general purpose technolo­
gies on economic growth. The main objective of this study is to remedy this la­
cuna and shed new light on the Finnish growth miracle by presenting new evi­
dence on the impacts of the general purpose technologies ICT and electricity on 
Finnish productivity and growth. Therefore the second research objective of this 
thesis is to find out what new insights on Finnish growth can be gained, by using 
state-of-the-art neoclassical growth accounting on Finnish historical national ac-
66 Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005) named quantifying the impact of information technology on 
economic growth as the "killer application" of their productivity framework.
67 Bohlin (2003); Smits, Horlings and van Zanden (2000).
68 Denison (1962a).
69 The data compiled by Hjerppe (1988) was, of course, the starting point for Tiainen (1994).
70 Jorgenson (2005) wonders at the lack of connection between Kuznets' empirical work and 
Solow's theoretical work even though they worked at the same physical location -  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts -  at virtually the same time.
71 Clark (1940), Kuznets (1966) and Hartwell (1973).
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counting data72, on the impacts of electricity and ICT on Finnish economic 
growth and productivity. Especially the production, use and productivity of 
these technologies is analyzed. As the third research question I want to shed light 
on the Artto-Pohjola paradox, that is, how capital has influenced recent Finnish 
economic history.
The overall research focus in this thesis is binary. Attention is given both to de­
tailed empirical work on data issues, where every effort is made to respect the data, 
and above all to analytical topics, where the aim is to see the wood for the trees. The 
general approach used in this thesis is economic historical at the macro level. The 
System of National Accounts (SNA93) is the guiding principle.731 do not step out­
side of the SNA’s production or asset boundaries. W hat I do is to reclassify indus­
tries or assets to serve my purposes. Mosdy the data used is from the most recent 
version of official national accounts and from the historical national accounts pro­
ject. Often the splicing together of the most up-to-date series and the historical se­
ries is done by me. Use of official data has also for several years included direct ac­
cess to data underlying the accounts in various Statistics Finland’s databases while I 
have worked at the Economic Statistics Division of Statistics Finland. At times our 
breakdowns are novel as e.g. in the case of investment data for electrical capital 
goods in 1900-13 and 1920-38, or for more recent decades in the case of invest­
ments in hardware and communications equipment.74 In this way insights that were 
not readily discernible directly from the data were gained.75
Following the official data has at times been like trying to hit a moving target. 
The most fundamental revisions in the almost six decades long history of compil­
ing Finnish national accounts have been made during the time of our research. 
Supply and use tables at the level of almost 1,000 goods and services, in both 
current and constant prices, now form the core of the accounts beginning with 
the publication in spring 2006.76 This relates to current price supply and use ta­
bles from the statistical year 1995 onwards and for the constant price series from 
2001 onwards. Consistent double deflation77 has also been introduced at approx-
72 Lindmark (2004) points out that certain disrespect for orthodox source criticism is inherent in 
historical national accounting work. That can also be said for the work at hand, since similarly 
as is the case with Vikstrom (2002), no new primary data has been uncovered from the depths 
of archives.
73 Pohjola (2007) highlights the system of national accounts as the foremost achievement of eco­
nomics. We do not feel that it is too heroic a statement to assert that the same is true also for 
economic history. Easterlin (1996) states that: "lacking such quantitative data, the historical re­
cord is liable to obscure interpretation.” See also O'Brien (1994) on the importance of histori­
cal national accounts.
74 Investments for hardware and communications equipment are still not compiled by Statistics 
Finland although it will be required by Eurostat in the near future. The classification compiled 
by us for ICT goods and services was first published in Jalava and Pohjola (2003).
75 Kuhn (1996) spoke of how scientists during revolutions see novel and different things when 
looking at phenomena they have observed before using familiar tools.
76 Statistics Finland (2006).
77 This means that output and intermediate consumption are deflated with their own, separate, 
indexes. In single deflation output is deflated with some index and the volume change of out­
put is used for intermediate consumption as well. Single deflation was used in Finnish national 
accounts e.g. for manufacturing industries until the implementation of double deflation.
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imately the level of 120 industries and 950 goods and services.78 When beginning 
our research total supply and demand were still balanced at the aggregate total 
economy level by manipulating the usual suspects on the demand side (the pro­
duction approach has traditionally been the main method in compiling Finnish 
national accounts), while this balancing is now done individually for all 1,000 
products. Also the volume series have changed. When making our first calcula­
tions the underlying national accounts series were compiled with a fixed base 
year with 1995=100. This was changed to a fixed base year with 2000=100. The 
most recent change is that Finnish national accounts use a chain-linked Laspeyres 
type volume index with the reference year being 2000 starting with the publica­
tion in spring 2006.79
The system of national accounts, the current version of which is SNA93, is 
not simply a statistical device.80 It is a rich system that connects the macroeco­
nomic transactions taking place during a year to their impacts on the balance 
sheets. Such activities as production, generation of income and the distribution 
or use of income are all accounted for. These flows are linked to the balance 
sheets (stocks) of assets and liabilities. The flow accounts are also linked to each 
other so that the balancing item of each account, which is defined as the differ­
ence between total uses and resources, is carried forward to the following ac­
count. In that way, the transactions of each institutional sector are enumerated 
beginning with production and going all the way to the financial status of the 
sector. This shows whether the sector is a net lender or net borrower with regard 
to other sectors. Transactions across sectors, i.e. households, non-financial corpo­
rations, housing corporations, financial and insurance corporations, general gov­
ernment, non-profit institutions serving households, and rest of the world, are 
also consistently recorded. GDP, the value of goods and services produced dur­
ing a year, is the best known and most widely used statistical product of these 
flow accounts. GDP includes goods and services that have markets (or which 
could have markets) and products which are produced by general government 
and non-profit institutions.
Figure 1.4 shows graphically the process of economic growth. It should be 
noted that no explicit attem pt has been made here to quantify the stock of hu­
man capital or to explicitly estimate its impact on economic growth as human 
capital is outside the present asset boundary of national accounts.81
Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt have shown that the distance to the tech­
nology frontier, that is, to the most advanced producers, plays an important
78 Aulin-Ahraavaara (2006).
79 See Statistics Finland (2006) that also lists a number of other of the most recent revisions.
80 See Aulin-Ahmavaara (2007) for the narrative of how the first crude national income measures 
of the 17th century evolved into the modem, complicated, national accounting framework. 
Gronlund and Niitamo (1968) recount the story of how national accounts became a part of the 
production of official statistics in Finland.
81 The two best known approaches of measuring human capital are Kendrick (1976) and 
Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989). The first approach is cost based and the latter approach esti­
mates human capital by discounting future labour income. See Aulin-Ahmavaara (2004) for a 
discussion of the pros and cons of including human capital in the SNA framework.
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Figure 1.4 The process of economic growth
Source: Adapted from Jaiava and Pohjota (2004).
role.82 It is not possible to adapt technology developed elsewhere if one is on or 
close to the frontier in a specific industry. It was as late as the 1990s when the 
Finnish level of labour productivity in manufacturing surpassed EU and reached 
US levels.83 Before that Finland could in many industries use its advantage of 
backwardness. By the 21st century Finland had to abandon the previously suc­
cessful strategy of growth through investment and adopt a new strategy of 
growth through innovation.84 From the 1990s onwards human capital85 and 
other intangible capital is crucial for the Finnish story. For the task at hand, i.e. 
to account for 20th century growth and productivity, the tools we are using are 
more than sufficient.
In order to be able to produce correct productivity calculations, the quality of 
the underlying national accounts data is of paramount importance. Eurostat has 
done extensive work on the harmonisation of national accounts within the EU 
member states. At first the focus was on current price data, because national ac­
counts data is used widely for administrative purposes, e.g. to determine coun­
tries’ contributions to the EU budget, for regional funds, etc. Since the signing of 
the Stability and Growth Pact in July 1997, the focus has also turned to price and
82 Aghion and Howitt (2005).
83 O ’Mahony and van Ark (2003); Maliranta (2003); Jalava (2006a).
84 Asplund and Maliranta (2006).
85 While human capital naturally is important for absorbing frontier technology quality adjusting 
the labour input for shifts to labour with higher marginal products approximates the impact of 
human capital on production when viewing human capital as being generated outside the pro­
duction process as is done in this thesis (in accordance with SNA93’s recommendations).
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volume measures. Consequently, Eurostat together with the national statistical 
institutes started the work to improve price and volume calculations. The results 
of this work was summarised by Eurostat.86 Three topics stand out as being of 
the highest priority: i) the choice of index formula, ii] the work on hedonic in­
dexes for high-tech goods, and iii) the work on volume measures for services. All 
these topics have clear links to the quantification of the so-called New Econ­
omy87 and especially to the measurement of growth and productivity.
The national account deflators in many countries have traditionally been 
based on the matched pairs method. The idea is simply to match pairs of goods, 
i.e. the same product basket is priced at time t and then again at time t+1 to ob­
serve how the price of the basket has changed. The thus compiled price indices 
were then customarily used by national accountants to deflate their current price 
figures into prices of the base year to obtain Laspeyres volume indexes. How­
ever, using an index formula with a fixed base year has the well known drawback 
of substitution bias, which occurs when the relative prices of certain industries 
fall very rapidly, causing these industries volume growths to be overstated.88 This 
is why the use of chain-linked indexes, where the weights of the previous year 
are used, is preferred. Eurostat recommends that member states use Laspeyres 
type chain-linked volume indexes.
When calculating price indexes for high-tech goods that appear and vanish in a 
rapid succession, it is difficult to pinpoint the quality changes taking place.89 In 
such cases, the usage of the matched pairs-method results in a serious loss of infor­
mation, since only perfect matches from one period to the next are used.90 To 
remedy this, different techniques have been tried. The so-called hedonic method 
has been seen as a good method in dealing with high-tech goods and their inherent 
quality adjustment problem. It is based on the idea that a good is decomposed 
into certain qualities and characteristics that can be quantified. For instance Timo 
Koskimäki and Yrjö Vartia have shown that a large part of the price variations of 
personal computers can be explained by two factors, processor speed and size of 
memory.91 Regression analysis is then utilised to quantify the reason for the price 
differential between two computers. Notwithstanding the promising results of 
hedonic methods, there are also some drawbacks. The compilation of the hedonic 
price index is much more knowledge intensive and time consuming than compil­
ing price indices in the traditional way, and it is also more expensive to collect not 
only data on prices of goods, but also on their technical characteristics.
86 Eurostat (2001).
87 Lipsey (2002) defines the phenomenon of the New Economy as the: "... the full effects on the 
economic, political and social systems of the ICT revolution that is driven by the computer, la­
sers, satellites, the internet and a few other re-lated communication technologies with the com­
puter at the centre."
88 See Whelan (2002).
89 In the national accounts only price changes are to be reflected in the price index. All other 
changes are to be captured by the volume component (Eurostat, 2001).
90 Unless of course the matched model indexes are constructed at a high degree of disaggregation 
and use high frequency data (Aizcorbe, Corrado and Doms, 2003).
91 Koskimaki and Vartia (2001).
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Finnish national accounts do not use hedonic techniques for ICT products. 
This is why we turned to data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. The 
methodology utilized here is broadly that of Paul Schreyer.92 The idea is that the 
annual changes in the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ price index for non-ICT 
fixed investments are contrasted with the annual changes in the Bureau of Eco­
nomic Analysis’ ICT price indexes. We smoothed the series thus obtained, after 
which they were multiplied with the Finnish investment deflator to obtain the 
Finnish quality adjusted ICT deflators.
The third important price and volume topic is the ongoing work to obtain better 
volume measures for services, since they presently are very unsatisfactory indeed, 
with for instance average earnings indices being used as proxies for price changes of 
output. The development work on service statistics is ongoing both on international 
fora and in national statistical institutes. The focus of the development work is on 
the methods used compiling producer price indexes for the services sector, on the 
classification of service products and on statistics on service production by products. 
Statistics Finland has started to produce producer price indexes for a limited amount 
of service industries and will gradually extend the coverage.93
A core part of the neoclassical model of economic growth94 was the formula­
tion of an aggregate production function.95 There economic output is explained 
as a function of capital and labour inputs and time. Usually the aggregate pro­
duction function is expressed in the form:
Y, = A j[ K t ,L t ) , ( U )
where, at any given time t, aggregate value added Y  is produced from aggregate 
inputs consisting of capital services K and labour services L. The level of technol­
ogy or multi-factor productivity is here represented in the Hicks neutral or out­
put augmenting form by parameter A. Assuming that constant returns to scale 
prevail in production and that markets are competitive, growth accounting gives 
the share weighted growth of outputs as the sum of share weighted inputs and 
growth in multi-factor productivity:
AY = aAK + (1 -  a)AL + A4 , (1.2)
where the A-symbol refers to a first difference, i.e. Ax = x(f) —x(t -1), (1 -  a )  is 
the income share of labour and a  is the income share of capital. Due to constant 
returns to scale the income shares (which are averaged over the periods t and
92 Schreyer (2000).
93 Statistics Finland (2005b).
94 Solow (1956, 1957).
95 What Solow had in mind when working with growth theory was to find a systematic way to an­
alyze equilibrium growth paths for the economy (Solow, 2000).
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t-1) sum to unity. AA  is the residual that remains after the share weighted 
changes in inputs have been deducted from the change in output.96
Neoclassical growth accounting basically divides output growth into the con­
tributions of input growth, i.e. labour and capital, with multi-factor productivity 
growth being the residual. The classic production function of Robert Solow97, 
where he theoretically linked the production function with the non-parametric 
index approach, was further developed by Dale Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches who 
broadened the concept of substitution in Solow’s growth accounting framework 
and showed that it is also im portant to account for substitution between differ­
ent kinds of capital and labour.98 The inputs are corrected for changes in quality 
and weighted with their marginal products -  their market prices. MFP catches all 
unmeasured factors such as technical change [a shift of the production function], 
organisational improvements, economies of scale and measurement errors. The 
neoclassical theory is based on many assumptions, which are important to keep 
in mind when analysing the results. Most importantly, capital -  though consid­
ered the engine of growth in the short run -  is seen to suffer from diminishing re­
turns, so that productivity growth in the long run is completely exogenous.99
In the production possibility frontier100 approach on the other hand aggregate 
outputs consist of outputs of investment goods and consumption goods which in 
their turn are produced by aggregate inputs (capital and labour services at some 
technology]101:
(0 , ^o (0)  = m F Î K ,c r  (0, *o [t], L (t]], (1.3]
where, at any given time t, aggregate value added Y is assumed to consist of the 
production of ICT goods and services Yfcr as well as of other production Y0. 
These outputs are produced from aggregate inputs consisting of ICT capital ser­
vices KIcr, other capital services KQ and labour services L. The level of technol­
ogy or multi-factor productivity is represented in the Hicks neutral or out­
put-augmenting form by parameter A.
Assuming constant returns to scale in production and competitive product and 
factor markets, growth accounting gives the share weighted growth of outputs as 
the sum of the share weighted inputs and growth in multi-factor productivity:
Ain Y = wlCT AlnY;cr + m7q AlnY0 ^
= vicr AlnKiCr + v0 AlnXo + vLAlnL + Alru4 ,
96 Griliches (1996) finds the first mention of an output-over-input index in Copeland (1937). 
Griliches (1996) credits Tinbergen (1942) for the first explicit calculations of "technical devel­
opments", followed by Stigler (1947), Schmookler (1952), Fabricant (1954), Kendrick (1955), 
Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957). See also Fabricant (1974) and Hulten (2000).
97 Solow (1957).
98 Jorgenson and Griliches (1967).
99 The aggregate production function gives a single output as a combination of capital and labour 
at some technology. Therefore there is no role for separate prices for investment and consump­
tion goods Jorgenson (2005).
100 E.g. Jorgenson (2005).
101 This is my favoured approach. As it is very data intensive it is only used in chapter 6.
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where A refers to a first difference, i.e. Ax =x(t) -  x(t - 1), and where the time in­
dex t has been suppressed for the economy of exposition. The weights wICT and 
w0 depict the average nominal value-added shares of ICT and other production, 
respectively, and they sum to one. The weights vICT, vQ and vL also sum to one 
and respectively represent the average nominal income shares of ICT capital, 
other capital and labour. All shares are averaged over the periods t and t-1 .
Concerning fixed capital SNA93 is not adequate for growth accounting. In the 
national accounts there are two measures of capital stocks: the gross capital stock 
and the net capital stock. The traditional capital stock measures have been devel­
oped since the 1950s and due to their easy availability they have been widely used 
in productivity calculations. However, neither national accounts capital stock mea­
sure is appropriate for use in productivity or growth accounting computations. The 
gross capital stock does not take into account the possible decline in the capital 
good’s productive capacity as it ages. The net capital stock depicts the market value 
of capital and not its productive capacity. In growth accounting based on neoclassi­
cal theory, the measure of capital input to be used (instead of gross or net stocks) is 
widely accepted to be the Jorgenson and Griliches measure of capital services based 
on the concept of productive capital. The price indexes of the homogeneous asset 
types are assumed to convert nominal investments in different years into identical 
units of efficiency. Thereafter the productive capital stocks of homogeneous capital 
goods are aggregated using their Hall-Jorgenson102 rental prices. Concerning capital I 
could be said to belong to the Jorgensonian school.103 In this thesis I also favour the 
(non-parametric) index approach to productivity measurement rather than the re­
gression approach (although regression techniques are used in studying structural 
change); since the index approach is recommended by the OECD as well as 
Jorgenson and Steven Landefeld.104 However, I prefer to use the Törnqvist index.105 
The reason for this is that Erwin Diewert showed that the Törnqvist index is super­
lative which the Laspeyres index is not.106 The index approach is the system used by 
the official producer’s of national accounts and productivity statistics.107 It enables 
national statistical institutes to produce reliable productivity statistics on a continu­
ous basis. The alternative would be for them to re-parameterize their regressions 
whenever a new year’s observations become available. Not to mention that regres­
sion results are more difficult to explain to those users of statistics that are not tech­
nically oriented.
102 Hall and Jorgenson (1967).
103 I do not treat consumer durables as investment as e.g. Jalava and Kavonius (2007) does nor do I 
compute stocks of inventories or land as does Jalava (2002).
104 OECD (2001b); Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006). Diewert (1980) finds that the main disad­
vantage of the econometric approach is that it becomes unworkable when the number of out­
puts and inputs is large. This property is not shared by the index approach.
105 Törnqvist (1936).
106 Diewert (1976, 1978). It was shown that the Laspeyres index (unlike a superlative index) sig­
nifies a production function where the inputs can be combined only in set proportions.
107 Statistics Finland's productivity publications used the index approach (e.g. Statistics Finland, 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 2000a, 2002a, 2003; Jalava, 2004b; Jalava 2005).
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1.4 Structure of thesis and main results
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter, six research chapters and a chap­
ter with concluding remarks. In chapter 2 Finnish economic growth and the 
evolvement of the structure of the economy is observed. Finland was a late in­
dustrialized country that managed to transform itself from a predominantly pri­
mary production based economy to a modern welfare state with a large service 
sector. In raising the level of Finnish GDP per capita to three quarters of the US 
level the role of labour productivity was cardinal. Secondary production was the 
leading sector in labour productivity change due to rapid technical progress. In 
the late 1800s and early 1900s labour shifting out of primary production contrib­
uted at best half of overall labour productivity growth. Recently productivity 
growth has been more concentrated than before as the rural surplus labour has 
long since shifted to secondary production and services.108 Our analysis confirms 
the idea of economic growth taking place in stages. Yet, the role of secondary 
production as the single engine of growth remains uncorroborated by my regres­
sions.109 Chapter 2 furthermore demonstrates the considerable impact of labour 
productivity on GDP per capita. Finland’s industrialization changed her eco­
nomic structure irrevocably. Structural change in itself was more an effect of 
rather than the cause for Finnish economic growth. Finland’s share of secondary 
production in GDP still exceeded its US equivalent by approximately ten per­
centage points at the turn of the millennium.
The fundamental role of capital in economic growth has been long known. 
Flow capital should be defined and measured has been the subject of much dis­
cussion. The starting point in chapter 3, which was co-authored with Pirkko 
Aulin-Ahmavaara, is methodological as we define starting from a neoclassical 
production function the indicators for capital input and compare these with the 
traditional capital stocks of national accounts. The origin of Finnish capital mea­
surement is also traced. The different capital measures are applied to Finnish 
data in 1975-2001. This period is interesting as the early 1990s was a turbulent 
period for Finland with GDP declining by more than 10 per cent. We find that 
there was a spectacular increase in capital productivity growth after the 1990s 
recession. Finally, we observe how our new estimates accord with the previous 
view on how capital has influenced recent Finnish historical economic develop­
ment. O ur main result is a resolution of the Artto-Pohjola paradox, as we show 
that a high rate of return was combined with a low capital productivity growth 
in 1975-1990. The effect (of which alternative capital measure is used] on 
multi-factor productivity is minor at the level of the whole economy. Although 
the composition of capital has shifted into a more short-lived and intangible di­
rection, the good old K in the production function is by no means obsolete. It has 
just transformed, which poses a great challenge for an historical analysis of the
108 The result of this is often large scale urbanization. The rural labour force can also take recourse 
to self-employment; this is an alternative to migration (Tervo, 2004).
109 See also Broadberry (1993) who found that US, UK and German convergence can not be ex­
plained solely by manufacturing. Kokkinen, Jalava, Hjerppe and Hannikainen (2007) found 
that Finland's convergence to Sweden in GDP per capita terms relied to a significant extent on 
the service industries (especially after 1965).
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proximate sources of Finland’s economic growth. To put it another way, the 
greater part of Finnish economic growth is left unexplained when using tradi­
tional growth accounting.
Advanced economies are becoming more and more "weightless", as the share 
of the production of tangible goods in their GDPs diminishes.110 Idas something 
profoundly new taken place? That is, could it be that we actually are in the midst 
of an information and communication technology revolution, as ICT follows in 
the footsteps of steam and electricity in becoming a general purpose technology? 
The diffusion of two general purpose technologies, electricity and information 
and communication technology, throughout the Finnish manufacturing industry 
is described in chapter 4. The historical genesis of electricity and ICT is also 
briefly outlined. The full diffusion of electricity as motive power in the 1920s 
and 1930s led to an increase of nearly 4 percentage points in manufacturing la­
bour productivity growth. Furthermore, all industries gained across the board in 
productivity. In contrast, by the time ICT was fully diffused, towards the end of 
the twentieth century, yeast-like productivity gains were nowhere to be found. 
In fact, labour productivity growth had slowed down in many industries, the no­
table exception being the manufacture of electrical and optical equipment indus­
tries, in which labour productivity growth mushroomed. From a breakdown of 
growth in labour productivity into the contributions of internal productivity 
growth, employment share effect and a cross term, I found that labour shifting to 
industries with differing levels or growth rates of labour productivity explains 
less of aggregate labour productivity change in the period 1920-1938 (and even 
less in the period 1974-2000) than it does for the period 1901-1920.
Although investment in ICT has exploded since the mid-1970s, aggregate 
productivity growth remained sluggish until the mid-1990s in the United States 
which is the world’s leader in both the production and use of ICT. Therefore, 
many researchers have taken the strong performance of the US economy in the 
late 1990s as most welcome evidence for the view that the large investments in 
ICT have finally started to pay off. It is generally believed that the United States 
has become a "New Economy" in which business firms have learnt to take advan­
tage of both the ICT revolution and the globalization of business activities in 
ways which improve productivity. Indeed, the US growth rate of labour produc­
tivity has doubled in the late 1990s. By surveying recent research, chapter 5 
which was co-authored with Matti Pohjola, confirms that both the production 
and use of ICT have been the factors behind the improved economic perfor­
mance of the United States in the 1990s. The evidence for the New Economy is 
much weaker outside the United States. Growth accounting is applied to esti­
mate the impacts in Finland using provisional, unofficial, data. It is shown that 
the contribution to output growth from ICT use has increased from the early 
1990s to the late 1990s. In addition, the fast growth of multi-factor productivity 
in the ICT producing industries has had an even larger impact. But, unlike in the 
US, there has been no acceleration in the trend rate of labour productivity.
Chapter 6, which was co-authored with Matti Pohjola, analyzes the impacts of 
information and communications technology on output and labour productivity
110 Quah (2001).
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growth in Finland in 1995-2005. Using the production possibility frontier ap­
proach the chapter analyzes the impacts of information and communications tech­
nology on output and labour productivity growth in Finland in 1995-2005. ICT is 
a general purpose technology that spreads to all sectors of the economy, improving 
and becoming cheaper over time and facilitating the creation of new goods, ser­
vices and modes of operation. It affects economic growth both as a component of 
aggregate output in the form of ICT production and as a component of aggregate 
input in the form of ICT capital services. Furthermore, it has an impact on growth 
via the effect of multi-factor productivity gains induced by rapid technological ad­
vances in the ICT producing industries. ICT accounted for nearly two thirds (ICT 
capital deepening one sixth plus ICT related contribution to MFP one half) of the 
observed labour productivity growth. The rest is attributed to multi-factor pro­
ductivity growth in non-ICT production. It is shown how properly quality adjust­
ing capital and labour inputs and, above all, using hedonic indexes for ICT prod­
ucts gives a clearer picture of the true sources of growth.
The roles of two macroinventions, electricity and ICT, as engines of growth 
in Finland’s economic transformation from a backward agricultural nation to a 
prominent high-tech producer are explored in chapter 7, which was co-authored 
with Matti Pohjola. Finland was one of the leading countries in the electrification 
of mechanical drive in industry in the early 20th century. Today the country is 
generally regarded as one of the foremost information societies. The age of steam 
power was in Finland historically compressed by the rapid process of the electri­
fication of manufacturing. The transition to the new power regime happened at 
the same time as productive resources shifted from agriculture to manufacturing. 
One of the factors which contributed to the rapid adoption of electricity in a 
technologically backward country must have been the fact that there was not 
much existing manufacturing capacity based on old technology.
Economic theory explains how economic growth is driven by advances in 
technology, that is, in ideas about how to combine inputs to produce outputs. 
The empirical literature applying the growth accounting approach usually sees 
the productivity effects of a new technology as coming in three stages. Firstly, 
there are significant improvements in multi-factor productivity in the industries 
producing the new technology due to rapid advances in technological knowl­
edge. Secondly, the industries using the new technology experience positive la­
bour productivity impacts as they increase their capital intensity by investing in 
new capital goods. Thirdly, the industries using the new technology experience a 
boost in multi-factor productivity growth as they introduce new modes of opera­
tion and continually improve the technology by incremental product and process 
innovations. Such spillovers may result from the re-organization of production 
that the new GPT makes possible.
It is shown that ICT’s contribution to GDP growth in 1980-2004 was almost 
twice as large as electricity’s contribution in 1920-1938. The improvement of 
multi-factor productivity in production accounted for 90 per cent of ICT’s con­
tribution but only one third of electricity’s. The contributions of both electricity 
and ICT have been somewhat smaller in Finland than in the United States. For 
electricity, the main source of the difference is the multi-factor productivity 
spillovers associated with the use of electricity. They were much larger in the
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United States than in Finland. Regarding ICT, capital deepening has been impor­
tant for the United States, improvement of productivity in ICT manufacturing 
for Finland. No evidence is found for spillovers arising from ICT use.
Chapter 8 offers concluding remarks on how successful this thesis was in an­
swering the research questions and what this works’ contribution to our under­
standing of the Finnish economic historical development is.
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Production, primary, secondary, and 
tertiary: Finnish growth and structural 
change, 1860-2004
Jukka Jalava
2
Abstract: In this chapter Finnish economic growth and the evolvement of the 
structure of the economy is observed. In 1860 primary production still domi­
nated, while by year 2004 the share of services was the greatest. Characteristic 
to the Finnish long run economic transformation was that industrialization 
started late and that services increased directly at the expense of primary pro­
duction. Industries’ internal productivity growth was more important than 
structural change although growth and productivity in secondary production 
was consistently highest. Our analysis confirms the idea of economic growth tak­
ing place in stages. Yet, the role of secondary production as the single engine of 
growth remains uncorroborated.
2 .1 Introduction
In the 1800s Finland was a backward agrarian country where as late as 1867-8 a sig­
nificant part of the population suffered death by starvation when the crops failed. 
Finland embarked on the road of industrialization utilizing her forest sector, her 
hydropower potential and the rural labour reserve. The role of electrification as an 
enabler of productivity boosting technical innovations was critical. Characteristic to 
the Finnish long run economic transformation was that industrialization started late 
and that services increased directly at the expense of primary production. The share 
of secondary production in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) did not decrease until 
the 1970s. The classical view of structural change is that the main contributor to 
economic growth first shifts from primary production to secondary production dur­
ing the process of industrialization, and subsequently from secondary production to 
tertiary production as the post-industrial stage is entered. W hat happens to growth
111 This chapter first appeared as: Jukka Jalava (2006b): "Production, Primary, Secondary, and 
Tertiary: Finnish Growth and Structural Change, 1860-2004", Pellervo Economic Research Insti­
tute, Working Papers No. 80, January.
112 I wish to thank Janne Huovari, Arto Kokkinen and Petri Rouvinen for helpful comments and 
discussions without implicating them for any remaining errors. My research is partly supported 
by the EU KLEMS project "Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Ap­
proach", funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the o 
Framework Programme, Priority 8, "Policy Support and Anticipating Scientific and Technolog­
ical Needs” (www.euklems.net).
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when the gains from industrialization are depleted or the labour-saving nature of 
secondary production’s productivity growth shifts the focus of the economy to ser­
vices? Is it so as Baumol’s (1967) hypothesis of unbalanced growth predicts that 
productivity growth in the whole economy will slow down when resources shift to 
service industries? Fortunately Oulton (2001) showed that that is only the case for 
those service industries which produce final goods, and not for the industries pro­
ducing intermediate goods. What about Griliches’ (1992) concern that when the 
difficult to measure industries’ share of the economy grow, an inevitable slowdown 
in aggregate productivity is the result? The resolution of the quantification puzzle 
lies in better measurement, something which both the academic community and 
statistical institutes have focused on recently.
The Finnish share of services in GDP was only two thirds and the respective 
US ratio close to three quarters in 2001 (OECD, 2003). Therefore, in an histori­
cal perspective, the challenges facing Finland in the 21st century are similar to 
those facing her when embracing the fruits of the second industrial revolution. It 
is inevitable that structural change will continue, and the role of service indus­
tries, particularly those using the fruits of the third industrial revolution, is para­
mount as our economy becomes increasingly weightless (Quah, 2001).
In this paper the evolvement of the present industrial structure will be observed 
and the impact of structural change on growth and productivity quantified. Special 
attention will be given to the hypothesis that manufacturing is the engine of total 
economy growth and that it exhibits increasing returns to scale; the Kaldor- 
Verdoorn growth laws. In the next section the growth of GDP per capita and its 
components are delineated from 1860 to 2004. Section three looks at the three 
main sectors and their development. The penultimate section tests whether 
Kaldor-Verdoom laws stand the test of Finnish data and the final section concludes.
2.2 GDP per capita
A nation’s economic standard of living is usually measured with Gross Domestic 
Product per capita. GDP is a flow measure that denotes the value of the goods 
and services produced during one year. GDP includes in its production boundary 
goods and services that have markets (or which could have markets) and prod­
ucts which are produced by general government and non-profit institutions. 
GDP is the best known and most widely used final product of national accounts. 
The system of national accounts, the current incarnation of which is SNA93, 
comprehensively connects flow accounts that capture various economic transac­
tions taking place during the accounting period. Such activities as production, 
generation of income, and the distribution or use of income are all accounted for. 
These flows are linked with the balance sheets (stocks) of assets and liabilities. 
The flow accounts are also linked with each other so that the balancing item of 
each account, which is defined as the difference between total uses and re­
sources, is carried forward to the following account. In that way each institu­
tional sector’s transactions are enumerated beginning with production and going 
all the way to the sector’s financial status. That is, whether the sector is a net 
lender or net borrower with regards to other sectors.
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Unfortunately national accounts do not measure the positive factors of the 
quality of life such as expected life length, health and clean environment. Na­
tional accounts do not either measure the drawbacks on nature and human 
well-being due to negative externalities from production such as the pollution of 
the environment caused by spills or leaks from production plants. Furthermore, 
the production of "bads" like tobacco and pesticides is recorded as increases in 
output. An additional drawback with national accounts is that it is not designed 
to quantify income and wealth inequalities between social and economic classes.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned caveats GDP per person is the most 
valuable tool for measuring the economic well-being of a nation.113 For an 
inter-temporal comparison of how a nation’s living standards have evolved over 
time the impact of inflation needs to be subtracted. I.e., the GDP’s per person in 
consecutive years must be expressed in the prices of some base year. The stan­
dard of living can be expressed as a product of its two components: labour pro­
ductivity and labour input per capita. Labour productivity (GDP per labour in­
put) is the more important one as it can grow without bounds. For the amount 
of work that can be done per person there is an upper limit. Therefore economic 
growth can in a long run perspective only be sustained by labour productivity 
change. Equation 2.1 shows GDP per person and its components:
GDP GDP labour input . ,----------------■ =------------------ x ---------- -— - — . (2 .1)population labour input population
Labour input can be quantified either by using number of persons employed or 
by hours actually worked. The latter one is preferable as changes in the hours 
worked by employees due to longer vacations or shifts to atypical employment 
patterns otherwise distort the results. Hence the basic unit for labour productiv­
ity (LP) is GDP per hour worked. GDP per person is the higher the higher LP is, 
the larger the employment share of population is and the more each employee 
works. Economies can settle for a lower living standard by choosing to work less. 
This choice depends on how much society values leisure versus material well-be­
ing. A point in case can be discerned from the numbers compiled by the 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre.114 Their purchasing power cor­
rected GDP per capita figures for 2004 reveal that the United States had one of 
the highest living standards in the world. A result that is hardly surprising. Yet, 
countries such as Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway all si­
multaneously exhibited a higher level of LP and a lower level of GDP per capita 
than the US. Looking at equation 2.1 it is easy to figure out that these countries 
worked less per average person than what was done in the US.
Figure 2.1 shows the levels of Finnish GDP per capita and its components for 
the years 1860-2004. GDP at market prices is expressed in the constant prices of 
year 2000. The variables are in natural logarithms so that the logarithm of the
113 Development economists, such as Easterly (2001), have found strong positive correlations be­
tween the positive factors of the quality of life and GDP per capita.
114 See www.ggdc.net, Total Economy Database, January 2005.
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12.0
Figure 2.1 GDP per capita and its components in Finland, 1860-2004 (LN, GDP at year 2000 prices)
Source: Own calculations; data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
material living standard is the sum of the logarithms of labour productivity and 
labour input per person:
\n(GDP / population) -  In (G D P / labour input) + \n(labour input / population). (2.2)
Two lessons can be learned from figure 2.1. First, it is obvious that the main con­
tribution to the standard of living came from labour input. In 2004 each Finn 
worked on average 778 hours per year and GDP per hour worked was 35.3 euro. 
This means that GDP per capita was 27,400 euro. Second, the graph shows that 
the increase in material well-being stemmed from LP growth. In 1860 each Finn 
worked approximately 794 hours while LP was only 1.5 euro per hour. This 
amounted to 1,225 euro in the prices of year 2000. The standard of living grew 
22-fold in less than a century and a half, even though fewer hours were worked 
in 2004 per capita compared to 1860. The explanation to this is that labour pro­
ductivity increased 23-fold.
The labour input increased to approximately 1,000 hours per person in the 
1940s. This level was kept until the late 1960s when the hours worked started to 
decline. The recession of the early 1990s brought the hours down to 700 per 
person from which level they rebounded to somewhat less than 800 hours. Inter­
estingly, Finns are presently working less than ever before during their 
independence.
Figure 2.2 shows the growth rates of figure 2.1’s three level variables in the 
years 1861-2004. The annual observations often fluctuate quite much from year
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GDP per capita
Figure 2.2 Growth rates of the Finnish living standard, labour productivity and labour input, 
1861-2004, LN%
Source: Own calculations; data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
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to year. Hence, a line from which short-term variations have been smoothed11̂ 
out was added to the graphs. This simplifies the visual interpretation of the aver­
age growth rates. The top part of figure 2.2 depicts GDP per capita growth. The 
standard of living gradually increased its growth rate from the 1920s -  with the 
exception of wartimes -  until peaking in the 1960s at 4 per cent. This growth 
stemmed in the early years from both LP and hours worked. During the latest 
decades growth relied solely on LP. This changed once again after the recession 
of the early 1990s, when also labour input contributed to GDP per capita 
growth. The most recent average observations of GDP per capita change have 
shifted into slower gear -  around 3 per cent per annum -  due to a decline in LP 
growth. The decline in hours worked that began in the late 1960s stands out as 
negative growth in the lowest part of the graph. It did not turn positive until the 
1990s. Also LP growth halved from the 1960s peak 4-5 per cent growth to 
somewhat more than 2 per cent per annum recently.
It is easy to show that the slowdown in LP growth -  and not a decrease in la­
bour input -  poses a threat to the future growth of the Finnish standard of living. 
From equation 2.1 and figure 2.1 it can be seen that an increase in labour input 
has a level effect on GDP per capita. Productivity growth on the other hand acts 
through the interest on interest principle. Even a slight change in growth rates 
has significant long term implications.
2.3 Structural change
Economic activity takes place in three major sectors. What is the difference be­
tween primary, secondary and tertiary production? Fisher (1939) called primary 
production something which is "...concerned with satisfying the basic primary 
needs, in the absence of which any kind of activity would be impossible". Clark 
(1957)Ufa defined primary production as depending on first-hand and instant use 
of natural resources. A distinguishing feature of primary production is that it can 
be carried out only where the natural resources are situated, and it can also be de­
pendent on climatic and seasonal constraints. On that note one could also include 
mining and quarrying, as Kaldor (1967) did, because it is an extractive activity. In 
this paper, however, mining and quarrying is incorporated in secondary produc­
tion since it requires considerable investments into fixed capital and is as an eco­
nomic activity more similar to manufacturing than to agriculture or forestry, a 
point which Kuznets (1966) agreed with. Table 2.1 contains the used taxonomy.
Secondary production is not straightforwardly the refinement of primary 
products. Clark (1957) included into secondary production such large scale, cap­
ital intensive and continuous production that produces transportable goods. 
Fisher (1939) thought that secondary production contained such manufacturing 
activities that catered for the standardized demand for less than essential things. 
So by default tertiary production was according to him the production and distri­
bution of new things which come about as a result of improving technology, i.e.,
115 The Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter was used with the smoothing parameter 1=100.
116 The first edition appeared in 1940. The 1957 version was a third largely rewritten edition.
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T a b le  2.1 Taxonom y of prim ary, seco n d a ry  an d  tertiary  p roduction  by branch  o f eco n o m ic a ctiv ity
Primary production A Agriculture, hunting and forestry
B Fishing
Secondary production C Mining and quarrying
D Manufacturing
E Electricity, gas and water supply
F Construction
Tertiary production G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles etc.
H Hotels and restaurants
1 Transport, storage and communications
J Financial intermediation
K Real estate, renting and business activities
L Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
M Education
N Health and social work
0 Other community, social and personal service activities
P Activities of private households as employers etc.
Source: Adaptation of the UN International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic
Activities, Revision 3.1 (ISIC Rev. 3 .1).
items which could be called luxury goods and services. Kuznets ( 1966) wanted 
to include transport and communications into secondary production. Kaldor 
(1967) thought that secondary production encompassed industry, construction 
and public utilities. Hartwell (1973) defined the tertiary sector as the residual af­
ter subtracting agriculture, industry and construction. In this paper it was de­
cided to classify transport and communications and public utilities in tertiary 
production or services as the SNA93 calls it. The justification for this decision is 
in SNA93’s paragraph 6.8:
"Services are not separate entities over which ownership rights can be estab­
lished. They cannot be traded separately from their production. Services are het­
erogeneous outputs produced to order and typically consist of changes in the 
conditions of the consuming units realized by the activities of producers at the 
demand of the consumers. By the time their production is completed they must 
have been provided to the consumers."
As early as in the 17th century Sir William Petty (1676) wrote:
"There is much more to be gained by Manufacture than Husbandry, and by 
Merchandize than Manufacture...Now here we may take notice, that as 
Trades and curious Arts increase; so the Trade of Husbandry will decrease, or 
else the Wages of Husband men must rise, and consequently the Rents of 
Lands must fall."
Petty realized that shifting resources away from less productive sectors into more 
productive ones is not only beneficial but actually a prerequisite for increased 
growth. Clark (1957) was along the same lines as he described how primary pro­
duction, which is dependent on local natural resources and climate, usually faces 
diminishing returns and that as economies become more advanced the share of 
the labour force employed in primary production shifts relative to secondary 
production, which in turn declines relative to tertiary production. How then is a
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nation able to avoid the Malthusian Trap117 in the first place? Many authors 
agree that the first industrial revolution was THE watershed in human economic 
history after which we were freed from the Malthusian Trap (Hansen and 
Prescott, 2002; Komlos, 2003; Mokyr, 2005; and Clark, 2005). However, as 
Mokyr (2005) points out, societies with sound institutions and active trading en­
joyed growth even prior to the industrial revolution. The point is that after the 
industrial revolution the importance of technology118 to growth became para­
mount. Hansen and Prescott (2002) described this as a shift from a pre-industrial 
land-intensive Malthusian technology, with decreasing returns to labour, to a 
modern era Solowian constant returns to scale technology, with both capital and 
labour as inputs. This shift is of relatively recent origin as modern economic 
growth as we know it today has actually existed only for the last two centuries.
Kuznets (1966) stressed four arguments which cause a declining share of pri­
mary production in total output. Firstly, as incomes per capita grow there might 
be a proportionately larger demand for non-agricultural products. Secondly, as 
an increasing agricultural output volume goes hand in hand with increased popu­
lation and incomes (as it must in a non-Malthusian economy) the widening do­
mestic markets provide more opportunities for non-agricultural import compet­
ing industries. Thirdly, Kuznets noted declining primary production shares in de­
veloped countries especially after they began trading with less developed coun­
tries and fourthly, he observed that technological change was an important fac­
tor; he actually stated that the rapider the technical change the faster the change 
in sectoral shares. In secondary production the fruits of technological change are 
most readily harnessed for productive use, so although its relative share first in­
creases at the expense of primary production the rapid productivity increases po­
tentially makes its labour share decrease in favour of the tertiary sector. This 
classic view is not unchallenged as e.g. Broadberry (1998) argued that Germany 
and the United States surpassed Britain’s level of aggregate labour productivity 
by shifting resources out of agriculture and improving the productivity of 
services rather than manufacturing.
W hat about Finland? Characteristic to the Finnish long run economic trans­
formation was that industrialization started late and that services increased di­
rectly at the expense of primary production, since the share of secondary pro­
duction in GDP did not decrease until the 1970s (figure 2.3). Finland embarked 
on the road of industrialization utilizing her forest sector, her hydropower po­
tential and the rural labour reserve. The role of electrification as an enabler of 
productivity boosting technical innovations was critical. In the 1860s only a frac­
tion of the Finnish populace was employed in industry or industrial handicrafts. 
Fifty years later a tenth of the workforce was employed in industry, with a share 
in total output of one fifth by 1913. At the eve of WWII industry’s share in GDP 
amounted to nearly one in four.
117 If the size of the population grows, i.e. births outnumber deaths, the material living standard 
declines in a pre-industrial society due to diminishing returns to land (Clark, 2005).
118 Technology is here widely interpreted to include all knowledge and ideas of how to produce 
goods and services.
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Figure 2.3 Shares of primary production, secondary production and tertiary production in Finnish 
GDP, 1860-2004, %
Source: Own calculations: data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
In 1860 four out of five persons were employed in primary production. As 
productivity was low they managed to generate only 60 per cent of value added. 
Less than 15 per cent were working in secondary production and their value 
added shares and employment ratios were approximately on par. The labour 
share of services was low: just 7 per cent. Yet their share of GDP was one in five. 
This high productivity was to a significant extent explained by the large share of 
ownership of dwellings in services: two fifths of services’ value added with no la­
bour input in 1860 (Hjerppe, 1996).119
Tertiary production’s labour share caught up with that of secondary produc­
tion during and after the civil war of 1918, during the turbulent early 1930s and 
during the Second World War. Employment in industry and construction re­
bounded each time (Hjerppe, 1996). From 1955 onwards services permanently 
employed more persons than secondary production and three years later even 
more than primary production. The share of secondary production in GDP 
peaked both in 1951 and 1974 at more than 40 per cent. By the beginning of the 
21st century industry and construction's share of GDP was 30 per cent and pri­
mary production’s only three per cent. The rest originated from services. The 
Finnish economy had in Q uah’s (2001) terminology become increasingly weight­
less. Since the US share of services in GDP was close to three quarters in 2001 
(OECD, 2003) it does not take a crystal ball to predict that the Finnish economy 
will become even more weightless in the future. Increased globalization has al­
ready shifted secondary production to countries with lower unit labour costs and 
close proximity to developing markets.
119 These extraordinary figures do raise a question of the correctness of the deflators of services; a 
topic which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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During the whole 1860-2004 period GDP grew on average by almost 3 per 
cent, the value added of primary production by one per cent, secondary produc­
tion by 4 per cent and services by three (table 2.2). Growth was especially rapid 
in the 1920s and 1930s and in the post-WWII pre-oil crisis era. As a result of this 
consistent growth Finland’s GDP per capita converged to 77 per cent of its US 
equivalent in 2004.120
Value added growth can be decomposed into the contributions of a change in 
labour input and a change in labour productivity. More formally:
Aln(GDP) = A\n(labour input) + A ln(G D P/  labour input) , (2.3)
where A refers to a first difference. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 contain average yearly 
growth rates of labour input and LP. Tables 2.2—4 can be interpreted in the fol­
lowing way: of the average yearly 2.9 per cent GDP growth in services in 
1861-1949 2.7 percentage points stemmed from increases in labour input and 
0.2 percentage points from LP change. O f the overall average GDP growth of
Table 2.2 Growth rates of value added at 2000 prices, LN%
; 1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004
Primary production 1.1 0.6 0.9
Secondary production 4.0 4.0 4.0
Tertiary production 2.9 3.9 3.3
Total 2.6 3.5 2.9
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland. 
Table 2.3 Growth rates of labour input, LN%
: 1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004
Primary production 0.4 -3.2 -1.0
Secondary production 2.1 -0.1 1.3
Tertiary production 2.7 1.7 2.3
Total 1.2 0.1 0.7
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
Table 2.4 Growth rates of labour productivity, LN%
1 8 6 1 -1 9 4 9 1 9 5 0 -2 0 0 4 1 8 6 1 -2 0 0 4  I
Primary production 0.6 3.8 1.9
Secondary production 1.9 4.0 2.7
Tertiary production 0.2 2.2 1.0
Total 1.4 3.4 2.2
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
120 See Groningen Growth and Development Centre and The Conference Board, Total Economy 
Database, August 2005, http://www.ggdc.net.
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2.9 per cent in 1861-2004 only 0.7 percentage points were the result of in­
creased labour input and 2.2 percentage points came from LP improvement.
The growth of labour input in primary production was consistently slower than 
in the other sectors in 1861-1949. Growth turned negative after WWII. The de­
cline accelerated from period to period until it was more than 5 per cent in 
1995-2004. Labour input in secondary production grew faster than the national 
average in the first observation period. In the latter period it was close to zero. The 
labour input in services increased at a pace above average in every period. LP 
growth was faster than average every period in industry and construction. LP 
change in agriculture and forestry was more than average in 1950-2004 thanks to 
extensive labour shedding -  and not due to rapid growth of value added.
A shift-share analysis was performed in order to find out what the impact of 
structural change, that is of labour shifting to industries with either a higher level 
of or higher growth rate of LP was on labour productivity growth (see Syrquin, 
1984). The relative change in labour productivity can be expressed as:
LP .-LP ,  ,
LPt-x
¿ ( L P , , , -LP„_X )Si;t_, + ¿ ( S u )LPiit_x + ¿ ( S u - S 4M )(LP,, -L P it_x )
L P . i (2.4)
where LP is the level of labour productivity, S, is sector is share of all hours worked 
(the sectors used are primary production, secondary production and tertiary produc­
tion) and t is time. The first term on the right side of the equation is the industries’ 
internal (within) productivity effect, i.e., sub-industries impact on aggregate produc­
tivity change. The second term on the right is the static shift effect of labour, that is, 
the contribution of a shift of labour to industries with a higher level of LP. The third 
term on the right captures the dynamic shift effect of labour, i.e., the contribution 
of labour shifting to industries with a higher than average LP growth rate.
It can be seen from table 2.5 that one half to eight tenths of LP growth ema­
nated from internal productivity increase. The rest was due to structural change. 
The effect of structural change was largest in the 1800s when labour shifted from 
primary production to industry and construction. In the years between the two 
world wars Finnish manufacturing was fully electrified (Jalava, 2004a). The impact 
of static shift diminished when there was a step-up in LP growth across all sectors in 
the post-WWIl period (table 2.4). The dynamic shift has slowed productivity
Table 2.5 The impact of structural change on labour productivity growth, %
mam 1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 I
Within 4 8 .3% 8 1 .6% 6 9.2%
Static 5 5 .1% 18.2% 3 1.9%
Dynamic - 3 .4 % 0 .1 % - 1 .2 %
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
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growth in the first observation period whereas it was negligible in the latter period. 
All in all the dynamic effect's impact has been minor. Table 2.5 shows us that inter­
nal productivity growth is more important than structural change and that produc­
tivity change was more concentrated than ever before in the latest period.
2.4 Phases of growth
Hartwell (1973) defined successive stages of economic development according 
to the share employed in services. First, agricultural countries with a small indus­
trial sector exhibit slow growth rates of services. Second, industrialising nations 
display declining agricultural employment and industry and services that grow at 
similar rates. The third stage is industrial nations with minimum agricultural and 
maximum industrial employment. The final stage is a service economy where 
services grow at the expense of secondary production. Hartwell (1973) found 
phase one to have ended in Western Europe between 1800 and 1850. Stage two 
took place between 1840 and 1910, and stage three between 1920 and 1970. 
Writing in the early 1970s he concluded that stage four was just beginning. 
Hjerppe (1990) defined stage one to have lasted in Finland until the mid-1880s. 
She found stage two to have continued until the 1950s. A similar development 
as portrayed by Hartwell’s stage three was not found by Hjerppe (1990) for Fin­
land at all. She concluded that the employment share of primary production was 
still high in the 1950s and that it subsequently diminished directly in favour of 
services. At the time of writing Hjerppe (1990) found the employment share in 
secondary production to have decreased only mildly. It is easy to concur with 
Hjerppe that Hartwell’s stage three as such did not take place in Finland. Indus­
try’s employment did not peak simultaneously with a trough in primary produc­
tion employment. The employment of secondary production is presently in a 
post-peak declining phase whereas employment in agriculture and forestry has 
failed to reach a bottom as yet.
W hat is the role of the three sectors in overall growth? Kaldor (1967) stressed 
that a precondition for the growths of the secondary and tertiary sectors is that pri­
mary production produce a surplus over the bare subsistence minimum. As a nation 
passes from economic immaturity to maturity, by which Kaldor (1978) meant a 
state where real incomes per head in each sector are comparatively similar, the role 
of secondary production is crucial due to increasing returns to scale. Kaldor (1967, 
1978) suggested that aggregate economic growth is related to growth in manufac­
turing, that manufacturing productivity growth is related to manufacturing output 
growth and that manufacturing productivity increases the productivity of the other 
sectors. These observations are often called Kaldor’s growth laws121 (e.g. Stoneman, 
1979; Bairam, 1990; Mamgain, 1999; Wells and Thirlwall, 2003).
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions were carried out to cast some light 
on the applicability of Kaldor’s laws’ on Finnish historical economic develop­
ment. As a proxy for the first proposition GDP growth was explained with sec-
121 Not to be confused with Kaldor's stylized facts.
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ondary production’s real value added growth (and as checks also with value
added of primary production and services).122
A T GDP =  a l  +  P i  +  £ 1 < [ 2 . 5 )
Â GDP = a 2 + P 2 ^ ^ P R /M  +  £ 2 > [2-6)
A ^ C D P  = a 3  +  P 3 A ^ T E R T  +  £ 3  > ( 2 - 2 )
D P  =  a 4  + P 4 ^ ^ S £ C  + P 5 ^ ^ P R / M  + ^S^^TERT +  £ 4  / ( 2 - 8 )
where A YCDP is volume growth of GDP and A , AYPR1M, and A YTERT are respec­
tively secondary production, primary production and tertiary production real 
value added change. The error term is e. The error term is often called the resid­
ual as it captures all that is left unexplained. The index for time t has been sup­
pressed for the economy of notation. The results are shown in table 2.6 and table
2.7 (the numbers in brackets are the t-statistics).123
Looking at table 2.6 it does seem that our basic regressions, where GDP 
growth is explained with secondary production value added (equation 2.5), are 
highly significant. All of the explanatory variables are significant at the 0.1 per 
cent level. This means that the likelihood that the beta coefficients equal zero is
Table 2.6 Regression results for equations 2.S and 2.6
1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 I
N 89 55 144 89 55 144
equation 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6
constant 0.012**
(2.84)
0.010**
(3.31)
0.015***
(6.71)
0.021***
(4.55)
0.035***
(7.33)
0.026***
(7.36)
Pi (AYsec) 0.306***
(5.27)
0.671***
(14.26)
0.345*’ *
(6.71)
P2 (A Yprim) 0.296*
(2.15)
0.223***
(3.77)
0.272**
(2.67)
Adj. R2 0.391 0.863 0.434 0.198 0.165 0.184
D.W. 2.35 1.76 2.12 1.99 1.00 1.72
F 27.79*** 203.48*** 45.00*** 4.62* 14.24*** 7.12**
*** =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 0.1 %  level.
** =  s ig n if ica n t  at the  1 %  level.
* =  s ig n if ica n t  a t  the 5 %  level.
+  =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 1 0 %  level.
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
122 See Appendix for graphs of all variables and their unit root tests.
123 The t-statistics and F-statistics have been obtained using the Newey-West (1987) regression 
procedure in the software Intercooled Stata 8.2 for Windows. The idea is that the error struc­
ture is expected to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to some predetermined lag. We 
chose the lag length to be Nl/3, this means 4 for each of the both sub-periods and 5 for the 
whole period.
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very low. The highest adjusted124 R2, our measure for goodness-of-fit, is for the 
post-WWII period at 0.86 and the beta coefficient more than doubles to 0.67. 
The implication is that 86% of GDP growth is accounted for by equation 2.5 in 
1950-2004 and that it according to the model takes on average 1.5 units 
(=1/0.671) of industry and construction growth per unit of GDP increase. The 
significance of agriculture is also very high in the latter period although the ex­
planatory power of equation 2.6 is rather low. The R2:s fail to rise above 0.2 and 
the beta coefficients vary between 0.2-0.3. Agriculture does explain GDP 
slightly better in the first period, 1861-1949, than in the latter which corre­
sponds with intuition. Interestingly equation 2.7 is very significant with good lin­
ear fits (table 2.7). Especially in 1950-2004 the R2:s are close to 0.9 and the beta 
coefficient is very near unity. Kaldor (1978) also found similar results for twelve 
industrial countries in 1953-1964 and interpreted them the other way round; 
i.e. as the rate of GDP growth determining growth in services. We would not go 
as far as to claim anything definitive about causation based on these regressions. 
It is, however, interesting to observe that GDP and services have over the past 
half-century grown hand-in-hand. As all of the explanatory variables in equa­
tions 2.5-7 are significant they are combined in equation 2.8 to explain GDP 
growth with primary, secondary and tertiary production value added. The results 
reinforce those of equations 2.5-7 except for agriculture in 1950-2004; the drop 
in the beta coefficient to 0.07 from 0.34 is quite dramatic. Furthermore, the 
F-tests reject for all periods for equations 2.5-8 the likelihood that the linear re­
lationship is nonexistent. The weakest rejection is for agriculture in the earlier
Table 2.7 Regression results for equations 2.7 and 2.8
1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 I
N 89 55 144 89 55 144
equation 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8
constant 0.008+
(1.76)
-0.001
(-0 .46)
0.009+
(1.97)
- 0 .0 0 2 +
(-1 .8 7 )
0.001
(0.99)
0.000
(0.39)
Pa(A YSec) 0.116***
(5.87)
0.305***
(14.56)
0.155***
(7.94)
Ps (w prim) 0.341***
(8.21)
0.071***
(5.03)
0.253***
(6.67)
Pb or Pe
(AYtert)
0.555***
(4.91)
0.963***
(16.19)
0.615***
(5.17)
0.621***
(35.78)
0.595***
(20.93)
0.607***
(34.23)
Adj. R2 0.509 0.875 0.563 0.963 0.992 0.931
D.W. 1.77 1.84 1.75 1.62 1.87 1.74
F 24.13*** 262.12*** 26.72*** 555.93*** 6061.23*** 569.16***
*** =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 0 .1 %  level.
** =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 1 %  level.
* =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 5 %  level.
+  =  s ig n if ica n t  at the  1 0 %  level.
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
124 Adjusted means that it is corrected for the degrees of freedom lost when estimating the regres­
sion parameters.
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period. Kaldor’s first law holds in the Finnish case for industry and construction. 
Especially the latter period shows strong correlations. The regressions for pri­
mary production and services also pass the statistical tests.
Kaldor’s second law is about increasing returns to scale in manufacturing. In 
testing Kaldor’s second proposition (which is also known as Verdoorn’s law), we 
used industry and construction LP growth which was explained by its value 
added growth (and as checks similar regressions were performed also for primary 
production and services). It is clear from figure 2.1 that most of long-run eco­
nomic growth comes from LP growth. So there would be little point in applying 
regressions 2.9-11 at the level of the total economy.
^LPSec :-  a 5 + P7ATS£C + e5 , (2.9)
ALPpMM = a 6 + Ps^^PR/M + £6 ’ (2.10)
A LPTeet = a 7 + p9 AY^-j. + s7 , (2.11)
where ALPsec, ALPprim and ALPTERT are respectively secondary, primary and ter­
tiary production labour productivity growth. The results for equations 2.9 and 
2.10 are in table 2.8 and the results for equation 2.11 are in table 2.9.
Observing tables 2.8 and 2.9 it would seem that there is statistical support for 
secondary production, for tertiary production in 1950-2004 and surprisingly for 
agriculture and forestry the whole period; both for the equations as a whole ac­
cording to the F-tests and for the explanatory variables individually according to 
the t-tests.
Table 2.8 Regression results for equations 2.9 and 2.10
1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 I
N 89 55 144 89 55 144
equation 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.10 2.10 2.10
constant 0.003 0.029*** 0.011* -0 .0 0 2 0.033*** 0.011**
(0.47) (4.94) (2.16) (-0 .8 6 ) (6.64) (2.60)
P t (A V W ) 0.416*** 0.283*** 0.401***
(6.24) (3.38) (5.73)
P 8 (A Yprim) 0.821*** 0.876*** 0.829***
(24.80) (11.07) (21.68)
Adj. R2 0.490 0.302 0.448 0.875 0.726 0.753
D.W. 2.00 1.43 1.74 1.55 1.50 1.05
F 38.92*** 11.43** 32.79*** 615.17*** 122.52*** 470.05***
*** =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 0 .1 %  level.
** =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 1 %  level.
* =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 5 %  level.
+  =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 1 0 %  level.
So u rce : O w n calculations, data fro m  Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
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As a specification for Kaldor’s third proposition aggregate LP growth was ex­
plained by secondary production’s value added growth and the non-secondary 
sectors’ labour input growth.
ALPCdp = c t8 + ß 10AYS£C + ß nAEprim&tert + e 8 , (2.12)
where ALPcdp is total economy LP change and &PPRIM&:[mr is change in non-sec­
ondary production labour input. The results are in table 2.9. In the latter period 
the R2:s climb to 0.71. Aggregate LP growth is explained by industry and ser­
vices’ value added growth; beta coefficient 0.43 and by the decrease in non-sec­
ondary production value added, beta coefficient -0.43 (both are significant at 
the 0.1% level). This means that our results suggest that a one unit increase in 
secondary production’s value added increased aggregate LP by 0.43 units and a 
one unit increase in non-secondary production’s labour input decreased aggre­
gate productivity by 0.43 units. We must keep in mind that 29 per cent of pro­
ductivity growth was left unexplained and that the scope of general government 
increased in the same period.125 This latter relation was in 1861-1949 only -0.14 
(although statistically insignificant). Kaldor’s third law does seem to hold for Fin­
land in 1950-2004. The unfortunate implicit implication of equation 2.12 is that 
it supports Baumol’s unbalanced growth hypothesis given the facts that the beta 
coefficient is much larger in the second period and the only sector that has in­
creased its labour input after the oil crisis is services. Taking a second look at fig-
Table 2.9 Regression results for equations 2.11 and 2.12
1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004
N 89 55 144 89 55 144
equation 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.12 2.12 2.12
constant 0.000
(-0 .0 1 )
0 .0 07 +
(1.67)
0.005
(0.65)
0.006
(1.25)
0 019*** 
(9.10)
0 014*** 
(4.02)
ß io  (A ^src) 0.199***
(3.58)
0.428***
(11.20)
0.226***
(4.21)
ß 9 (A  Y tcrt) 0.072
(0.36)
0.377***
(4.53)
0.131
(0.66)
P i i
(A  EpRiMSTERr)
-0 .1 3 8
(-0 .4 9 )
-0.429***
(-4 .0 7 )
-0 .2 6 1
(-1 .1 4 )
Adj. R2 0.002 0.461 0.036 0.236 0.708 0.260
D.W. 1.60 1.28 1.48 2.10 1.75 1.78
F 0.13 20.48*** 0.44 6.86** 76.83*** 10.08***
*** =  s ig n ifica n t at the  0 .1 %  level.
** =  s ig n ifica n t at the  1 %  level.
* =  s ig n ifica n t at the  5 %  level.
+  =  s ig n ifica n t at the  1 0 %  level.
Source: Ow n calculations, d a ta  fro m  Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
125 As modem national accounts computes the output of general government using the sum of 
costs principle the implication is that the calculated productivity increase is virtually zero (with 
the exception of an increase in labour quality).
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ure 2.2’s middle panel we see that LP growth has nearly halved from what it was 
in the 1960s and 1970s.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we set out to describe Finnish long run economic growth and the 
role structural change played in this transformation. Finland was a late industri­
alized country that managed to transform itself from a predominantly primary 
production based economy to a modern welfare state with a large service sector. 
In raising the level of Finnish GDP per capita to three quarters of the US level 
the role of labour productivity was cardinal. Secondary production was the lead­
ing sector in LP change due to rapid technical progress. Until the first oil crisis 
the labour input in secondary production grew faster than the national average, 
whereas the labour input in services increased at a pace above average in every 
period. In the late 1800s and early 1900s labour shifting out of primary produc­
tion contributed at best half of overall LP growth. Recently productivity growth 
has been more concentrated than before as the rural surplus labour has long 
since shifted to secondary production and services.
W hat did our number crunching efforts reveal of the Kaldor-Verdoorn laws 
in the Finnish case? Was it so that secondary production and its productivity was 
the engine of economic growth in Finland? Yes and no. O ur regressions support 
the role of industry and services as explaining GDP growth to a large part. How­
ever, the first law holds also for primary production and services; for primary 
production only barely in the early years. Services actually explained GDP 
growth better than secondary production. Did economic growth cause growth of 
services or vice versa? Unfortunately our regressions cannot give a definitive an­
swer to the direction of causation. Kaldor's second law, which he used to test for 
increasing returns to scale, holds for secondary production (although more so in 
the first period than in the latter), for services in 1950-2004 and surprisingly for 
agriculture and forestry for the whole observation period. The equation we used 
as a proxy for Kaldor’s third law -  explaining aggregate labour productivity 
change with secondary production value added and non-secondary production 
labour input -  did corroborate the theory for 1950-2004. Inopportunely this 
meant, given the fact that only services increased their labour input after the first 
oil crises, rending implicit support for Baumol’s theory of aggregate LP growth 
slowing down as the share of services in the economy grew.
In conclusion we can say that our numbers confirmed Hartwell’s basic idea of 
economic growth taking place in different phases. Finland’s industrialization 
changed her economic structure irrevocably. Structural change in itself was more 
an effect of rather than the cause for Finnish economic growth. It does not take a 
crystal ball to realize that the Finnish economic structure will continue evolving, 
since Finland’s share of secondary production in GDP still exceeded its US 
equivalent by approximately ten percentage points at the turn of the millen­
nium. For a developed nation change is the only thing that is constant.
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The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was used to test for a unit root in the 
time series. As the graphs contain no visible trend we felt comfortable in omit­
ting a trend-term from the tests. The null hypothesis of the ADF test is that of a 
unit root and the results are in table 2.10. To our convenience it would seem 
that the existence of a unit root is rejected for most series and most time periods. 
The null hypothesis is not rejected for services' labour productivity in 
1950-2004 and is significant only at the 10 per cent level for total economy LP 
in the same period. Overall the rejections in 1950-2004 are weaker than in 
1861-1949 or the whole period.
Table 2.10 Results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with no trend and four lags in the 
sub-periods and no trend and five lags in the whole period
1861-1949 1950-2004 1861-2004 I
AYgop
AYsrc
A YPRIM
A Y
-5.01*** -3 .2 9 * -5 .23 * * ’
-5.52*** -3 .1 3 * -6.28***
-6.27*** -3 .4 2 * -6.90***
-6.82*** -3 .47** -5.81***TERT
ALPsrc
ALP
-4 .06** -2 .9 5 * -4.17***
-6.37*** -3 .1 8 * -4.66***PRIM
ALP__ -4.31*** -2 .0 6 -4.15***TERT
ALPGDP 
A E
-4.14*** -2 .7 6 + -3 .60**
-5.51*** - 3 .4 2 * -5.55***PRIM&TERT
*** =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 0 .1 %  level.
** =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 1 %  level.
* =  s ig n if ica n t  at the 5 %  level.
+  =  s ig n if ica n t  at the  1 0 %  level.
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Finland.
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Capital and its productivity 
in Finland, 1975-200 f '
Pirkko Aulin-Ahmavaara and Jukka Jalava
Abstract: The fundamental role of capital in economic growth has been long 
known. How capital should be defined and measured has been the subject of 
much discussion. The starting point of this study is methodological as we define 
starting from a neoclassical production function the indicators for capital input 
and compare these with the traditional capital stocks of national accounts. The 
origin of Finnish capital measurement is also traced. In the empirical part of the 
paper we apply the different capital measures to Finnish data in 1975-2001. 
This period is interesting as the early 1990s was a turbulent period for Finland 
with GDP declining by 11 per cent. We find as a result of our number-crunching 
effort that there was a spectacular increase in capital productivity growth after 
the recession. Finally, we observe how our new estimates accord with the previ­
ous view on how capital has influenced recent Finnish historical economic devel­
opment. Our main result is a resolution of the Artto-Pohjola paradox, as we 
show that a high rate of return was combined with a low capital productivity 
growth in 1975-1990.
3.1 Introduction
The fundamental role of capital in economic growth has been known at least 
since the writings of the physiocrat Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot and Adam 
Smith in the 18th century. Since Karl Marx and the Cambridge controversies 
there has been constant dissension on how to define capital and what for in­
stance is meant by the quantity of capital. Separate views even exist on the ques­
tion whether heterogeneous capital can be aggregated into a single measure of 
capital at all. The practical measurement of capital is also subject to opposing 
views. Therefore the economic historian doing research on matters pertaining to 
capital should be prepared to meet criticism. However, as Hicks has it:
126 This chapter was first published as: Pirkko Aulin-Ahmavaara and Jukka Jalava (2003): "Capital and 
its productivity in Finland, 1975-2001", Scandinairian Economic History Review (50) 3, pp. 62-79.
127 We thank Sakari Heikkinen, Reino Hjerppe, Pekka Sauramo, two anonymous referees and 
seminar participants in Reykjavik for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Statistics Finland. Jukka Jalava gratefully ac­
knowledges financial support from the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation.
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"Capital (I am not the first to discover) is a very large subject, ivith many aspects; 
wherever one starts it is hard to bring more than a few of them into view. It is just 
as if one were making pictures of a building; though it is the same building it looks 
quite different from different angles. 1,128
While the recent discussion in the historical economics literature has focused on 
alternative models explaining economic growth129, i.e. exogenous or endogenous 
growth130, institutions131 and catching-up132, the problems relating to capital 
measurement are many times ignored altogether, and often K is casually written 
to denote both the value of capital and the input into production it provides, 
both of which are then assumed to decline uniformly by the same rate 5, which 
is called the depreciation rate.
In the national accounts (SNA93 and ESA95) on the other hand, there are 
two measures of capital stocks: the gross capital stock and the net capital stock. 
The traditional capital stock measures have been developed since the 1950s and 
due to their easy availability they have been widely used in productivity calcula­
tions. However, neither national accounts capital stock measure is appropriate 
for use in productivity or growth accounting computations. The gross capital 
stock does not take into account the possible decline in the capital good’s pro­
ductive capacity as it ages. The net capital stock depicts the market value of 
capital and not its productive capacity.
In growth accounting based on neoclassical theory (and the productivity re­
search associated with it), the measure of capital input to be used (instead of gross 
or net stocks) is widely accepted to be the Jorgenson and Griliches133 measure of 
capital services based on the concept of productive capital. The productive capital 
stocks of homogeneous capital goods are aggregated using their rental prices. 
Complete consensus has not been reached on the empirical side either, though 
there has been a vivid recent discussion, especially under the auspices of the 
OECD.134 The differences in opinion mainly focus on the definition and quantifi­
cation of depreciation.133 There is no consensus on what the measure of capital 
should encompass either. In productivity research produced fixed assets, land and 
inventories are often included in capital input. In addition to these, human capital 
and natural resources are needed in production. Research and development ex­
penditure can also be seen as capital formation. In some cases even the inclusion of 
financial capital into the measure of capital input has been suggested.136
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we introduce state-of-the-art 
tools of economic analysis to Finnish data and extensively discuss what kind of
128 Hicks (1973).
129 For an overview of the models, see: Crafts [1992).
130 Crafts (1995), Greasley and Oxley (1997).
131 Booth, Melling and Dartmann (1997).
13 2 Abramovitz (1986).
133 Jorgenson and Griliches (1967).
134 OECD (1993); OECD (2001a); OECD (2001b); Aulin-Ahmavaara (2003).
135 Hill and Hill (1999).
136 Keuning (1999).
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theoretical and empirical choices have to be made in quantifying capital and its 
contribution to growth and productivity in the period 1975 to 2001.13 The ori­
gin of Finnish capital measurement is also traced. We observe how the different 
capital measures perform in a turbulent period in Finnish economic history. This 
period is interesting because the Finnish economic recession in the early 1990s 
was very severe; with GDP declining by 11 per cent from 1990 to 1993 (the 
1930s recession was much less severe in comparison as GDP declined by only
3.5 per cent 1929-1931}. We define capital as produced tangible fixed assets 
such as machinery, equipment, and produced intangible fixed assets such as 
computer software, and construct in the neoclassical tradition the indicators for 
capital input and compare these with the traditional capital stocks of national ac­
counts in Finland. We show how the rental prices are used in the aggregation of 
heterogeneous productive capital stocks into a volume index of capital services 
for the whole economy, and discuss the alternative rates of return on capital. A 
sensitivity analysis on the impacts of the different capital measures on growth, 
capital productivity and multi-factor productivity (MFP) is also performed, 
which to our knowledge has not been done for Finland before. The most signifi­
cant result of our number-crunching effort is an observation of a spectacular in­
crease in capital productivity growth in the latter part of the 1990s. Secondly, 
we observe how our new estimates accord with the previous view on how capital 
has influenced recent Finnish historical economic development. Olli Haltia and 
Mikko Leppamaki coined the term Artto-Pohjola paradox, to describe the seem­
ingly conflicting observations of Matti Pohjola and Eero Artto.138 Pohjola ob­
served that in 1960-90 a high investment ratio resulted in low capital productiv­
ity growth and concluded that capital was inefficiently used in Finland. Pohjola 
acknowledged that capital fundamentalism, the view that economic growth 
would be attained by massive fixed investments, did result in growth. His point 
was that the high social cost paid by Finland due to high investment ratios could 
have been lower with a more efficient use of capital. Artto countered with his 
findings of reasonable returns on capital especially in the paper industry. We of­
fer an empirical resolution (as Haltia and Leppamaki already presented a 
theoretical one) to the Artto-Pohjola paradox by observing how capital 
productivity and the return on capital have evolved. In our results we show that 
a high rate of return was combined with a low capital productivity growth in 
1975-1990.
This paper is organized in the following way. First the stage is set by going 
through the genealogy of capital measurement in Finland until their incorpora­
tion in the national accounts. We continue by showing how capital is defined in 
the national accounts and how these definitions are related to the productive
137 The reason we start our periodization from the year 1975 is that the share of secondary production 
in GDP only peaked as late as 1974. Thus the pattern of development thus far had differed in Fin­
land from other developed countries, where usually the main contribution to economic growth first 
shifted from primary production to secondary production during the process of industrialization, 
and subsequentiy from secondary production to tertiary production as countries entered the 
post-industrial stage. Although the absolute contribution of services to GDP in Finland surpassed 
that of secondary production already in 1956, both continued by and large to increase their relative 
shares at the expense of primary production until 1974 (Hjerppe 1988).
138 Haltia and Leppamaki (2000); Pohjola (1996); Artto (1997).
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capital stocks and their rental prices. The penultimate section contains our em­
pirical results and the ultimate section concludes.
3.2 Previous research
Both in productivity analysis and growth accounting capital input is often mea­
sured by using either gross139 or net140 capital stocks (or bo th141). The stocks are 
constructed using the perpetual inventory method (PIM) pioneered by Raymond 
Goldsmith in 1951.142 Neither of these stock measures, however, depicts the pro­
ductive capacity of capital. In the GCS the capital good is assumed to retain its full 
productive capacity until retirement. The NCS is a measure of wealth; it describes 
the market value of the capital stock. The market value is of course dependent on 
the expected evolution of the productive capacity, but does not reflect the pro­
ductive capacity at a certain point in time. The value of the asset declines as its ser­
vice life draws to an end (with smaller future revenues accruing) even though no 
physical deterioration in the capital good’s productive capacity necessarily takes 
place. In growth accounting based on neoclassical theory, the measure of capital 
input to be used is widely accepted to be the Jorgenson and Griliches143 measure 
of capital services based on the concept of productive capital. The productive cap­
ital stocks for homogeneous capital goods are aggregated using their rental prices. 
Intuitively, when adding up e.g. the stocks of non-residential buildings and com­
puter software, we must in the production function take notice of the fact that 
their respective service lives and price changes are very different (computer soft­
ware must generate revenue in a much shorter period than buildings, since capital 
theory144 tells us that the capital assets value equals the discounted flow of future 
rental payments that the good is expected to accrue).
Olavi Niitamo145 distinguished the difference between the capital in place 
(stock) and the capital in use (services) in an early MFP calculation for the Finn­
ish manufacturing industry. As capital input he quite elegantly used the volume 
index of the electricity used in manufacturing. An early attem pt to construct ac­
tual capital stocks for Finland was done by Kalevi Koljonen.141’ He was well 
versed in state-of-the-art capital measurement, but decided not to use the PIM 
method when constructing residential and non-residential capital stocks due to 
data availability and reliability issues. Instead Koljonen used data on building 
stocks in the 1950 and 1960 censuses as bench-marks. He estimated the flows in
139 Denison (1962bj; Maddison (1987); Kendrick (1993); Maddison (1996); O'Mahony (1996).
140 Kendrick (1961); Nordhaus (1972).
141 Denison (1983).
142 Goldsmith (1951).
143 Jorgenson and Griliches (1967).
144 Diewert (2001).
145 In his earlier work Niitamo alternatively used consumption of electricity in industry and power 
directly installed for driving machines, and in his later work only electricity as proxies for capi­
tal services. Niitamo (1958, 1969).
146 Koljonen (1968).
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the interim years using construction statistics as proxies for investments and the 
volume changes by type of building as basis for estimates of retirements. In an 
other study done the same year Eino Laurila did not even attem pt to measure 
capital stocks, he simply defined AK (the change in capital) as investments and 
calculated capital-output ratios at constant 1954 prices.14' These ratios he com­
pared with those of other advanced European economies, respectively at differ­
ent stages in the business cycle and by industry. In the mid-1970s Reino Hjerppe 
and Pertti Kohi calculated gross capital stocks for the years 1960, 1965 and 1967 
at fixed 1963 prices.148 In addition to buildings they also incorporated measures 
for civil engineering construction and machinery and equipment. The methodol­
ogy used was a combination of the PIM, bench-marks plus investments less re­
tirements and physical quantities times their unit prices. Seppo Suokko and 
Pirkko Valppu used the perpetual inventory method consistently to estimate gross 
capital stocks at constant 1975 prices for the years 1960-1975.149 Their work laid 
the foundations for a joint venture three years later, when Statistics Finland also 
started to compile capital stock statistics as a part of implementing SNA68.1:>0 
Both gross and net stocks, as well as retirements and consumption of fixed capital, 
in current and constant 1975 prices were included in the measures of the stocks 
and flows of fixed capital. As the investment series were (and are) the main inputs 
into the Finnish national account’s capital stock calculations, the stock series were 
rebased to a new base year whenever the capital formation (and production) series 
were rebased. The base years have been 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995. The 
switch to 1995 also entailed an enlargement of the asset classification as the intan­
gible fixed assets as defined by SNA93/ESA95 were introduced.
3.3 Capital in the national accounts
In SNA93, the most recent international recommendations for national account­
ing, the passages on capital stocks are rather dispersed. Paragraph 15.101 states 
that the perpetual inventory method is usually used to obtain measures for gross 
and net capital stocks. According to SNA93 stock measures are needed for ana­
lyzing production and productivity and for balance sheets. Based on SNA93, the 
European system of national accounts has been revised. ESA95 also deals with 
capital stocks briefly and fragmentarily. In paragraph 6.04, the PIM is recom­
mended whenever direct information on capital stocks is missing. The net capital 
stock is the stock measure in both SNA93 and ESA95. It is used in balance 
sheets, input-output analysis and use tables.151
Gross capital stock (GCS) is the value of the capital used in production, val­
ued at "as new" prices, i.e. regardless of age or actual condition, at a certain point
147 Laurila (1968).
148 Hjerppe and Kohi (1975).
149 Suokko and Valppu (1977).
150 Vihavainen, Valppu, Suokko and Björk (1980).
151 The use table describes the use of goods and services by product and type of use, i.e. intermedi­
ate consumption, final consumption, capital formation or export. ESA95, paragraph 9.04.
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of time. GCS consists of the value of the cumulated past investments less the cu­
mulated retirements of fixed assets. A capital good is retired from the capital 
stock when its service life expires. Gross capital stock K(G at the end of year t is 
estimated using the perpetual inventory method:
K? ■ C31)
s =0
where df is the surviving share of the cohort of capital goods that are s years old 
in year t and S is the maximum service life of the asset type.1 52 The relative share 
of survivors is declining and eventually goes to zero. The GCS of the whole 
economy is calculated as the sum of the gross capital stocks by asset type, indus­
try and type of producer.
The gross capital stock as such is not needed in the SNA93/ESA95 account­
ing framework. Previously the GCS was thought of as a kind of production po­
tential. However, since the gross capital stock does not take into account the 
physical deterioration of assets, it is only used as an intermediate step in calculat­
ing productive and net capital stocks, and not always even for that. For instance 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis now directly calculates net capital stocks 
for all capital assets.1’3
Net capital stock (NCS) is the market value of the capital in use. The net 
value of the capital good is defined as the current purchaser’s price of a new asset 
of the same type less the cumulated consumption of fixed capital.1’4 The na­
tional accounts term consumption of fixed capital broadly equals the term de­
preciation, which is more widely used in economics and economic history.155 Ac­
cording to the SNA93 consumption of fixed capital is calculated for all capital 
goods in the GCS using either the linear or geometric depreciation formula. 
Consumption of fixed capital is the decline in the value of capital during the ac­
counting period due to physical deterioration, normal obsolescence, normal acci­
dental damage and aging.1’6
3.4 Productive capital stocks and rental prices
Capital performs capital services, being a factor of production along with labour 
and intermediate goods. The quantity of services a capital asset produces is usu­
ally dependent on its age. Assuming that the capital service a new homogeneous 
asset performs is one, and that the flow of relative services is declining:
152 SNA93 and ESA95 do not present formulas. The equation shown here is the authors' interpre­
tation of the SNA93 and ESA95 verbal definitions.
153 Katz and Herman (1997); Fraumeni (1997).
154 SNA93, para. 6.199.
155 By depreciation is in the productivity literature usually meant the difference in price at the 
same time point in time between two otherwise identical capital goods of successive vintages. 
This is the loss in value due to aging, which is often called cross-section depreciation (Diewert, 
2001; Hill, 1999).
156 SNA93, para. 6.179; ESA95, para. 6.02; Katz and Herman (1997).
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¿0P =1 and ^ - ^ , < 0  (5=0,1,...)- (3.2)
Assuming that all capital assets eventually are discarded or retired, so that the 
capital service diminishes to zero:
lim dp = 0 . (3.3)
S  - X »
The capital service of a new, year t acquired, capital good is /,. The capital service 
of the capital good acquired the previous year, t - 1, is then df / M and d' I t_s for 
the assets invested in year t-s. When the flow of capital services of a new asset is 
thought to be proportional to the capital asset, dp can also be said to represent 
the relative efficiency of the capital goods acquired in year t-s.
The flow of capital services can be perceived as representing the services of 
fixed capital analogously to labour representing the services of human capital in 
the production function. Furthermore, assuming that the different vintages of 
capital services are completely substitutable and that there is only one kind of 
capital (and no intermediate goods), the production function can be written as:
Q = A,F{Lt,K,) = AF[L, ,[dp0I, + dpI ,_, +...+«£, /,_s+1 ]). (3.4)
The sum within brackets can also be expressed as:
K  (3.5)
s =0
which is often called the productive capital stock (PCS).157 Equation (3.5) is 
meant to be used directly on the investment vintages.
A first step in calculating productive capital stocks is to choose the profile of 
efficiency decline. Commonly used assumptions are the hyperbolic and the geo­
metric age-efficiency profile.158 In this paper we will only deal with geometric 
decline in efficiency157, thus
d ; = ( l - 5 ) s . (3.6)
The point of departure in a growth accounting exercise is often a standard neo­
classical production function, where the change in MFP is calculated using the 
Tornqvist-index. The Tornqvist-index is also used in aggregating heterogeneous 
capital input. Different types of capital are aggregated using their respective 
rental prices, which takes into account the contributions of different types of 
capital to production. A substitution towards capital assets with higher marginal
157 OECD (2001a and b).
158 For an extensive coverage of the subject, see: Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) and 
OECD (2001a).
159 Empirical research performed in the US has supported the use of geometric depreciation ap­
plied directly on the investment vintages: Hulten and Wykoff (1981), Hulten and Wykoff 
(1996), Jorgenson (1996) and Fraumeni (1997).
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products implies a change in capital quality. As rental price the Hall-Jorgensonl6u 
rental price is used:
P.,o ~ rP',o + 8 ^ 0  P ',qP',o ■ (3.7)
In equation (3.7) the depreciation rate 8 can be estimated from the expected 
age-efficiency profile. Holding gain/loss p can be obtained from the price index 
of new capital assets. The remaining unknown term is the net rate of return on 
capital r. In the ex-ante approach some interest rate can be used as return on cap­
ital, e.g. the base rate of the central bank. In the ex-post approach the internal re­
turn on capital is estimated. That is, it is assumed that the industry’s capital in­
come T  is equivalent to the imputed rents it receives each period t:
(3.8)
j
The rate of return can be solved by placing equation (3.7) into equation (3.8):
r, =-'V' -X ; (8 Uo -PuoKoK (3.9)
In empirical work nominal value added less labour income161 is mostly used as 
capital income.
The rental prices are used to aggregate productive capital stocks by asset type 
into a measure of capital services by industry. If the capital input is a trans- 
logarithmic function of its components, then the capital service of industry i, 
that is, the volume index of its capital input can be expressed as162
K
K - i
n K
y  atij.t
where the weights v are defined as:
p K  t s P p K  i s P
P K K p +  v  P K
/  T i i . t - l  'N i t - 1
/  2 .
(3.10)
(3.11)
160 Hall and Jorgenson (1967).
161 This equals the national accounts compensation of employees plus the imputed labour income 
of the self-employed. The imputed labour income is usually estimated by multiplying the 
self-employed's hours worked by wage earners average hourly earnings.
162 Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987).
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3.5 Capital in Finland: Resolution of a debate
Our focus shifts from theory to application as we turn our attention to how dif­
ferent capital measures perform in quantifying a turbulent period in recent Finn­
ish economic history. This period is interesting because the Finnish economic re­
cession in the early 1990s was very severe; with GDP declining by 11 per cent 
from 1990 to 1993 (the 1930s recession was much less severe in comparison as 
GDP declined by only 3.5 per cent 1929-1931). Our results also enable us to 
compare capital productivity growth and the rate of return on capital prior to 
the 1990s recession, the indicators which are the main ingredients of the 
Artto-Pohjola paradox.
We used a geometric age-efficiency profile in calculating productive capital 
stocks for Finland. The productive capital stock in year t for a homogeneous cap­
ital asset type is defined as163:
K, =KM(l-<() + / , = £ ( l - <i r / M , (3.12)x=0
where /  is gross fixed capital formation and d is rate of depreciation. The symbols 
for industry and asset type (i and f) have been suppressed for notational simplic­
ity. In the ex-ante method we used the central bank’s base rate as rate of return 
and used equation (3.7) to calculate the rental prices. In the ex-post method we 
used equation (3.9) to calculate the internal rate of return and equation (3.7) to 
calculate the rental prices. These rental prices were used to aggregate the eight 
different capital asset types into a volume index of capital services (see table 3.1 
for the asset type classification and the average service lives).164 The capital goods 
are also classified by type of producer and industry, which accounts for the varia­
tion in service lives. Consumer durable goods, inventories and land are not in­
cluded in the capital stocks.
Table 3.1 Asset types and average service lives of fixed assets
I Asset type Average service life m years j
Non-residential buildings 2 0 -5 0
Civil engineering and other structures 2 0 -7 0
Transport equipment 7 -2 5
Other machinery and equipment 5 -3 2
Mineral exploration 10
Computer software 5
Entertainment, literary or artistic originals 10
Improvement of land 3 0 -5 0
163 For recent applications see: Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003).
164 When the fixed price productive capital stocks are aggregated using the prices of new invest­
ment goods as weights the result is capital quantity, and when they are aggregated using rental 
prices as weights the result is capital services.
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Since residential buildings are a significant part of the capital stock (39% of 
the nominal productive stock in 2001), but are not actually a production factor 
we decided to omit residential investments from our definition of capital and, 
symmetrically, we omitted also the value added of industry operating and letting 
of dwellings from GDP at basic prices.
Table 3.2 displays the shares of the PCS by asset type. The share of non-resi- 
dential buildings has grown nearly 10 percentage points and constitutes close to 
half of the capital stock, while the share of civil engineering has declined to 22 per 
cent. Together, non-residential buildings and civil engineering structures form 
more than two thirds of the capital stock in 2001. The share of transport and other 
machinery and equipment was one third of the stock in 1975, but their share has 
declined to slightly more than a quarter in 2001. The share of intangible produced 
assets (mineral exploration, software and originals) was less than 3 per cent of the 
PCS and improvement of land 2 per cent in the year 2001. The investment ratio 
less residential gross fixed capital formation (i.e., nominal investments divided by 
nominal value added) changed from 23.2 per cent in 1975-1990, via the early 
1990s 18.5 per cent to 17.7 per cent in the years 1995-2001. As far as capital was 
concerned, after the recession of the early 1990s there was a shift to more inten­
sive growth -  that is, economic growth was achieved with less investments and 
greater capital productivity than previously.163
The lower investment ratio in the 1990s resulted in a deceleration of the 
growth rates of the different kinds of capital166 as can be seen in table 3.3 and in 
figure 3.116' where the volume indexes are shown graphically with year 1975 
normalized as 100. The GCS has consistently grown faster than the other kinds 
of capital throughout the observation period. The other capital measures grew in 
1975-1990 on average by 2.6-2.9 per cent per year, but the picture changes during 
the recession. By 1995, the NCS is nearly at the pre-recession level, as the average 
growth rate in 1990-1995 is close to zero. At the same time the growth rates of the 
capital services were the weakest: -0.5 per cent. In the years 1995-2001, the
Table 3.2 Shares of nominal productive capital stock by asset type, 1975-2001, %
1 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001 I
Non-resid. buildings 36.8 39.6 42.9 46.3 42.1 46.2
Civil engineering etc. 26.3 24.7 23.0 20.0 23.4 22.4
Transport equipment 6.4 6.0 5.5 5.1 5.5 5.3
Other m achinery and eq. 26.5 25.3 24.2 24.5 24.4 21.5
Mineral exploration 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Computer software 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.1
O riginals 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5
Improvement of land 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations: data from Statistics Finland.
165 Jalava (2002).
166 On the definition of GCS and NCS in Finnish national accounts, see Statistics Finland (2000b).
167 See the appendix for the series. The early 1990s economic recession is clearly visible in the 
graph and is the reason behind the periodization of time in the subsequent tables.
6 4  Statistics Finland
5.3
Figure 3.1 Capital services, capital quantity, GCS and NCS, volume-indexes 1975-2001, 
1975=log (100)
Source: Own calculations: data from Statistics Finland.
Table 3.3 Growth rates of capital, 1975-2001, %
1 1975-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
Capital services (ex-ante) 2.9 - 0 .5 1.1
Capital services (ex-post) 2.8 - 0 .5 0.9
Capital quantity 2.6 - 0 .4 0.7
GCS 3.2 1.4 1.2
NCS 2.7 -0 .1 0.5
Source: Own calculations: data from Statistics Finland.
ex-ante capital services grew 1.1 per cent per year, the ex-post capital services by 
0.9 per cent per year, the net stock by half a per cent and capital quantity by 0.7 per 
cent. The main differences between NCS, capital quantity and capital services are 
due to different assumptions regarding retirements/depreciation. In the case of capi­
tal services a compositional shift towards intangible capital has also taken place (ta­
ble 3.4). After the recession the growth rate of the gross stock is closer to that of the 
capital services than the NCS. The growth rates of the stocks are also influenced by
Table 3.4 Growth rates of the productive capital stock by asset type, 1975-2001, %
1975-1990
Non-resid. buildings 3.2 0.4 0.8
Civil engineering etc. 1.2 0.8 0.6
Transport equipment 1.3 -3 .0 0.0
Other machinery and eq. 3.3 -2 .2 0.8
Mineral exploration 15.2 2.4 2.8
Computer software 10.2 1.8 6.4
Originals 2.1 -0 .2 2.2
Improvement of land -0 .4 -2 .2 -3 .2
Source: Own calculations: data from Statistics Finland.
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the depreciation rates, which have increased since there has been a shift to capital 
goods with shorter service lives (table 3.5).
Table 3.6 shows the average annual growths of the prices of new investment 
goods. The most moderate price increases are to be seen in machinery and equip­
ment. By 2001 the price development has been most rapid in software, non-resi- 
dential buildings and mineral exploration.
The small share of profits in national income keeps the ex-post rate of return 
smaller than the ex-ante rate of return during the recession of the early 1990s 
(table 3.7). Correspondingly, the boom years of the late 1990s are reflected as 
ex-post rates of return being higher than their ex-ante equivalents. In a study of 
the manufacturing industry in the United States, where they treat capital as a 
quasi-fixed production factor, Ernst Berndt and Melvyn Fuss168 observe that the 
use of the ex-ante rate of return during cyclical swings leads to the marginal 
product of capital differing from capital’s income share. When using the ex-post
rate of return there is no such problem. According to Paul Schreyer, Pierre-Em­
manuel Bignon and Julien Dupont this is only so when the quantity of capital
Table 3.5 Depredation rates of the productive capital stock by asset type, 1975-2001, %
;
1 975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
Non-resid. buildings 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.2
Civil engineering etc. 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.2 5.3
Transport equipment 16.2 15.0 14.4 15.4 14.7 15.4
Other machinery and eq. 14.0 13.7 14.7 15.2 15.4 16.8
Mineral exploration 30.0 24.5 25.5 25.0 25.5 24.9
Computer software 57.4 54.5 52.9 52.3 53.9 53.6
Originals 25.1 25.3 25.0 25.9 25.2 25.4
Improvement of land 5.7 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.9 7.9
Total 8.4 8.3 8.6 9.3 8.9 9.7
Source: Own calculations; data from Statistics Finland.
Table 3.6 Average annual growths in prices of new investment goods, 1975--2001, %
1975-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001 *
Non-resid. buildings 9.0 -2 .7 4.3
Civil engineering etc. 7.6 1.6 2.5
Transport equipment 7.9 5.1 2.4
Other m achinery and eq. 6.7 2.3 0.5
Mineral exploration 9.9 2.8 3.4
Computer software 10.0 2.5 4.4
O riginals 9.6 4.4 1.6
Improvement of land 9.4 1.9 2.0
Source: Own calculations; data from Statistics Finland.
168 Berndt and Fuss (1986).
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Table 3.7 Rates of return, 1975-2001 (arithmetic averages), %
1975-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001 I
Ex-ante 8.5 7.2 4.4
Ex-post 11.5 5.7 14.4
Source: Own calculations: data from Statistics Finland.
cannot be adjusted during the period of production.“’9 Furthermore, the ex-post 
measure is prone to measurement errors and it requires knowledge of levels of 
capital stocks. Estimates of capital stock levels are usually less reliable than 
measures of changes in capital.
The capital productivities (table 3.8) reinforce the picture given in table 3.3. 
The gross capital stock has grown most rapidly during the observation period; 
hence, capital productivity measured with the GCS is always the lowest. The net 
capital stock usually overestimates the relative change in capital productivity 
(except during the recession). The most eye-catching feature of table 3.8 is the 
significant increase in capital productivity during the latter part of the 1990s. 
However, as we have not included inventories and land in our measure of capital 
stocks, our ex-post rates of return are likely to be somewhat overstated. Still cap­
ital’s growth contributions calculated with both ex-ante and ex-post measures 
are nearly identical (table 3.9). The growth contributions of gross and net capital 
stocks do not differ that much from that of the capital services, except during 
the recession when the GCS overestimates capital’s contribution. After the re­
cession, the contribution of the NCS is slightly smaller than that of the other 
kinds of capital. Gauged by all measures of capital both the absolute and relative 
impact of capital on Finnish economic growth has diminished.
The results in tables 3.7 and 3.8 can be used to offer a resolution to the 
Artto-Pohjola paradox. Our figures show that capital productivity growth was 
very low in the period 1975-1990. In this sense, we corroborate Matti Pohjola’s 
view that capital was inefficient during this period.1'0 However, a recent study 
by Marcel Timmer, Gerard Ypma and Bart van Ark reports that the ratio of la­
bour productivity growth to MFP growth in 1980-95 is very similar in Finland, 
the United States and the European Union. Finnish labour productivity (LP)
Table 3.8 Capital productivity, 1975-2001, %
1  P M 1975-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
Capital services (ex-ante) 0.0 -0.1 3.5
Capital services (ex-post) 0.1 -0.1 3.7
GCS -0 .3 - 1 .9 3.5
NCS 0.3 -0 .4 4.1
Source: Own calculations: data from Statistics Finland.
169 Schreyer, Bignon and Dupont (2003).
170 Pohjola (1996).
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T a b le  3 .9  A ltern ative  gro w th  co n trib u tio n s o f  ca p ita l, 1 9 7 5 -2 0 0 1
1 1975-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
GDP at basic prices (exd. dwellings),
average annual volume growth 2.9 -0 .5 4.7
Contribution2
Capital services (ex-ante) 0.6 -0 .1 0.3
Capital quantity 0.5 -0 .1 0.2
Capital quality 0.1 0.0 0.1
Capital services (ex-post) 0.5 -0 .1 0.3
Capital quantity 0.5 -0 .1 0.2
Capital quality 0.1 0.0 0.0
GCS 0.6 0.3 0.3
NCS 0.5 0.0 0.2
Capital's income share1 19.3 19.9 27.1
1 Per cent.
2 P e rce n tage  points.
N um be rs m ay no t add to  totals du e  to ro u n d in g .
Source: Own calculations: data from Statistics Finland.
grew 1.9 times faster than MFP and the ratios were 2.0 and 2.1 respectively in 
the US and the EU.171 These findings imply that the contribution of Finnish capi­
tal productivity growth to MFP was not that different from the EU and US aver­
ages. That Eero Artto would find high returns on capital in the paper industry in 
the same period that Pohjola coined as inefficient we also find plausible as we re­
port a double-digit ex-post rate of return for the whole economy in 1975-90.172 
Our results were preceded by Olli Haltia and Mikko Leppamaki who demon­
strated mathematically that it is possible for shareholders’ financial return to 
grow faster than capital productivity.1'3 They showed that this could happen if 
the growth in the value of shareholders’ equity is positive, but that the financial 
return would be higher if the shareholders invested elsewhere. Thus, the owners 
do not interfere with the managers’ unsuccessful investments that are depleting 
the value of the firm. In addition, Jukka Jalava implicitly showed that there was a 
major increase in capital productivity growth after 1995. He reported a simulta­
neous increase in MFP growth and decrease in labour productivity growth (MFP 
is the geometric average of labour and capital productivity, so if MFP growth 
goes up and LP growth down then CP growth must also go up).1'4 However, 
here we demonstrated explicitly that growth in capital productivity was low al­
though the rate of return on capital was quite reasonable. This is intuitively un­
derstandable as when the return on capital is high (the rate of return on capital 
equals capital’s marginal product), there is not necessarily a need to improve 
capital’s average productivity (table 3.8 shows the average productivities) until
171 Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003).
172 Artto (1997).
173 Haltia and Leppamaki (2000)
174 Jalava (2002). The exceptional increase in Finnish capital productivity is also corroborated by 
the results of Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003) as the Finnish L.P/MFP growth ratio declined 
to 1.1 in 1995-2001, whereas it was 2.3 in the US and 2.8 in the EU.
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the rate of return goes down. Only when faced with declining returns would the 
firms act to utilize capital more efficiently.1'3 Therefore, we concur with Haltia 
and Leppamaki’s conclusion that the paradox is actually no paradox at all. It 
would seem that Artto failed to discern the difference in capital’s good 
performance in gaining a reasonable return on capital (its marginal product) with 
its less than good performance in average productivity growth.
Table 3.10 shows the MFP estimates by alternative types of capital. Labour 
input is here hours worked unadjusted for quality changes. The tendency of the 
NCS to overestimate capital productivity is not reflected that much in MFP due 
to capital’s small income share. In the late 1990s the relative change in MFP is 
ever so slightly larger when using the NCS than when using the other measures 
of capital, due both to an increase in capital’s share of income and the faster 
growth rate of the net stock. Again, the picture given by the GCS during the re­
cession differs most from that of the capital services. On the whole, when com­
paring the MFP growth rates in table 3.10 with the growth of GDP it is clear that 
the residual is and has been the most important contributor to economic growth 
in Finland during the whole observation period.
Table 3.10 Alternative multi-factor productivity measures, %
1 1975-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
Capital services (ex-ante) 2.4 2.6 2.9
Capital services (ex-post) 2.5 2.6 2.9
GCS 2.4 2.2 2.9
NCS 2.5 2.5 3.0
Source: Own calculations; data from Statistics Finland.
3.6 Conclusion
The starting point of this chapter was methodological as we introduced 
state-of-the-art tools of economic analysis to the Finnish case and discussed exten­
sively what kind of theoretical and empirical choices have to be made in quantifying 
capital and its contribution to growth and productivity. The use of capital services, 
instead of gross or net capital stocks, does not alter the previously held view of the 
development of capital input during the 1975-90 period. During the economic re­
cession of the early 1990s, the volume index of capital services shows a much 
greater decline in capital input than does the net stock. Correspondingly, in the late 
1990s capital services grow faster than the net stock. The gross stock grows during 
the whole observation period at the most rapid rate. The calculations based on the 
net capital stock somewhat exaggerate the decline in capital productivity in the early 
1990s and overstate the growth in capital productivity after 1995. The most signifi­
cant feature observed is common to all measures of capital, i.e. a marked increase in 
capital productivity in the latter part of the 1990s.
175 Our intuition is reinforced by Figure 13 in a recent paper by Pekka Sauramo (2003).
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The differences in growth contributions are also not that striking. The contri­
bution of capital to Finnish economic growth looks rather similar both when us­
ing the theoretically correct capital services measure and when using gross or net 
capital stocks. However, during the recession, the gross stock clearly overstates 
the case. After the recession, the contribution of the net stock is slightly smaller 
than that of the other capital types and both the growth rate and the contribu­
tion of the gross stock are closer to the correct one. The effect (of which alterna­
tive capital measure is used) on multi-factor productivity is minor at the level of 
the whole economy. Although the composition of capital has shifted into a more 
short-lived and intangible direction, the good old K in the production function is 
by no means obsolete. It has just transformed, which poses a great challenge for 
an historical analysis of the proximate sources of our economic growth.
We also observed how our new estimates accorded with the previous view on 
how capital has influenced recent Finnish economic history. Our empirical find­
ings show that reasonably high rates of return on capital and low productivity 
growth of capital did coexist in Finland in 1975-1995. This confirms the theo­
retical result to this effect obtained by Olli Haltia and Mikko Leppamaki. There­
fore, we concur with their conclusion that the Artto-Pohjola paradox is no para­
dox at all. The era of low capital productivity growth ended with a step-up after 
1995. The increase in capital productivity notwithstanding, the contribution of 
capital to Finnish economic growth has declined significantly. This is because the 
Finnish economy relies more on MFP after the 1990s recession than previously 
as growth has become more intensive than before. The diminishing importance 
of capital stems from the fact -  as Paul David1 6 points out -  that the focus in de­
veloped countries’ production has shifted from the mere efficient management 
of routines to the ability to solve problems and innovate. Hence, work on better 
understanding the measure of our ignorance, i.e. MFP, is called for, especially as 
the residual is the most important contributor to Finnish economic growth. To 
put it another way, the greater part of our growth is presently left unexplained.
176 David (2002).
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Appendix
T a b le  3.11 V o lu m e  In d e xe s  o f  the  ca p ita l se rie s , 1 9 7 5 = 1 0 0
C a p ita l s e rv ic e s  C a p ita l se rv ice s  
(ex-an te ) (ex-p ost)
C a p ita l q u a n tity 6 C S N CS
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1976 105.0 104.6 103.9 104.5 104.0
1977 108.1 107.6 106.7 108.5 107.2
1978 108.9 108.5 107.9 111.7 108.9
1979 110.3 110.0 109.6 114.9 110.9
1980 113.1 112.8 112.3 118.7 113.7
1981 116.6 116.0 115.2 122.6 116.7
1982 120.2 119.5 118.4 126.6 120.0
1983 123.7 122.9 121.8 130.8 123.5
1984 126.7 125.9 124.6 134.6 126.4
1985 130.1 129.3 127.8 138.8 129.7
1986 134.1 133.2 131.1 143.1 133.1
1987 138.7 137.6 134.8 147.7 137.0
1988 144.5 143.1 139.2 153.0 141.5
1989 152.7 150.6 145.1 159.2 147.4
1990 158.1 155.8 149.6 164.9 152.1
1991 158.6 156.3 150.7 168.5 153.5
1992 157.2 154.9 149.4 170.7 152.8
1993 153.9 151.6 146.2 171.4 150.2
1994 150.1 148.0 143.0 171.8 147.5
1995 148.5 146.5 141.6 172.7 146.1
1996 148.2 146.2 141.4 174.1 145.6
1997 149.7 147.5 142.3 175.9 146.1
1998 152.9 150.1 144.3 178.3 147.5
1999 155.6 152.2 145.9 180.6 148.9
2000 157.8 154.3 147.8 183.0 150.6
2001 162.2 157.8 150.7 186.1 153.2
Source: Own calculations; data from Statistics Finland.
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Electrifying and digitalising the Finnish 
manufacturing industry: Historical notes 
on diffusion and productivity 7 8
Jukka Jalava
4
Abstract: The diffusion of two general purpose technologies, electricity and in­
formation and communication technology (ICT), throughout the Finnish manu­
facturing industry is described. The full diffusion of electricity as motive power 
in the 1920s and 1930s led to an increase of nearly 4 percentage points in manu­
facturing labour productivity (LP). Furthermore, all industries gained across the 
board in productivity. In contrast, by the time ICT was fully diffused, towards 
the end of the twentieth century, yeast-like productivity gains were nowhere to 
be found. In fact, LP had slowed down in many industries, the notable exception 
being the electric and electronic appliance industries, in which LP growth had 
mushroomed. From a breakdown of growth in labour productivity into the con­
tributions of internal productivity growth, employment share effect and a cross 
term, we found that labour shifting to industries with differing levels or growth 
rates of LP explains less of aggregate LP change in the period 1920-1938 (and 
even less in the period 1974-2000) than it does for the period 1901-1920.
4.7 Introduction
Advanced economies are becoming more and more "weightless" (Quah, 2001), 
as the share of the production of tangible goods in their GDPs diminishes. Has 
something profoundly new taken place? That is, could it be that we actually are 
in the midst of an information and communication technology (ICT) revolution, 
as ICT follows in the footsteps of steam and electricity in becoming a general 
purpose technology (GPT)? Indeed, the quantification of ICT capital’s deepen­
ing contribution to labour productivity (LP) and that of ICT capital services to 
growth has revived interest in neoclassical growth accounting in both the fields
177 This chapter was first published as: Jukka Jalava (2004a): "Electrifying and digitalising the 
Finnish manufacturing industry: Historical notes on diffusion and productivity" in Sakari 
Heikkinen and Jan Luiten van Zanden (eds.), Explorations in Economic Growth, Aksant Aca­
demic Publishers, Amsterdam.
178 I thank Mika Maliranta, Matti Pohjola and Petri Rouvinen for their helpful comments. This re­
search is part of the wireless communication research program (brie-etla.org) of BRIE, the 
Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy at the University of California at Berkeley, 
and ETLA, the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. Financial support from the Yrjo 
Jahnsson Foundation, Nokia and TEKES is gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveat applies 
to any errors in this paper.
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of economics and economic history. Many a study has found that ICT use and/or 
ICT production contribute significantly to growth and productivity (e.g. Oliner 
and Sichel, 2000; Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Daveri, 2002; van Ark, Melka, 
Mulder, Timmer and Ypma, 2002; Jalava and Pohjola, 2002).
Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998) define a GPT as a technology that is widely 
used, has many uses, has scope for improvement, and has many complementarities 
with other existing or potential technologies. Mokyr (1990a) too stresses the histori­
cal importance of macro-inventions, which he defines as "technological break­
throughs that constitute discontinuous leaps in the information set and create new 
techniques". These macro-inventions are then followed and perfected by a string of 
micro-inventions. Stoneman and David (1986) emphasise the importance of the 
third part of the Schumpeterian trilogy. For them it is not the first two parts, inven­
tion (a new discovery) and innovation ("the successful solution ... of putting an un­
tried method into practice", Schumpeter, 1928), that matter but the third and last 
part, the diffusion of a new technology: "What determines improvements in pro­
ductivity and product quality, thereby enhancing economic welfare and the com­
petitiveness of firms and industries, is not the rate of development of new technolo­
gies but the speed and extent of their application in commercial operations".
In an empirical study of three GPTs: steam, electricity and ICT, Crafts 
(2002) found, when analysing UK and US data, that ICT had contributed more 
to growth than steam, and at least as much as electricity in similar, early stages of 
diffusion. However, even after a new technology is fully diffused there might be 
a considerable lag of 5-15 years before productivity effects emerge. Productivity 
literature usually sees the productivity effects of the adoption of a new technol­
ogy as being threefold. First, productivity growth picks up in those industries 
that actually produce the new technology, due to rapid technological advances. 
Second, productivity increases take place in industries using the new technology 
through capital deepening -  as the old capital is gradually substituted by new 
capital, and third, industries using the technology experience multi-factor pro­
ductivity increases as new organisational models emerge and as the new 
technology is followed by incremental product and process innovations.
Needless to say, technology is not the whole story. Human capital and R&D ex­
penditure should be seen as vital parts of the modern economy’s toolbox. Pinpoint­
ing contributions to productivity of, for example, innovations, improvements in cor­
porate governance or refinements in logistics is also an important task for the eco­
nomic historian. The availability/unavailability of venture capital for new start-ups 
and, more generally, the impact of competition for necessary micro-level structural 
changes should not be forgotten, either. Indeed, for Finnish manufacturing there is 
by now ample evidence gathered by Maliranta (2003) that during the recession of 
the early 1990s, productivity-improving creative destruction took place.
The aim of this chapter is to review and compare historical evidence of the 
effects of electrifying and digitalising Finnish manufacturing industry. What were 
the impacts on the productivity of Finnish manufacturing of the diffusion of 
these two GPTs? Section 4.2 starts by tracing the introduction and diffusion of 
electricity in the Finnish manufacturing industry. Section 4.3 does the same for 
ICT. A breakdown of growth is shown in Section 4.4 and in Section 4.5 some 
conclusions are drawn.
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4.2 Electrifying the production process
William Gilbert (1544-1603), a physician to Elizabeth I, was the first person to dis­
tinguish between magnetic and electrical attractive forces. The word electricity is 
derived from the Greek word ilektro, which means amber (amber acts like a magnet, 
attracting small objects when rubbed). His major work, De magnete, was published 
in 1600. Six decades later the German scientist Otto von Guericke started experi­
menting with static electricity, and finally discovered electroluminescence in 1672. Von 
Guericke was followed by Stephen Gray, who in the 1720s conducted electricity 
down a string of silk, concluding that electricity could be transmitted from one ob­
ject to another object. He furthermore showed that the material of the string influ­
enced the conductance (Hager, 1997; Windelspecht, 2002).
In the 1790s, Luigi Galvani experimented with frogs, and found that an elec­
tric current is produced when two different metals touch a frog’s muscle. Later 
that same decade Alessandro Volta showed that the same phenomenon occurs 
when two metals are put into a conducting fluid, i.e. he invented the first battery. 
Using batteries the Dane Hans Christian Oersted discovered electromagnetism in 
1819 and, improving on Oersted’s discovery, the following year Michael Faraday 
found in experiments on electromagnetic rotation that magnetism can also create 
electricity. These experiments led him, in 1831, to discover the dynamo. In 1879 
Thomas Alva Edison patented the incandescent light bulb (Rozakis, 2001).
In Finland the first demonstration of electric lighting took place in 1877. Five 
years later the Finlayson cotton mill in Tampere installed Edison’s incandescent 
lights. This was the fifth permanent installation in Europe: London, Paris, Milan 
and Strasbourg had been earlier. In 1888, the city of Tampere and, in 1890, the 
city of Oulu installed its own street lighting plants, and by the autumn of 1914 
all 38 Finnish towns had at least one electric utility (Myllyntaus, 1991).
In the saw-milling industry, four mills had already installed electric lighting from 
1882 to 1883; by 1900 the number had increased to more than 40 mills (about 7 
per cent of saw-milling firms). The electrification of motive power in saw-mills was 
slower than for electric lighting. Electrical engines accounted for only 0.3 per cent of 
the motive power in the saw-milling industry in 1900179, which slowly increased to 
9 per cent in 1910; by 1920 it had reached 36 per cent. In the metal-working sector, 
the first machine shops to use electric lighting were doing so by 1884. By the turn of 
the century approximately one-third of the metal-working industry’s enterprises 
had electric lighting. The electrification of motive power in the metal-working sec­
tor increased rapidly from 4 per cent of total motive power in 1898 to 47 per cent 
in 1913, and reached 75 per cent by 1920. In the pulp and paper industry the first 
steps towards electric fighting were taken in the late 1880s. The electrification of 
motive power in the pulp and paper industry increased from 6 per cent of total mo­
tive power in 1900 to 20 per cent in 1910, and 38 per cent by 1920 (Myllyntaus, 
Michelsen and Herranen, 1986). The volume index of motive power grew in the 
Finnish manufacturing industry from 1900 to 1938 at a compound average annual
179 From 1860 to 1900, saw-mills shifted from using water power to thermal power as an energy 
source. This freed the mills of the geographical constraint of having to be located next to rivers 
(Hoffman 1980).
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rate of 7.5 per cent. The growth was particularly rapid in the chemicals sector (10.0 
per cent), in the manufacture of leather, leather products and rubber products (10.0 
per cent), in the food, beverage and tobacco industries (9.7 per cent), in the manu­
facture of non-metallic mineral products (9.1 per cent), in the manufacture of pulp 
and paper (8.9 per cent), and in printing and publishing (8.4 per cent) (Hjerppe, 
Hjerppe, Mannermaa, Niitamo and Siltari, 1976). Before the Second World War, 
Finnish industry was very energy intensive: in the period 1890 and 1938 an increase 
in volume growth of one per cent required a growth of 3.5 per cent in electricity use 
(Myllyntaus, 1991).
The full diffusion of electric motors as the motive power of Finnish industry 
took place during the 1920s and 1930s. In the year 1913 the share was 32 per 
cent; in 1925 it was already 63 per cent; and by 1938 it was as much as 87 per 
cent. In comparison, the diffusion of electric motors as the source of mechanical 
power in US manufacturing industry was 25 per cent in 1909, 53 per cent in 
1919, 78 per cent in 1929 and 86 per cent in 1939 (Devine, 1983). The pace of 
diffusion of electricity in the Finnish manufacturing process bears close resem­
blance to that of the United States.
As parliament decided in the early 1920s to build more hydropower electric­
ity generating plants, more transmission lines had to be built as a consequence, 
laying the foundation for the national grid of transmission lines. The decision 
brought a switch from half to three-quarters of the electricity output coming 
from hydropower (of the country’s total electricity supply, manufacturing actu­
ally used 70-85 per cent). In the interwar period, Finland’s power distribution 
system was also significantly extended: for example, the length of transmission 
lines increased from 7,406 kilometres in 1923 to 18,016 kilometres in 1938 
(Myllyntaus, 1991; Herranen, 1996).
Warren Devine has traced the evolution of power distribution in US manufac­
turing plants. In direct drive systems, production machines were directly linked to 
their power source. In most cases, one machine supplied the power for an entire 
factory via pulleys and leather belts. This severely constrained the physical design of 
the factories as well as imposing restrictions on the organisation of work. When 
power failures occurred or the power source had to be serviced, the entire plant 
came to a stand still. In the subsequent stage, the machine that drove the line-shaft 
was simply replaced by an electric motor, in the electric line-shaft drive system. The 
next step was the electric group drive system, where factories single giant line-shafts 
were replaced by many shorter line-shafts with electric motors connected to groups 
of production machines. Finally, in the electric unit drive system, individual produc­
tion machines were connected to electric motors (Devine, 1983).
David and Wright (1999) attribute the slow diffusion of electricity180 in the US 
to the long lag in profits accruing from implementing this new technology in pro­
duction, which was due to the unprofitability of scrapping existing factories and the 
capital and production systems they embodied (similarly, there was not enough in­
centive in the Finnish saw-milling industry to rapidly adopt electricity and new la­
bour-saving technology in production because the costs of raw materials and labour
180 "Slow", as the first time electricity was used in US to drive machinery for manufacturing was in 
1883 (Devine, 1983).
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were low up until the First World War (Myllyntaus, Michelsen and Herranen, 
1986)). However, once the increased use of electric motors was well underway, a 
step-up in the labour productivity of the US manufacturing sector of 4.5 percentage 
points from 1909-1919 to 1919-29 [to an annual average of 5.6 per cent) took 
place (David and Wright, 1999). Devine (1983) sees the productivity increases that 
ensued as the result of an increased flow of production, an improved working envi­
ronment, improvement in machine control and increased ease of plant expansion. 
After WWI, power capital was substituted for other capital, which markedly in­
creased capital productivity (Du Boff, 1966). Not to be forgotten is the protection­
ist stance the United States took in the interwar era, thus avoiding the problems 
many export-oriented countries had. The US domestic market grew sufficiently 
enough to ensure rapid productivity growth (Nelson and Wright, 1992).
In 1860 only 4 per cent of the Finnish population worked in the industrial 
and handicrafts sectors, which managed to generate 7-8 per cent of GDP at basic 
prices. Half a century later, 10 per cent of the economically active population 
was employed in industry, and as industrial output grew faster than GDP, the 
share of industry and handicrafts in total output was one-fifth in 1913 
(Heikkinen and Hjerppe, 1986). By 1938 the industrial sector’s share in GDP 
had increased to almost one-quarter. Industry’s contribution to GDP growth was 
even higher, i.e. an average of 39 per cent in the period 1920-1938. Primary 
production lost its position as the Finnish economy’s growth engine after the 
1890s, but in the period 1890-1913 primary production, secondary production 
and tertiary production still did not differ significantly in their relative contribu­
tions to growth. The rapid decline of the contribution of primary production to 
growth and the pre-eminence of secondary production began in the 1920s. Ter­
tiary production did not take the lead in contributions to growth until the 
mid-1950s (Hjerppe, 1988). Heikkinen and Hjerppe (1986) sum up the Finnish 
model of industrialisation as follows: the country’s main assets were its vast for­
ests, its hydropower potential and a labour reserve in the rural areas. Export de­
mand was crucial from the 1860s to the 1880s. During the unfavourable export 
conditions of the mid-1880s to the mid-1890s, an increase in domestic demand 
and a growing domestic market share in industry was favourable for growth. 
From the 1890s until WWI, both exports (the forest sector) and domestic mar­
kets contributed to growth. Wood processing was crucial for the economy as it 
was an export industry with multiplier effects in primary production and trans­
portation, and the international price development was favourable for Finland as 
the terms-of-trade increased approximately 100 per cent from the end of the 
1860s to the early twentieth century. Myllyntaus (1991) also points out the cru­
cial role of electrification as a catalyst for modernisation and the introduction of 
productivity enhancing technical innovations. As the twentieth century’s first 
two decades, in which the compound annual average increase in manufacturing 
LP was only 0.3 per cent, continued into the 1920s and 1930s and the diffusion 
of electricity was nearing completion, the step-up in LP growth was 3.9 percent­
age points (to 4.2 per cent per year). The best performer in terms ol LP growth 
for the period 1920-1938 was the pulp and paper industry with 7.9 per cent (see 
table 4.1). However, all observed manufacturing sub-industries increased their 
LP growth, with the largest absolute improvements taking place in the printing
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T a b le  4.1 O u tp u t per em p lo ym en t in m a n u fa ctu rin g , com pound a ve ra ge  an n u a l gro w th
■
■ K '..' . ■ ■
1901-1920
%
1920-1938
%
1920-1938
less
1901-1920
%-points
M anufacturing 0.3 4.2 3.9
Food, beverages & tobacco 0.3 3.3 3.0
Textiles 0.3 1.1 0.8
W ood-working 0.2 2.7 2.5
Pulp and paper industry 3.0 7.9 4.9
Printing and publishing -1 .2 4.0 5.2
Leather industries -0 .9 3.7 4.6
Chem icals 3.2 5.0 1.8
Non-metal mineral products 1.0 4.2 3.2
M etal-working -0 .7 4.2 4.9
Miscellaneous 0.6 4.9 4.3
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe, Hjerppe, Mannermaa, Niitamo and Siltari (1976).
and publishing industries, the pulp and paper industry, the metal industry, in 
leather manufacturing and other, miscellaneous manufacturing.
The investments in electrification were mainly financed by the industrial firms 
independently or through bank loans. Private power utilities and/or distribution 
companies issued shares to acquire financing, and municipalities used tax revenues 
or other income (Myllyntaus, 1991], Although financial capital was not obtained 
from abroad to a significant degree (the role of foreign direct investment was small 
due to strong Finnish economic nationalism (Myllyntaus, 1992)), foreign experts 
were often encouraged to join companies that adopted new technology (Hjerppe, 
1988). Finns also studied abroad in the period prior to domestic technical educa­
tion gaining momentum. The educational aspect was always at the forefront. Im­
ported turn-key technology construction was not sought after. Usually the more 
cumbersome road of Finnish firms participating in installing as much of the new 
technology as feasible was chosen (Myllyntaus, 1991).
Due to shortcomings in data availability, we cannot perform an LP compari­
son for the main electricity producing industry (the electricity, gas and water 
supply industry) for the same period as we did for the manufacturing industry. 
However, we extracted data from Statistics Finland’s Historical National Ac­
counts Database from 1914 to 1938 that enabled us to compute the annual LP 
growth in the period 1915-1938. We found that the compound average annual 
LP growth for 1915-1920 was 8.2 per cent; for 1920-1938 it was 10.7 per cent. 
This agrees with views in the productivity literature that productivity gains first 
emerge in those industries that produce a new technology.
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4.3 The digital revolution
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716), a German mathematician and phi­
losopher invented the binary system of notation in 1679. The binary system was 
fundamental to the invention of electronic calculating machines, the first com­
pletely electronic computer, the ENIAC, in 1946 and ultimately all computers 
(Windelspecht, 2002). The ENIAC used 18,000 vacuum tubes, which had the 
awkward tendency of frequently burning out. In addition, the warmth and glow 
of the tubes attracted moths, causing short circuits.181 The problem of overheat­
ing was solved by the invention of the transistor (made of the semi-conducting 
material germanium; later silicon was also used) in 1947 by William Shockley, 
Walter Brattain, and John Bardeen at Bell Labs. In the year 1959, Jack Kilby at 
Texas Instruments invented the microchip, the first integrated circuit to defeat 
the "tyranny of numbers" that had hitherto constrained technical progress (Reid, 
2001). In 1971, Intel created the microprocessor, and the fourth generation of 
computers was born. Other important milestones in the development of ICT 
were the use of fibre optics to transmit data in 1966; the invention of ARPANET 
(the first computer network) in 1969 by the US Department of Defense; the 
creation in 1975 of what was to become the world’s leading software company, 
Microsoft; the first testing of cell phones in 1978; the market launch of personal 
computers for the general public by IBM in 1981; the market launch of cell 
phones for the general public by Motorola in 1984; and the invention of the 
World Wide Web in 1989 (Rozakis, 2001).
In introducing the computer in Finland, the role of the Finnish Committee for 
Mathematical Machines was crucial. The committee started its work in 1954 with 
the objective of establishing the need for mathematical machines and to make rec­
ommendations on their purchase or construction. The decision was made to copy 
a computer designed in Gottingen, the G la. W hat the committee was unaware of 
was that the G la was still only a blueprint, and therefore what had been intended 
to be a quick one-and-a-half year long task of duplication actually became the con­
struction and design of a computer. Completion was therefore delayed until 1960, 
when a by then outdated computer was presented to the University of Helsinki. 
The acronym ESKO, derived from Elektroninen Sarja KOmputaattori, was chosen 
for this Finnish venture, which as it turned out produced the only G 1 a ever com­
pleted (Andersin and Carlson, 1993). Although the ESKO was a failure in a tech­
nical sense, it played an important educational role as the first effort by Finnish en­
gineers to study computer technology (Paju, 2003). While the ESKO project was 
still in progress the government-owned Postisäästöpankki (Post and Savings Bank) 
purchased from IBM an IBM 650 computer, which was delivered in the autumn 
of 1958. Finland’s first computer was quite fittingly christened ENSI (first, earli­
est). The primary objective of the ENSI was to oversee entries in savings accounts. 
Although the ENSI did not altogether replace punched cards, it simplified and ra­
tionalised many stages of work (Pukonen, 1993). Both ESKO and the ENSI were 
first generation computers (Seppänen, 1993).
181 Hence the term debugging when attending to computer related problems.
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International Business Machine Corporation (IBM) had a strong position in 
Finland. Its predecessor (the Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company changed 
its name to International Business Machine Corporation in 1924 (Pusateri, 1988)) 
had already in 1922 supplied the first punch card machines in Finland, to Statis­
tics Finland. The subsidiary IBM Finland was founded in 1936, and it consoli­
dated its position as a supplier of punch card machines, precision instruments 
and electrical typewriters. IBM Finland founded a computing centre, what they 
called a service bureau, in 1939. However, in the beginning there were no ma­
chines in the centre. In the 1960s the service bureau entered a new era when it 
used IBM 1401s to cater for the needs of customers. The success of IBM Finland 
was mirrored by the increase in its employees. In 1951 the company employed 
48 persons in Finland, by 1961 approximately 200 and by 1964 about 500 
(Dickman, 1993). IBM also dominated the market in the US. In 1965 it had a 
market share of 65 per cent, while the second largest company, Sperry Rand 
(that manufactured the ENIAC’s successors, UNIVACs), had a mere 12 per cent 
market share. By 1987 IBM became the third largest industrial corporation in the 
US (Pusateri, 1988).
One of the two original engineers that had started to build the ESKO, Tage 
Carlsson, was hired in 1960 by Suomen Kaapelitehdas Oy (Finnish Cable 
Works) (Aaltonen, 1993). The other original engineer, Hans Andersin, had al­
ready gone to work for IBM Finland. Kaapelitehdas was one of the three compa­
nies that in 1966 merged to form Oy Nokia Ab (Häikiö, 2002). Kaapelitehdas 
had in 1958 decided to explore the possibility of starting to sell electronics (with 
the long-term plan of eventually constructing computers), and therefore in the 
following year it acquired a majority of shares in an electronics importer, Chester 
Oy, that represented in Finland companies such as Texas Instruments and Iso­
tope Developments. In 1960 Kaapelitehdas decided to set up a computing cen­
tre, which laid the foundation for Nokia's electronics department. The first com­
puters the centre purchased were the Elliot 803 and the Siemens 2002, which 
were operational in 1960 and 1961, respectively (Aaltonen, 1993). The idea was 
to sell services to clients, and later on computers, as the clients’ needs grew. The 
Elliot 803 was a fully transistorised, second generation computer and it had been 
purchased to meet the needs of scientifically- and technically-oriented custom­
ers; the Siemens 2002 was meant to service administrative and commercial cli­
ents (Seppänen, 1993). In the early 1960s the Cable Works, which had more 
than 30 years of experience in manufacturing telecommunications cables, 
launched itself into the production of telecom equipment. The development 
work was divided into three categories: microwave technology; UHF- and radio­
phones; and carrier-wave technology. An important customer was the Finnish 
Defence Forces. In the mid-1960s the Cable Works started to supply alarm sys­
tems to power utilities and registering systems to saw-mills. The company also 
designed dataloggers for manufacturing, and power production and distribution 
systems in co-operation with power plants (Aaltonen, 1993). In the early 1970s 
Nokia started manufacturing computers (computer production was a major part 
of Nokia until it was sold to ICL-Fujitsu in 1991), and digital telephone ex­
changes. The beginning of the electronics division was humble as it did not con­
tribute significantly to Nokia’s net sales until the late 1980s (actually electronics
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did not become profitable until 1971], and it was not until the 1990s that Nokia 
started focusing on electronics (Häikiö, 2002).
The diffusion of ICT in Finnish manufacturing was three-phased. First, in the 
1960s and 1970s firms started using ICT for administrative purposes. Second, in 
the 1970s and 1980s ICT found its way into manufacturing processes. By the be­
ginning of the 1990s close to half the Finnish manufacturing firms used ICT in 
their production processes, with higher than average use in the pulp and paper in­
dustry, the printing and publishing industries, and the chemical industry. Finally, 
third, in the 1980s and 1990s ICT was embedded into manufactured products. 
The main driver in adopting the new technology was the desire to decrease pro­
duction costs, to improve process and product quality, and to ensure reliable oper­
ations and delivery (Jaakkola, 1992). By the year 2001, ICT had diffused widely 
throughout the manufacturing industry: of all firms, 96 per cent used computers; 
91 per cent used the internet; 59 per cent had homepages; 42 per cent used broad­
band connections; 27 per cent used intranet; 10 per cent used extranet; and 12 per 
cent used EDI. For all enterprises the corresponding statistics were: 95 per cent 
used computers; 90 per cent used the internet; 51 per cent had homepages; 39 per 
cent used broadband connections; 24 per cent used intranet 10 per cent had 
extranet; and 10 per cent used EDI. Of all firms in Finland, the share of those for 
which at least one-quarter of employee working time was spent using computers 
was 69 per cent in 2001 (Statistics Finland, 2002b). That statistic had been only 
17 per cent in 1984, 44 per cent in 1990 and 66 per cent in 1997. Thus by the 
turn of the millennium, the Finnish workplace had become quite extensively com­
puterised (Statistics Finland, 1999b). Micro-level evidence from the end of the 
1990s indicates that the diffusion of the use of ICT in firms was a within firm 
story (and not so much one of restructuring), with stronger productivity impacts 
in especially young, ICT-intensive firms (Maliranta and Rouvinen, 2003).
Table 4.2 Output per hours worked in manufacturing, compound average annual growth
.  ijiläÄ lIsii É ÎiM  7  ■ i s l l i l r  J i  ■
1990-2000
less
1974-1990
%-points
Manufacturing 4.4 6.2 1.8
Food, beverages & tobacco 3.4 4.9 1.5
Textiles 4.2 3.4 -0 .8
W ood-working 4.3 4.8 0.5
Pulp and paper industry 4.8 6.0 1.2
Printing and publishing 3.7 3.4 -0 .3
Leather industries 5.3 2.0 -3 .3
Chemicals 3.6 4.7 1.1
Non-metal mineral products 3.5 3.0 -0 .5
M etal-working (exd. electrical) 4.6 3 .4 -1 .2
Electrical and electronic appliances 5.2 14.2 9.0
Miscellaneous 3.6 2.5 -1 .1
Source: Statistics Finland.
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A step-up in the manufacturing industry’s LP was to be seen in the 1990s 
(see table 4.2). However, the increase did not take place across the board, for all 
industries, as was the case when electricity was adopted. LP growth actually 
slowed in the leather industry, the metal-working industry (excluding electron­
ics), in miscellaneous manufacturing, the textile industry and in printing and 
publishing. The increase was moderate in the pulp and paper industry, the 
chemical industry, the food, beverage and tobacco industry and in saw-milling 
and other timber-related activities. The performance of the electric and elec­
tronic appliance industry was astonishing. At first sight growth in productivity 
seemed to mushroom in contrast to the steady yeast-like rise in productivity 
growth that resulted from the widespread use of electricity.182 This impression is 
reinforced when ones looks at the whole non-residential business sector. In the 
latter part of the 1990s, the LP growth of ICT producers experienced a major 
boost, but it remained at the same level in industries using ICT and even fell in 
other branches of industry (Jalava, 2003).
The 1990s was a decade in which there was a shift in corporate governance of 
major Finnish firms from the Continental system -  with a strong position of 
banks as sources of credit and significant shareholders, concentrated ownership 
and a limited amount of listed companies -  to the Anglo-Saxon model, which is 
distinguished by a large number of listed firms, a broad base of ownership, and, 
above all, the maximisation of shareholder value. This shift was the result of a 
rapid increase in the share of foreign ownership in Finnish stock-exchange listed 
firms. Whereas foreigners owned approximately 10 per cent of the market 
capitalisation in 1992, in 2000 that share had risen to 70 per cent (from whence 
it declined to 60 per cent in 2002). Empirical evidence shows that the foreign 
owned companies performed better than those that were Finnish owned 
(Ali-Yrkkö and Ylä-Anttila, 2003). As the Finnish financial system became more 
diversified and stock-oriented, the prospect of innovative and possibly high-risk 
SMEs attaining financing improved in comparison with earlier, bank-dominated 
times. Thus the focus of Finnish industrial development shifted from invest­
ment-driven growth to innovation-driven growth, which was characterised by a 
rapid multi-factor productivity growth (Jalava, 2002; Hyytinen, Rouvinen, 
Toivanen and Ylä-Anttila, 2003).
4.4 Electricity i/s. ICT: Decomposing growth
To compare the productivity dynamics that the diffusion of electricity and ICT 
led to, we broke down labour productivity growth into the impacts of a compo­
nent reflecting industries’ internal productivity growth (the within-component), 
an employment share effect, i.e. the positive (negative) impact of the labour 
share increasing (decreasing) in a sub-industry with a level of LP higher than the 
aggregate level of LP (the static shift effect), and a cross term, i.e. the combined
182 Harberger (1998) was the first person to coin the terms "mushroom" and "yeast" when talking 
of growth.
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impact of a shift in the sub-industries’ labour share and LP growth rate (the dy­
namic shift effect). Formally:
[LP, -  LPt_x) /  LP,., = ( ±  [LPi t -  LPi t.A ) V , ) /  LP_,
¿=1
- H i X . - V i  )LPt̂ )/ L P ^  (4.1)
i =1
+ -S ^ K L P . '- L P ^ V / L P , . i ,
¿=1
where LP is level of labour productivity, S[ is sub-industry t’s share of hours worked 
and t denotes time. The first term on the right is the within-component, the second 
term is the static shift effect and the third term is the dynamic shift effect.183
From 1901 to 1920 the cross-term was very negative, indicating that industries 
with above average LP growth rates had diminishing labour shares (table 4.3). On 
the other hand, a positive employment share effect signified an increasing labour 
share in industries with an above average level of LP. All in all, structural change 
was much less marked in the other periods than in the 1900s and 1910s; the shift 
factors are furthermore positive in the latter two periods. For LP growth in the 
1990s, 5 percentage points of that can be attributed to structural change, i.e. that la­
bour shifted to industries with either a higher level of LP or a higher growth rate of 
LP (Jalava, Heikkinen and Hjerppe, 2002; see also Maliranta, 2003).
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the pulp and paper industry 
alone accounted for almost half the growth of the manufacturing industry’s ag­
gregate within-component (table 4.4). Another strong performer was the wood 
manufacturing industry. The food, beverage and tobacco industry, the textile in­
dustry and the non-metallic mineral product industry were also strong perform­
ers. The largest drag on the aggregate within-component came from the metal­
working industry and from printing and publishing. In the 1920s and 1930s this 
picture changed. The metal-working industry became the second largest contrib­
utor. The pulp and paper industry was still the biggest contributor, but its rela-
Table 4.3 The impact of structural change on labour productivity growth in the manufacturing 
industry in 1901-1920, 1920-1938, 1974-1990 and 1990-2000
. 1901-1920%
1920-1938
%
1974-1990
%
1990-2000
%
Within 113.6 104.6 97.7 94.9
Static 12.2 -1 .7 2.2 3.8
Dynamic -2 5 .8 -2 .8 0.2 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: own calculations; data for 1901-1938 from Hjerppe, Hjerppe, Mannermaa, Niitamo and
Siltari (1976); the breakdowns for 1974-2000 from Jalava, Heikkinen and Hjerppe (2002)
183 For a nice overview of different productivity decomposition methods, see Maliranta (2003).
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Table 4.4 Breakdown of manufacturing sub-industries' within-components' contributions to labour 
productivity growth in 1901-1938
m ,
Manufacturing
Food, beverages & tobacco
Textiles
W ood-working
Pulp and paper Industry
Printing and publishing
Leather industries
Chem icals
Non-metal mineral products
Metal-working
Miscellaneous
1901-1920
%
■ 1 ,
1920-1938
%
V  . • r  • .
1920-1938
less
1901-1920
%-points
100.0 100.0 0.0
16.6 13.8 -2 .8
16.5 3.1 - 1 3 .4
23.2 14.4 -8 .8
48.2 39.6 -8 .6
- 5 .4 6.0 11.4
- 0 .8 1.9 2.7
2.1 1.5 -0 .6
10.5 4.3 -6 .2
- 1 1 .0 14.9 25.9
0.3 0.5 0.2
Source: own calculations; data from Hjerppe, Hjerppe, Mannermaa, Niitamo and Siltari (1976)
tive share declined. That was also the case for the former number two: the wood 
manufacturing industry. The biggest decline in contribution was experienced by 
the textile industry. In the 1920s and 1930s no industries’ within-component 
contributed negatively to aggregate LP growth, as had been the case two decades 
earlier. During the period 1974-1990 the non-electric metal industry was the 
growth engine of the within-component for the aggregate manufacturing indus­
try (table 4.5). The pulp and paper industry was a distinct second, with the re­
maining industries contributing evenly. In the 1990s, the contributions of almost
Table 4.5 Decomposition of manufacturing sub-industries' within components' contributions 
to labour productivity growth in 1974-2000
Manufacturing 100.0 100.0 0.0
Food, beverages & tobacco 8.8 8.3 -0 .5
Textiles 6.6 1.7 -4 .9
W ood-working. 6.1 4.2 -1 .9
Pulp and paper 19.8 19.6 -0 .2
Printing and publishing 6.4 4.0 -2 .4
Leather industries 4.8 1.2 -3 .6
Chem icals 6.0 6.2 0.2
Non-metal mineral products 3.4 1.6 -1 .8
Metal-working 27.9 15.0 -1 2 .9
Electrical and electronic appliances 7.3 36.9 29.6
Miscellaneous 2.9 1.1 -1 .8
Source: Jalava, Heikkinen and Hjerppe (2002)
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all industries decreased, as the electric and electronic appliance industry resumed 
the responsibility as the engine of aggregate growth.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have surveyed the diffusion of two general purpose technolo­
gies (GPTs) -  electricity and ICT -  in the Finnish manufacturing industry. The 
full diffusion of electricity as motive power in the 1920s and 1930s led to an in­
crease of nearly 4 percentage points in manufacturing labour productivity. In­
deed, all industries across the board gained in productivity. In contrast, when 
ICT was fully diffused -  by the end of the twentieth century -  a steady yeast-like 
growth of productivity could not be observed. In fact, LP slowed down in many 
industries, the notable exception being the electrical and electronic appliance in­
dustries (Finland’s main ICT producer), in which LP growth mushroomed. The 
electronic industry is the natural place to expect the first sign of productivity 
gains, as it is the main producer of ICT in Finland. Similarly, LP growth surged in 
the electricity producing industry before gains were visible in the main manufac­
turing industries using electricity. Therefore there is, as historical precedent has 
shown, likely to be a lag of several years before the productivity gains of wide­
spread adoption of ICT become visible.
From a breakdown of LP growth during both GPTs’ periods of diffusion, it was 
found that labour shifting to industries with differing levels or growth rates of LP 
explains less of aggregate LP change in period 1920-1938 (and even less in period 
1974-2000) than it did in the period 1901-1920. Sub-industry contributions to 
the aggregate manufacturing industry’s within-component remain rather concen­
trated. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the pulp and paper indus­
try and wood manufacturing contributed more than 70 percentage points. Two 
decades later, the pulp and paper industry, the wood manufacturing industry and 
the metal-working industry contributed close to 70 percentage points of the 
within-component. In the period 1974-1990, the non-electric metal industry and 
the pulp and paper industry contributed approximately 50 percentage points and, 
finally, in the period 1990-2000 the electronic industry, the metal-working indus­
try and the pulp and paper industry contributed more than 70 percentage points. 
As the within-component’s share of aggregate LP growth is even larger in the lat­
ter two periods than it was in the first two, we conclude that productivity growth 
is more concentrated in current times of diffused ICT than that experienced by 
our grandfathers and grandmothers in the 1920s and 1930s. What started as a 
transfer of technology to a late industrialising country through the import of for­
eign machinery and equipment, the recruitment of skilled foreign workers and 
study trips abroad has through post-World War II investment-driven growth suc­
cessfully evolved into a growth driven by innovation.
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Economic growth in the new economy: 
Evidence from advanced economies84185
Jukka Jalava and Matti Pohjola
5
Abstract: Firstly, by surveying recent research, this chapter confirms that both 
the production and use of ICT have been the factors behind the improved eco­
nomic performance of the United States in the 1990s. However, the evidence 
for the New Economy is much weaker outside the United States. Secondly, the 
chapter applies growth accounting to estimate the impacts in Finland. It is 
shown that the contribution to output growth from ICT use has increased from 
0.3 percentage points in the early 1990s to 0.7 points in the late 1990s. In addi­
tion, the fast growth of multi-factor productivity in the ICT producing indus­
tries has had an even larger impact. But, unlike in the US, there has been no ac­
celeration in the trend rate of labour productivity.
5.1 Introduction
The popular view is that information and communication technology (ICT) will 
change the world by boosting productivity and economic growth. But while ICT has 
many visible effects on the modem economy -  the growth in electronic commerce 
and in Internet use for example -  its impact on productivity and economic growth 
has been surprisingly difficult to detect. Although investment in ICT has exploded 
since the mid-1970s, aggregate productivity growth remained sluggish until the 
mid-1990s in the United States which is the world’s leader in both the production 
and use of ICT. Therefore, many policy-makers and economists have taken the 
strong performance of the US economy in the late 1990s as most welcome evidence 
for the view that the large investments in ICT have finally started to pay off. It is 
generally believed that the United States has become a "New Economy" in which 
business firms have learnt to take advantage of both the ICT revolution and the 
globalization of business activities in ways which improve productivity. Indeed, the 
growth rate of labour productivity has doubled in the late 1990s.
The defining characteristics of the ICT revolution are the fast improvement in 
the quality of ICT equipment and software, and the concomitant sharp decline in 
their quality adjusted prices. For example, in the United States the price of com-
184 This chapter was first published as: Jukka Jalava and Matti Pohjola (2002): "Economic growth 
in the new economy: Evidence from advanced economies", Information Economics and Policy 
(14) 2, pp. 189-210.
185 The authors wish to thank Pirkko Aulin-Ahmavaara and Pekka Yla-Anttila for helpful com­
ments and Paul Schreyer for providing his data.
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puter investment declined 18 per cent per year in 1960-95 and 28 per cent per 
year in 1995-98 (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000). Profit maximizing firms respond to 
the change in relative prices by substituting ICT equipment and software for other 
capital equipment and structures. A larger portion of investment will be in assets 
with relatively high marginal products, and the aggregate capital service flow in­
creases. This increase in capital intensity raises labour productivity in the ICT us­
ing industries. The standard argument for the fact that it has taken so long for the 
productivity impact to show up in the productivity statistics is that firms have not 
yet invested enough in ICT (see, e.g., Oliner and Sichel, 2000). Even if informa­
tion and communication technology investments earn hefty returns, the share of 
nominal income accruing to computers has been rather small until recently.
Besides improving productivity in the ICT using industries, the rapid technolog­
ical advance should also raise productivity in the ICT producing industries and, con­
sequently, should contribute to productivity at the aggregate level as well. Conse­
quently, the mechanisms underlying the structural transformation of the industrial 
economy into a "new”, ICT-based economy are easy to understand by applying the 
basic principles of economic theory. The problems lie on the empirical side.
Growth accounting is the standard technique for assessing the impacts of 
both the use and production of different types of assets including ICT. The 
method is briefly reviewed in the next section. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 take stock of 
the productivity debate by reviewing recent research on the impacts of both the 
use and production of ICT in the United States and other advanced countries. 
Section 5.5 contains the findings of our own application to explaining economic 
growth in Finland. This country is of special interest because it is one of the lead­
ing producers of ICT in Europe and is sometimes regarded as a model country in 
ICT consumption as well. It is well known that Finland ranks among the top 
countries in the world in terms of the number of Internet hosts and mobile 
phones per capita.
5.2 Accounting for ICT's contribution to output 
and productivity growth
Information and communication technology is both an output from the ICT pro­
ducing industries and an input into the ICT using industries. Therefore, to assess 
ICT’s contribution to economic growth, it is helpful to express the aggregate 
production function in the form
H ^ c r W T o M )  = A (t)F [K lcr (O.Kq (0 , (5-1)
where, at any given time f, aggregate value added Y is assumed to consist of ICT 
goods and services YICT as well as of other production Y0 . These outputs are pro­
duced from aggregate inputs consisting of ICT capital services KICT, other capital 
services KQ and labour services L. The level of technology or multi-factor pro­
ductivity is here represented in the Hicks neutral or output-augmenting form by 
parameter A. Assuming that constant returns to scale prevail in production and 
that product and factor markets are competitive, growth accounting gives the
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share weighted growth of outputs as the sum of share weighted inputs and 
growth in multi-factor productivity (see, e.g., Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000):
^ = wict^ ict + wo^o = v ;cr f^/cr + v o-^o + vlL + A  (5-2)
where the A-symbol indicates the rate of change and where, for the economy of 
notation, the time index t has been suppressed. The weights wlCT and wQ denote 
the nominal output shares of ICT and other production, respectively, and they 
sum to one. The weights v(CT, vQ and vL also sum to one and represent the nomi­
nal income shares of ICT capital, other capital and labour, respectively.
It can now be seen from eq. (5.2) that information and communication tech­
nology can enhance economic growth in the following three basic ways. Firstly, 
the production of ICT goods and services contributes directly to the total value 
added generated in an economy. This contribution -  wICTYICT in eq. (5.2) -  is 
calculated by multiplying ICT’s nominal output share by the growth rate of the 
volume of ICT production. OECD (2000) estimates that ICT goods and services 
typically constitute between 3 and 5 per cent of total GDP at current prices. But 
their contribution to output growth can be larger than what these shares imply 
when ICT industries grow faster than the rest of the economy.
Secondly, the use of ICT capital as an input in the production of other goods 
and services can also make a significant contribution to economic growth. The 
benefits from ICT use are even likely to outweigh the benefits from ICT produc­
tion, which are limited to just one sector of the economy. As is shown in the next 
section, Oliner and Sichel (2000) estimate that almost one-half of the recent la­
bour productivity pick-up in the United States is due to the increased use of ICT 
capital in the production of output in the overall economy whereas close to 25 per 
cent of the labour productivity step-up is due to multi-factor productivity im­
provements in the ICT industry. The standard way of estimating the growth con­
tribution of ICT use is to treat ICT as a specific type of capital good in which firms 
invest and which they combine with all other types of capital as well as with la­
bour to produce output. As shown in eq. (5.2), the growth contribution of each 
input is then obtained by weighting its rate of change with a coefficient that repre­
sents its share in nominal income. ICT’s contribution is thus viCr KICT.
The third way in which information and communication technology can en­
hance economic growth is via the impact of ICT industries on multi-factor produc­
tivity. If the rapid growth of ICT production is based on efficiency and produc­
tivity gains in these industries, this contributes to productivity growth at the 
macro level as well. For example, Gordon (2000) argues that improvements in 
the production of computer hardware account for the entire acceleration in la­
bour productivity which has occurred in the United States since the mid-1990s. 
The productivity impact of ICT production cannot, however, be directly de­
duced from eq. (5.2) but the analysis has to be accompanied by an evaluation of 
the part of A  attributed to productivity growth in the ICT industry. The prob­
lem with interpreting an increase in multi-factor productivity as being caused by 
technological change is, however, that other non-technology factors will also be 
picked up by the residual. Such factors include changes in efficiency, scale and 
cyclical factors and measurement errors.
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To assess the contribution from ICT use and from multi-factor productivity 
improvement to the growth of labour productivity, let us denote the number of 
hours worked by H(t) and labour productivity by Y(t)/H(t). The basic growth ac­
counting equation (5.2) can be rearranged to
Y - H = v (CT(K,CT - H )  + Vo(K0 - H )  + vl ( L - H )  + A.  (5.3)
It shows that there are four sources of labour productivity growth. The first one 
is ICT capital deepening, i.e. an increase in ICT capital services per hour worked, 
and the second source is other capital deepening. The third component is the im­
provement in labour quality which is defined as the difference between the 
growth rates of labour services and hours worked. The fourth source is a general 
advance in multi-factor productivity.
Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3) are based on the assumption that the private and social 
rates of return from the use of ICT capital are equal to each other. But they can 
also be applied in the case where ICT generates positive externalities. The bene­
fits above those reflected in the measured income share cannot, however, be di­
rectly observed but will be captured by the multi-factor productivity residual A. 
Consequently, there is no reason to expect such externalities to exist if increases 
in multi-factor productivity cannot be observed. And even if they can, the prob­
lem is that they may have been caused by other factors than those associated 
with externalities emanating from the use of ICT.
The growth accounting technique described above can be applied to incorpo­
rate the fact that the capital input is not homogenous but consists of heteroge­
neous assets. A dollar spent on new ICT equipment can provide more productive 
services per period than, say, a dollar spent on a new building. For any given type 
of asset, there is a flow of productive services from the cumulative stock of past in­
vestments. These flows are not usually directly observable but have to be approxi­
mated. The standard assumption in growth accounting is that service flows are in 
proportion to the stock of assets after each vintage has been converted into stan­
dard "efficiency" units. The so computed capital stock is called the productive 
stock of a given type of asset (see, e.g. OECD, 2001b). It is the appropriate mea­
sure for growth accounting, as it measures the income-generating capacity of the 
existing stock over a given time period. This concept differs from the wealth stock 
which measures the current market value of the assets in use.
Aggregate capital service flows can be estimated by using asset-specific user 
costs or rental prices to weight each heterogeneous asset and to account for substi­
tution between them. Under competitive markets and equilibrium conditions, 
user costs reflect the marginal productivity of the different assets. They thus pro­
vide a means to incorporate differences in the productive contribution of hetero­
geneous investments as the composition of investments and capital changes 
(OECD, 2001b). For example, as firms respond to fast declining ICT prices by 
substituting away from other capital equipment or structures and toward ICT 
equipment, a larger portion of investment will be in assets with relatively high 
marginal products, and the aggregate capital service flow increases. This can also 
be interpreted as an increase in the quality of capital (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000).
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The user cost of ICT capital services will also be needed in estimating the 
share of nominal income accruing to ICT capital. Unlike the wage share, it is not 
directly observable in income statistics. The user cost is obtained as
r lC T  =  P lC T  d  +  d -iC T  ~ P l C T  )  ( 5 - 4 )
where picr is the acquisition price of new ICT capital goods and pICT its rate of 
change, i is the internal rate of return and dICT captures economic depreciation. 
ICT capital’s income share is then obtained as r¡CTSICT /  pY Y where S,CT is the 
real wealth stock of ICT capital and pY is the output price.
5.3 Lessons from the United States
The performance of the US economy was remarkable in the 1990s. The trend 
rate of GDP growth rose from 2.5 per cent at the start of the decade to 4.5 per 
cent at the end. This rapid advance was accompanied by a substantial increase in 
the growth of labour productivity. The growth of output per hour worked in the 
non-farm business sector accelerated from around 1.6 per cent per annum before 
1995 to almost 2.7 in the period 1996-99. By applying the standard growth ac­
counting framework (5.3), Oliner and Sichel (2000) estimate that the growing 
use of ICT equipment and the efficiency improvements in computer production 
account for about two-thirds of this one percentage point step-up in labour pro­
ductivity growth.
Table 5.1 summarizes Oliner and Sichel’s (2000) findings on the contribu­
tions of the input factors to real non-farm business output for three time periods. 
Output rose at an average pace of about 3 per cent in the first two periods cover­
ing 1974-90 and 1991-95 and all ICT capital services accounted for about 0.5 
percentage points of this growth. The contribution from computer hardware was 
the highest of the ICT components: about 0.3 percentage points a year. The 
third period, 1996-99, displays a significant change in the growth process. O ut­
put grew at the average rate of 4.8 per cent and the ICT contribution increased 
to 1.1 percentage points per year. Computer hardware contributed 0.6, software 
0.3 and communications equipment 0.2 percentage points, respectively. It is also 
interesting to see that since the start of the 1990s, ICT contribution to output 
growth has exceeded the contribution from the rest of the capital stock.186 An in­
creasing share of growth can also be attributed to multi-factor productivity 
whose contribution seems to have more than doubled in the late 1990s.
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) come up with estimates which are quite similar 
to Oliner and Sichel's. They show that in the late 1990s the growth contribution 
of computer hardware was 0.5, software 0.2 and communications equipment 0.1 
percentage points per year. The discrepancies in the findings primarily reflect the 
slight differences in the time periods and output concepts. Jorgenson and
186 The measure of the rest of the capital stock encompasses producers' durable equipment, 
non-residential structures, residential rental structures, inventories, and land.
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Tab le  S.1 C o n trib u tio n s to  real n o n -fa rm  b u sin ess o u tp u t in the US, 1 9 7 4 -9 9
1
i 1 9 7 4 -9 0 1 9 9 1 -9 5 1 9 9 6 -9 9  I
Output grow th1 3.1 2.8 4.8
Contributions2 from: ICT capital 0.5 0.6 1.1
Hardware 0.3 0.3 0.6
Software 0.1 0.3 0.3
Com m unications eq. 0.1 0.1 0.2
Other capital 0.9 0.4 0.8
Labour hours 1.2 0.8 1.5
Labour quality 0.2 0.4 0.3
M ulti-factor productivity 0.3 0.5 1.2
1 A v e ra g e  a n n u a l log d iffe re n ce  m ultip lied  by 100,
2 P e rce n tage  points per year.
N um be rs m ay  not a d d  to  to ta ls  d u e  to  ro u n d in g.
Source: Oliner and Sichel (2000).
Stiroh’s output concept is somewhat broader than the one used by Oliner and 
Sichel, making ICT output shares lower.
But what explains the observed increase in the growth contribution from in­
formation and communications technology? In their previous analysis, Oliner 
and Sichel (1994) concluded that this contribution had been relatively small 
through the early 1990s, especially if one focused on computer hardware alone. 
The reason was that, in spite of the large investments, computers were still only a 
small fraction (3-4 per cent) of the existing capital stock, and, consequently, the 
share of nominal gross income accruing to computers was rather small, about 1 
per cent. Now they find that this share increased to 1.8 per cent in the late 
1990s. Similar increases are also observed for software (from 0.9 to 2.4 per cent) 
and for communications equipment (from 1.6 to 2.1 per cent). In conclusion,
6.3 per cent of income accrues to ICT capital, making it an important compo­
nent of the capital stock in the US. This technology has diffused sufficiently 
widely to have a visible impact on aggregate economic growth.
Both Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) also apply 
growth accounting to break down the observed one percentage point step-up in 
the growth rate of labour productivity between the first and second halves of the 
decade. The results are displayed in table 5.2 which shows that the growing use 
of ICT capital accounted for almost half a point of the rise in productivity.
In addition, Oliner and Sichel (2000) observe that the rapidly improving 
technology for producing computers and embedded semiconductors has contrib­
uted another 0.3 percentage points to the acceleration. This second channel 
works through the multi-factor productivity {A) residual in the standard growth 
accounting model (5.3), and Oliner and Sichel estimate the impact of the effi­
ciency improvement of computer and semiconductor production in a three-sec­
tor model. Taken together, these two factors -  the use and the production of 
ICT -  account for about two-thirds to four-fifths of the pick-up in labour pro­
ductivity growth since 1995. Multi-factor productivity in the rest of the econ­
omy provided the remainder, with labour quality actually falling somewhat
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Table 5.2 Alternative estimates of the source of the acceleration in labour productivity in 
the US in the second half of the 1990s
\ Oliner and Sichel 
(2000)
Jorgenson and Stiroh 
(2000)
Change in the average growth rate of labour productivity 1.0 1.0
Contributions from:
Capital deepening 0.5 0.5
ICT 0.5 0.3
Other 0.0 0.2
Labour quality -0 .1 -0 .1
M ulti-factor productivity 0.7 0.6
Production of ICT 0.3 0.2
Other production 0.4 0.4
N u m b e rs m ay n o t ad d  to  tota ls du e  to  ro u n d in g .
Source: Sichel (2000).
which is consistent with the marked expansion in employment in this period. 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) analyse a broader set of 37 industries, but their 
findings about the productivity impacts of the use and production of ICT are 
again quite similar to Oliner and Sichel’s.
Regarding the acceleration of the multi-factor productivity from about 
0.3-0.5 per cent per year in 1974-95 to over one per cent per year in the late 
1990s, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) conclude that its source can be traced in 
large part, but not entirely, to the industries which produce computers, 
semi-conductors and other high-technology equipment. There is, however, little 
evidence of spillovers from production of ICT to the industries using this tech­
nology intensively such as finance, insurance and real estate and other services. 
The reasons for the sluggish productivity growth in services are not self-evident. 
Productivity is, of course, difficult to measure in many service activities and ICT 
is still a rather new technology, but it may also be the case that computers and 
telecommunications equipment are not very productive in some industries.
Gordon’s (2000) view about the impacts of ICT on labour productivity is 
somewhat more pessimistic than either Oliner and Sichel’s or Jorgenson and 
Stiroh’s. He first attributes a sizeable part of labour productivity growth in the 
late 1990s to cyclical factors. Labour, being a quasi-fixed production factor, 
tends to adjust only partially during cyclical swings of output. Consequently, if 
output is growing faster than trend, then labour productivity is also growing 
faster than trend. Secondly, after making adjustment for ICT capital deepening 
and other factors, Gordon finds that there has been virtually no change in the 
rate of productivity growth outside of the durable goods manufacturing sector 
which accounts for 12 per cent of the US GDP. He concludes that, in the re­
maining 88 per cent of the economy, the New Economy’s impacts on productiv­
ity growth are surprisingly absent and that ICT capital deepening has been re­
markably unproductive. Consequently, the productivity impacts of ICT invest­
ments have been limited to the computer and other durable goods manufactur-
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ing sector. However, a recent study by Nordhaus (2001), based on a new dataset 
and on new methods of measuring productivity growth, confirms that there in­
deed has been a rebound in labour productivity growth in the US but that it is 
not narrowly focused in the ICT sectors only. Baily and Lawrence (2001) arrive 
at similar conclusions.
But if information and communication technology has been the key factor of 
the improved productivity performance of the US economy in recent years, 
when can we expect the ICT revolution to occur in the rest of the advanced 
industrial countries?
5.4 Lessons from the G7 countries
The principal problem in analysing the impacts of ICT is that, except in the US, 
national income and product accounts do not provide detailed enough informa­
tion about ICT investment, quality-adjusted price indices and measures of the 
ICT capital stocks. As described above, there now exists a view of the role that 
ICT plays in the US economy, while even most other OECD economies still 
leave ICT out of the picture. The lack of data on other countries makes it diffi­
cult to make international comparisons that have to rely on alternative sources 
and use simplifying assumptions for purposes of comparison between countries. 
It also explains the bias towards the United States which is reflected in many 
studies in this field.
There are, however, some private providers of ICT data. For example, Inter­
national Data Corporation (IDC) publishes an annual report on the status of the 
world-wide information technology market in about 50 countries. The report 
contains data, based on the revenues of primary vendors, on spending on com­
puter hardware equipment, data communications equipment, computer soft­
ware and computer services including both professional and support services. 
The data produced by private consulting and other agencies may not be as accu­
rate and reliable as the national accounting data, but they have the advantage of 
a symmetric treatment of all countries.
Schreyer (2000) has tapped this data source for current price expenditure on 
ICT goods, software excluded, in the G7 countries. Indicators of ICT investment 
volumes can be obtained from such data by dividing current price expenditures 
with appropriate price indices, but the problem here is that methodologies to 
measure price change in ICT goods vary greatly across OECD countries. 
Schreyer has solved this problem by developing a common deflator for all the 
countries under investigation. It is based on the assumption that the differences 
between price changes for ICT capital goods and non-ICT capital goods are the 
same across countries. Under this assumption, information about the quality-ad- 
justed ICT prices for the United States can be used in estimating similar prices 
for the other countries.
Given information about the age-efficiency patterns of ICT goods, the invest­
ment volume data can be used to estimate productive capital stocks for ICT 
goods. Schreyer (2000) applies an age-efficiency pattern that declines slowly in 
the early years of an ICT capital good’s service life and rapidly at the end, similar
92 Statistics Finland
to the ones used by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (1997) and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics.
Figure 5.1 displays Schreyer’s estimates for the shares of ICT in the produc­
tive, non-residential capital stocks of the G7 countries.18' In 1996, the share was 
the highest, 7.4 per cent, in the United Sates and the lowest, 2.1 per cent, in It­
aly. All the G7 countries have been adding to their IT capital stock at two-digit 
rates over the period 1979-96. However, only in the United States, Canada and 
the United Kingdom has this process of building up IT capital accelerated in the 
mid-1990s. With the exception of Japan, the G7 countries have accumulated 
communication technology capital at a much lower pace than IT capital, the av­
erage annual growth rate being 8 per cent in 1979-96.
Table 5.3 summarizes Schreyer’s (2000) estimates of the contributions from 
ICT capital to output growth in the G7 countries in 1990-96. They are obtained 
by multiplying the annual growth rates of the IT and CT productive capital 
stocks by their respective income shares, by adding the IT and CT contributions 
together and by averaging over the period. In 1990-96, the ICT contribution to 
GDP growth was roughly 0.2 percentage points a year in France, Western Ger­
many, Italy and Japan, 0.3 percentage points in Canada and the UK, and 0.4 per­
centage points in the US where it amounted to almost half of the contribution of 
the entire fixed capital stock. The growth contribution was larger in the US than 
elsewhere because both the ICT investment rate was higher and the ICT income 
share was larger there than in the rest of the G7 countries. The higher income 
share, in turn, reflects the larger share of ICT assets in the total capital stock, as 
shown in figure 5.1.
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0
Figure 5.1 ICT capital as a percentage of the productive capital stock
Source: Schreyer (2000).
187 Schreyer's measure of the capital stock encompasses non-residential structures, other non-resi- 
dential construction, transport equipment, IT hardware, communications equipment, and 
other non-transport equipment. Software is not included.
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T a b le  5.3 IC T  co n trib u tio n  to  o utput gro w th  in the G7 countries, 1 9 9 0 -9 6
A v e ra g e  a n n u a l g ro w th  ra te  o f  * In co m e  sh a re s  in C o n trib u tio n s  to
1996:** o u tp u t g ro w th  from :*
To ta l IT CT IT  C T  ICT  To ta l
o u tp u t ca p ita l ca p ita l c a p ita l ca p ita l ca p ita l ca p ita l
Canada 1.7 17.6 4.3 1.5 1.3 0.28 0.7
France 0.9 11.0 2.1 0.9 0.9 0.17 1.0
W est Germany 1.8 18.6 3.4 0.8 1.1 0.19 1.0
Italy 1.2 12.9 9.2 0.9 0.9 0.21 0.7
Japan 1.8 14.S 15.0 0.8 0.4 0.19 1.0
UK 2.1 17.6 2.2 1.5 1.6 0.28 0.8
US 2.7 23.8 5.1 1.7 1.9 0.42 0.9
US 1 9 9 6 -9 8 4.6 0.72 1.8
* =  p e rc e n ta g e  po ints,
** =  per cent,
.. =  in fo rm a tio n  not availab le . 
Source: Schreyer (2000).
Schreyer also shows that the ICT contribution has been relatively stable in all 
countries over the longer period 1980-96. But when considered in terms of a 
share in total output growth, its relative importance to economic growth has 
risen in all countries in the 1990s. Interestingly, however, as shown in the last 
row of table 5.3, even the absolute contribution measured in terms of percentage 
points per year seems to have increased significantly in the US in the late 1990s, 
confirming Oliner and Sichel’s (2000) findings.
Moreover, the new version of the System of National Accounts (SNA93) rec­
ommends treating computer software as gross fixed capital formation, and not as 
intermediate consumption as previously. Also the US has implemented this rec­
ommendation in its national accounts, making it possible to assess its contribution 
to output growth. Schreyer (2000) estimates that in 1996-98 software added 0.2 
percentage points of growth to the 0.72 percentage points of ICT hardware dis­
played in the last row of table 5.3. Consequently, ICT hardware and software ac­
counted for a larger share of growth than the rest of the capital stock did.
Schreyer’s (2000) cross-country comparison raises at least two important 
questions. First, has the growth contribution of ICT been larger in those coun­
tries which are more advanced in the deployment of ICT than in the other G7 
countries except the US? Second, has the growth contribution picked up in such 
countries in the late 1990s?
5 .5  E vide nee from Finland
Finland is one of the leading ICT producers in Europe (see Koski, Rouvinen and 
Yla-Anttila, 2002), and is also often regarded as being one of the leading New 
Economies defined more generally. For example, UNDP’s (2001) new technol­
ogy achievement index ranks Finland as the top country followed by the United
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States, Sweden, Japan and the Republic of Korea in the ability to participate in 
the network age. Consequently, comparing the economic impacts of ICT in the 
two top countries is of special interest.
However, not much systematic evidence is available about the impacts of the 
production and use of ICT in this country. The only macroeconomic analysis we 
are aware of is Niininen’s (2001) growth accounting study in which he demon­
strates, among other things, that IT hardware contributed 0.4 percentage points of 
GDP growth at the average annual rate of 2.4 in the period from 1983 to 1996.
Our aim here is to update and extend Niininen’s [2001) findings in such a 
way that the results become comparable with the findings for the G7 countries 
reviewed above. Besides IT hardware, we also include software and communica­
tions equipment in our measure of the ICT capital stock. And, instead of using 
the net capital stock as the capital input measure like Niininen does, we estimate 
the productive capital stocks and apply them in the growth accounting analysis. 
In fact, this is the first time that productive capital stocks are estimated for Fin­
land. As explained earlier, the productive capital stock is the appropriate mea­
sure for growth accounting as it measures the income-generating capacity of the 
existing stock over a given time period. This concept differs from the wealth 
stock which measures the current market value of the assets in use. The differ­
ence between these measures can be quite substantial for assets like computers 
which tend to lose their market value at a much faster rate than their 
income-generating capacity.
5.5.7 Growth contribution from  the production o f ICT
Figure 5.2 displays the annual changes of the volume of GDP, hours worked and 
labour productivity in Finland in 1976-99. The recession of the early 1990s was 
one of the most severe ever experienced in an industrial country in peacetime. 
The volume of GDP declined by 10.4 per cent between 1990 and 1993. Since 
1994, GDP has grown at the average annual rate of 4.6 per cent which is sub-
Figure 5.2 Annual growth rates of GDP volume, hours worked and labour productivity in Finland, 
1976-99
Source: Statistics Finland's National Accounts Database.
Statistics Finland 95
stantially higher than the pre-recession rate of 3.0 per cent. However, similar ac­
celeration cannot be observed in labour productivity which is here defined as 
real GDP divided by the number of hours worked. In fact, its annual growth rate 
has been smaller (2.5 per cent) after the recession than before it (3.1 per cent) 
although a substantial adjustment in the level of labour productivity took place 
during the recession years. At a first glance, it is difficult to detect any signs of 
the new economy in these time series, and it may be the case that the economy is 
returning to its trend growth path.
It is well known that the production of ICT goods and services has played an 
important role in the recovery from the recession. As shown in eq. (5.2), the di­
rect growth contribution of the ICT industry can be calculated by multiplying 
the rate of change of its value added by its share in nominal income. To make the 
results comparable to those reviewed above, our analysis is confined to the mar­
ket sector which encompasses non-financial corporations, financial and insurance 
corporations and unincorporated enterprises. Table 5.4 shows that the direct 
contribution to output growth from the production of ICT goods and services in­
creased fourfold in the late 1990s amounting to two percentage points per year.
Table 5.5 presents our definition of ICT industries and shows that their out­
put share has increased steadily.188 In 1999, the Finnish nominal GDP was 6.8 
times as large as in 1975, but the nominal gross value added of ICT industries
Table 5.4 Output contribution of ICT production in the market sector, 1975-99
■ 1 9 7 5 -9 0 1 9 9 0 -9 5 1 9 9 5 -9 9 *
Output grow th, % 3.2 -0.7 6.0
Contribution from ICT industries,
percentage points 0.3 0.5 2.0
* pre lim in ary  estim ate.
Source: Statistics Finland's National Accounts Database.
Table 5.5 Shares of ICT industries in the value added of the market sector, %
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999*
M anufacture of electrical and optical equipment: 2.1 2.0 2.6 2.9 4.8 7.9
Office m achinery and computers (ISIC 30) 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1
Electrical machinery (ISIC 31) 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1
Radio, television and communication equipment (ISIC 32) 0.5 0.4 0.8 1.0 2.7 5.9
Medical and precision products (ISIC 33) 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8
Telecom m unications services (ISIC 642) 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.9 3.0
Computer software and services (ISIC 72) 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.3 2.1
Total ICT 3.7 4.2 5.3 5.8 8.0 13.0
* pre lim in ary  estim ate.
Source: Statistics Finland's National Accounts Database.
188 Because of problems with data availability, the ICT industries include neither wholesale trade 
in nor renting of office machinery and computers.
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was 21 times as large as it was in 1975. Manufacture of radio, television and 
communications equipment and apparatus (i.e. ISIC industry 32] has been the 
real success story. Its nominal gross value added was more than 72 times as large 
in 1999 as it was back in 1975.
5.5.2 Growth contribution from  the use o f ICT
The growth accounting framework of eq. (5.2) is applied next to assess the con­
tribution to output growth from the use of ICT capital as an input in the produc­
tion of other goods and services in the market sector. Our definition of ICT capi­
tal encompasses IT hardware, software and telecommunications equipment. 
Since Finnish national accounts data are not available on hardware and telecom­
munications gross fixed capital formation, the analysis is based on the ICT ex­
penditure data published by the World Information Technology and Services Al­
liance (WITSA 2001) for the years 1992-99 and provided by International Data 
Corporation Finland for the period 1983-91. For the earlier years ITC expendi­
ture was estimated using the ITC output shares for the first year for which data 
exist. As telecommunications expenditure in the WITSA dataset includes both 
investment and services, we follow Schreyer (2000) in assuming that a 30 per 
cent share constitutes a lower bound on the investment expenditure component 
in the total telecommunications spending. Information about software189 invest­
ment was received from Statistics Finland.
To deflate the current price ICT investment series, we use the same US indexes 
as Schreyer (2000) for computer IT hardware and telecommunication equipment 
and correct them for the exchange rate changes.190 The deflator for software invest­
ment is a weighted (50/50) average earnings index for industry computer and re­
lated activities and the pre-packaged software producer price index, corrected for 
the exchange rate, provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Productive capital stocks are calculated by industry and asset type, and they 
are aggregated using their user costs -  the rate of return plus depreciation minus 
holding gain -  to get the appropriate measure of capital services (see the Appen­
dix in Jalava and Pohjola (2001) for a more detailed explanation). Ten types of 
assets are distinguished, including the three ICT assets, transport equipment, 
other machinery and equipment, non-residential buildings and other structures. 
Residential buildings, consumer durables, inventories and land are not included. 
Hyperbolic age-efficiency profiles are applied to account for the loss in efficiency 
of the assets as they age. The rate of return needed for the evaluation of the user 
costs (see eq. (5.4)) is estimated with the help of the accounting identity by 
which capital income equals the difference between value added and labour 
compensation. Given this estimate for the value of capital services, and given a 
measure of the capital stock, of depreciation and of capital gains, the rate of re­
turn is obtained as a residual.
189 Purchased and own-account software compiled using the commodity-flow method.
190 As the last year in Schreyer's analysis is 1996, we extrapolated the deflator series until 1999 by 
using the relative changes of the appropriate indexes obtained from the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.
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Figure 5.3 displays our estimate of the shares of the ICT assets in the total 
productive capital stock. In 1999, about 9 per cent of this stock was in the form 
of ICT assets. Comparing Finland with the G7 countries shown in figure 5.1, we 
have to exclude software and consider the latest year for which comparable data 
exist. In 1996, IT hardware and telecommunications equipment accounted for 
about 4.5 per cent of the Finnish productive non-residential capital stock. This 
share is close to the ones displayed in figure 5.1 for Canada (5.0 per cent) and 
the United Kingdom (5.2 per cent) but well below the one for the United States 
(7.4 per cent).
As a measure of labour input we use hours worked adjusted for labour quality 
measured by the level of education. The hours worked are cross-classified by edu­
cational level, and the marginal product of each educational group is measured by 
the average salary of the group. Increases in labour quality reflect the substitution 
of workers with high marginal products for workers with low marginal products.
Table 5.6 presents the results of the growth accounting analysis. The entire 
period is divided into three subperiods. In the first phase, covering the years 
1975-90, the value added of the market sector grew at the average annual rate of
3.2 per cent. ICT capital accounted for 0.2 percentage points of this growth. The 
second phase covers the first half of the 1990s and includes the deep recession in 
the Finnish economy. Market output declined, but the growth contribution of 
ICT capital remained positive averaging 0.3 percentage points per year. The 
third phase, consisting of the years 1995-99, depicts the rapid recovery from the 
recession. O utput increased at the average annual pace of 6.0 per cent, and ICT 
capital’s contribution doubled to 0.7 percentage points per year. Interestingly, 
however, the growth contribution from the rest of the capital services was still 
negative. This reflects the fact that capital was used rather inefficiently in the 
Finnish business sector in the past decades (Pohjola, 1996) and that considerable 
improvement in its productivity has occurred after the recession.
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Figure 5.3 ICT capital as a percentage of the nominal productive non-residential capital stock 
in Finland
Sources: Statistics Finland's National Accounts Database and WITSA (2001).
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A recent study by Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) finds as well that the 
growth contribution from the use of 1CT capital has doubled in Finland in the 
late 1990s. The output contribution was 0.62 percentage points in 1995-99. 
This is quite similar to our estimate of 0.7 percentage points. A closer compari­
son of these findings is, however, difficult because the OECD study does not de­
scribe the source of the ICT investment data. Also Daveri (2001) in his compari­
son of the EU countries obtains results for Finland which are quite close to our 
estimates. He uses the same datasource for ICT investment.
When Finland is compared with the other countries analysed above, the fol­
lowing observations are immediate. First, in the period up to the mid-1990s, the 
contribution to output growth from ICT hardware was in Finland in the same 
range -  from 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points per year -  as in Canada and the United 
Kingdom. This contribution was, however, only about half of the level achieved 
in the United States. Second, just like in the US, the output growth attributed to 
the use of ICT, including software, doubled to 0.7 percentage points in the sec­
ond half of the 1990s, but still remained at a level well below the US record of
1.1 percentage points per year. The panel in the middle of table 5.6 shows the
Table 5.6 Contributions to real output growth in the market sector, 1975-99
1975-90 1990-95 1995-99*
Output grow th1 3.2 -0.7 6.0
Contributions2 from ICT capital 0.2 0.3 0.7
Hardware 0.1 0.2 0.4
Software 0.1 0.1 0.1
Communications eq. 0.0 0.1 0.1
Other capital 0.8 -0 .7 -0 .4
Labour hours -0 .4 -2 .9 1.3
Labour quality 0.2 0.2 0.3
Multi-factor productivity 2.2 2.3 4.2
Income shares1 ICT capital 1.7 5.0 5.6
Hardware 0.5 1.5 1.7
Software 0.6 2.4 2.4
Communications eq. 0.5 1.1 1.5
Other capital 33.9 33.8 38.8
Labour 64.4 61.3 55.6
Growth rates1 ICT capital 16.5 7.2 12.4
Hardware 29.7 15.1 28.1
Software 12.9 2.7 5.6
Communications eq. 9.9 9.1 10.2
Other capital 2.8 -2 .1 -1 .1
Labour hours -0 .7 -4 .5 2.3
* =  pre lim inary  estim ate,
1 =  per cent,
2 = p e rc e n ta g e  points.
N u m b e rs m ay not add to  tota ls du e  to  ro u n d in g.
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increasing importance of the ICT capital which is reflected in the rising income 
share attributed to this factor of production.
The third observation is rather surprising. In spite of the rapid accumulation 
of ICT capital, the growth rate of labour productivity declined in the Finnish 
market sector in the second half of the 1990s. This is seen from table 5.7 which, 
by applying eq. (5.3), displays the contributions of the production factors to the 
growth in labour productivity. It can be argued that its growth rate was unusu­
ally high in the early 1990s because of the structural adjustments which took 
place during the recession. But in the late 1990s labour productivity grew also at 
a lower rate than it did in 1975-90.
Table 5.8 looks for an explanation for the deceleration in labour productivity 
growth by contrasting the labour productivity trends in Finland and the United 
States. As noted above, the contribution from ICT capital deepening has been 
lower in Finland than in the US, but this cannot explain the observed fall in the 
growth rate of labour productivity. Also, the contributions from multi-factor 
productivity have had similar impacts in both countries, increasing rather than
Table 5.7 Contributions to labour productivity in the market sector, 1975-99
1975-90 1990-95 1995-99* I
Growth rate of labour productivity1 3.7 3.9 3.5
Contributions from2
ICT capital 0.3 0.6 0.5
Hardware 0.1 0.3 0.4
Software 0.1 0.2 0.1
Com m unications eq. 0.0 0.1 0.1
Other capital 1.0 0.7 -1 .3
Labour quality 0.2 0.2 0.3
Multifactor productivity 2.2 2.3 4.2
* =  p re lim in ary  estim ate,
1 =  p e r cent,
2 =  p e rce n ta g e  points.
N u m b e rs  m ay  not sum  to  to ta ls  d u e  to  ro u n d in g.
Table 5.8 Sources of the changes in labour productivity growth rates in the second half of the 1990s
:= «Î ' a  ' * - , : F in la n d U nited  S ta te s  P
Change in the average growth rate of labour productivity 
in 1 9 9 5 -9 9  over 1990-95 -0 .4 1.0
Contributions from:
Capital deepening -2 .1 0.5
ICT capital 0.0 0.5
Other capital -2 .1 0.0
Labour quality 0.0 -0 .1
Multi-factor productivity 1.8 0.7
N ote s: P e rce ntage  po ints. N u m b e rs m ay not sum  to  to ta ls  d u e  to ro u n d in g. 
Source: Oliner and Sichel (2000) for the United States.
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decreasing the pace of improvement in labour productivity. Consequently, the 
explanation lies in the decline of the amount of non-ICT capital per worker. As 
mentioned above, this reflects the fact that capital was used rather inefficiently 
in the pre-recession era. It is worth pointing out, however, that even in the late 
1990s the growth rate of labour productivity was higher in Finland than in the 
US. It is not the level of this growth which is the problem but its declining trend.
5.5.3 Growth contribution from  productivity im provem ent 
in ICT industries
Regarding the comparison between Finland and the other countries, the final ob­
servation concerns the contribution to output growth from multi-factor produc­
tivity. As shown in table 5.6, this has been quite large in Finland. Moreover, it 
has increased over time from 2.2 percentage points in 1975-90 to 4.2 percentage 
points in 1995-99. Although rising over time as well, the growth rates have been 
more modest in the United States: 0.3 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively 
(see table 5.1). Schreyer (2000) finds growth contributions of equal size for the 
rest of the G7 countries in the first half of the 1990s, ranging from 0.4 percent­
age points in France to 1.3 in Germany.
International comparisons of multi-factor productivity should, however, be 
interpreted with caution. For one, the quality of the growth accounting data dif­
fers between countries and these differences will be picked up by the residual 
term A  which is used as an estimate of multi-factor productivity growth. If, for 
example, the quality of capital and labour cannot be measured accurately, the 
measurement errors will be reflected in the residual. For another, this residual 
also picks up the impacts of other non-technology factors such as business cycles 
and changes in the scale and efficiency of economic activity. As already noted 
above, efficiency improvement may be one of the explanations for the fast 
productivity growth in Finland after the recession.
Leaving these problems aside, we could still try to trace aggregate multi-fac­
tor productivity growth to its sources in the productivity growth of individual in­
dustries following Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). To 
do this properly, however, would require the estimation of the productive capi­
tal stock for each industry. Also, because industries differ from each other with 
respect to their use of intermediate inputs, the application of the so-called 
KLEMS growth accounting framework would be preferable instead of the one 
applied here which is based on measuring output in terms of value added. In the 
KLEMS approach, industry output is measured using a gross output concept and 
the inputs include capital services (K), labour services (L) as well as intermediate 
inputs, energy (£), materials (M) and services (S) (see, e.g., Jorgenson and Stiroh 
2000). Unfortunately, adequate data are not available in Finland for measuring 
either the industry-level productive capital stocks or the intermediate inputs, 
and we have to be content with less satisfactory methods.
A recent study by Pilat and Lee (2001) evaluates the contributions of ICT us­
ing and ICT producing industries to labour and multi-factor productivity growth 
in 11 member countries using OECD’s STAN database and measuring output in
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value-added terms. For Finland, the study finds that about 20 per cent of the 
multi-factor productivity growth in the total economy can be attributed to the 
ICT industries in the 1990s. Using our estimate of productivity growth, this 
means that the contribution from ICT industries was 0.8 percentage points on 
average in the late 1990s. Adding this up with our estimate of the contribution 
from the use of ICT implies that the overall ICT contribution to output growth 
was 1.5 percentage points in 1995-99.
5.6 Conclusions
The research findings surveyed in the first part of this chapter confirm that both 
the production and the use of ICT have been the factors behind the improved 
economic performance of the United States in the 1990s. The acceleration in the 
growth rates of labour and multi-factor productivity has not only been limited to 
the computer and semi-conductor producing industries bu t much -  if not even 
most -  of it has taken place outside this sector, i.e., in the industries using ICT.
The evidence for the New Economy is much weaker outside the United States. 
In the other G7 countries, the contributions to output growth from the use of ICT 
were less than half of the contributions estimated for the US in the early 1990s. 
Moreover, a recent update of these calculations (OECD, 200Id) finds that the out­
put contributions have increased only in the US, Australia and Finland in the late 
1990s, being 0.9, 0.6 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. The fact that Australia 
is not a significant producer of ICT can be taken as evidence that ICT production is 
not a necessary condition to experience the growth effects of ICT.
Our analysis of the Finnish growth experience confirms that indeed the con­
tribution from the use of ICT to output growth in the market sector has in­
creased from 0.3 percentage points in the early 1990s to 0.7 points in the late 
1990s. In addition, the fast growth of multi-factor productivity in the ICT pro­
ducing industries has had a substantial growth contribution which has been at 
least as large as that from the use of ICT.
However, in spite of the significant role played by ICT in the recovery from 
the deep recession, there has been no acceleration in the trend rate of labour pro­
ductivity. Other factors, notably the decline in the use of non-ICT capital per 
worker, have offset the growth-enhancing impact of ICT. In fact, the growth 
performance of the Finnish economy has not been very outstanding when con­
sidered over the whole decade of the 1990s. The unemployment rate is now 
around 9 per cent, and the economy is still returning to its trend growth path. 
The New Economy is yet to demonstrate its strength.
W hat is it then that the US economy has and the others do not have to enable 
it to benefit so much better from the diffusion of ICT? Baily and Lawrence 
(2001) suggest that the answer lies in the fact that the US has globally competi­
tive service industries seeking out new technologies to improve their productiv­
ity. ICT innovations have been driven by the demand for improved technologies 
in the using industries. But the productivity gains not only reflect increased in­
vestment in ICT, but also complementary innovations in business organization 
and strategy. This is what the New Economy is all about.
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Abstract: The chapter analyzes the impacts of information and communications 
technology on output and labour productivity growth in Finland in 1995-2005. 
Information and communications technology (ICT) accounted for 1.87 percent­
age points of the observed labour productivity growth at the average rate of 2.87 
per cent. The contribution from increases in ICT capital intensity was 0.46 per­
centage points. The rest is attributed to multi-factor productivity growth in ICT 
production, especially in telecommunications production. The ongoing out­
sourcing of ICT production to low-wage countries provides a threat to produc­
tivity performance in the future. Policy makers should consider where the next 
wave of productivity growth will come from.
6.1 Introduction
Finland transformed itself in the 20th century from a backward agrarian country 
reliant on its natural resources into a modern industrial society whose telecom­
munications manufacturing is at the cutting edge of the world. The flagship of 
Finnish telecommunications is of course Nokia (see Häikiö, 2002). Back in 1950 
the Finnish living standard, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita, was less than half of the US equivalent. In 2003, this ratio was 
three-quarters.193 The road to prosperity, however, has not always been smooth 
(see Ojala, Eloranta and Jalava, 2006). The largest peace-time hurdle was the re­
cession in the early 1990s when real GDP plummeted by 11 per cent during the 
years from 1990 to 1993.
The tale of Finnish economic growth is very much one of productivity. From 
the year 1900 to 2005, the standard of living has increased 13-fold although the
191 This chapter was first published as: Jalava, J. and Pohjola, M. (2007a): "ICT as a source of out­
put and productivity growth in Finland", Telecommunications Policy (31) 8-9, pp. 463-472.
192 The helpful comments of the editor and two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. 
All remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. Jukka Jalava's research is partly sup­
ported by the EU KLEMS project "Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Indus­
try Approach", funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of 
the 6'h Framework Programme, Priority 8, "Policy Support and Anticipating Scientific and 
Technological Needs". Matti Pohjola gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Yrjo 
Jahnsson Foundation and from the HSE Foundation.
193 Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and The Conference Board, Total Econ­
omy database, August 2004 http://www.ggdc.net.
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number of hours worked per capita has declined. This was possible because la­
bour productivity -  GDP per hour worked -  rose 14-fold.
In an historical perspective, Finland is now in a similar situation as it was a 
century ago when the basis for electricity and telecommunications -  the new 
technologies of the day -  was laid. Past economic success was achieved through 
the adoption of electricity in the extraction of rents from its natural endowments 
-  forests and minerals. The process created the present industrial structure in 
which the forest and metal sectors dominate. At best, GDP per hour worked in­
creased at the average rate of five per cent per year. Starting in the early 1970s, 
however, there has been a worrisome shift into slower gear, as the gains from in­
dustrialization have been depleting. After the turn of the millennium, labour 
productivity change averaged only half of its earlier peak figures (figure 6.1).1!M
The slowing down of productivity growth would not be a policy problem if it 
could not be remedied. But as the recent success of the US economy shows, de­
celerating productivity growth can be turned into an accelerating one. The ob­
served step-up in the trend of US labour productivity in the post-1995 era was 
traced by Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2003, 2006) to the impact of information 
and communications technology (ICT) on GDP growth. This growth resurgence 
prompts the question: How can the same outcome be accomplished elsewhere? 
This is especially topical in a country like Finland which has reaped the benefits 
o f the Nokia-phenomenon -  the case in point of a successful production of a new 
technology -  but has not as yet fully learnt to use this new technology in the pro­
duction processes of other industries.
Like electricity, ICT is a general purpose technology (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg, 1995) that spreads to all sectors of the economy, improving and be­
coming cheaper over time and facilitating the creation of new goods, services and 
modes of operation. It affects economic growth both as a component of aggre­
gate output in the form of ICT production and as a component of aggregate in­
pu t in the form of ICT capital services. Furthermore, it has an impact on growth
Labour productivity
Figure 6.1 Growth of labour productivity, 1901-2005, %
Source: Statistics Finland's National Accounts Database.
194 The labour productivity series was smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter.
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via the effect of multi-factor productivity (MFP) gains induced by rapid techno­
logical advances in the ICT-producing industries.
To provide a background for policy conclusions, a brief history of ICT in Fin­
land is presented in Section 6.2. Neoclassical growth accounting is then applied 
to delineate ICT’s influence on output and labour productivity growth. Due to 
the extraordinary severity of the recession in the early 1990s, the focus is on the 
1995-2005 period. In Section 6.3 the growth accounting methodology is out­
lined. Section 6.4 describes the data, and Section 6.5 presents the results. The 
last section presents a projection of labour productivity growth in the future and 
draws conclusions for policy.
6.2 A brief hi5tory of ICT in Finland
Finland was one of the leading countries in adopting the telephone. The first line 
was built in Helsinki in December 1877, only 18 months after the telephone was 
patented in the United States (Turpeinen, 1981). The Helsinki Telephone Cor­
poration was established in 1882. There were already 3.3 telephone lines per 
100 inhabitants in Helsinki in 1900, making it one of the major telephone cities 
in the world.
According to historians (e.g., Turpeinen, 1981), politics was one of the fac­
tors explaining the rapid adoption of the new communication technology. 
When the telephone was invented, Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy of 
the Russian Empire. The Finnish Telegraph Office was operated by the Russian 
authorities, but it was not clear who should grant permissions for operating the 
telephone. Upon application, the Senate of Finland decided that it has the right 
to do so. This decision was endorsed by Czar Alexander III, and it resulted in the 
establishment of private, regional telephone corporations all over the country. 
The statute the Senate issued made a sharp distinction between telephone and 
telegraph regulation and created a competitive telecommunications market. Just 
before World War II there were 815 telephone companies in Finland. In most 
other countries, the telephone was considered to be a successor to the telegraph 
and thereby a state monopoly.
In 1961, the Helsinki Telephone Corporation started experimenting with 
data transmission systems. The first commercial connection was installed in a re­
tail group in 1964 (Häikiö, 1995). The Finnish era of information technology 
had started a few years earlier when the first computer was purchased by the 
government-owned Post and Savings Bank in 1958 to oversee entries in savings 
accounts. The first Finnish computer was built in 1960 under the auspices of the 
Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines. (Jalava, 2004a)
In the early 1960s, a cable factory, Finnish Cable Works, with its 30 plus 
years of experience in manufacturing telecommunications cables, launched itself 
into the production of telecom equipment. Its long-term plan was to eventually 
start constructing computers. It also set up a computing centre, which was the 
foundation of Nokia’s electronics department, when in 1966 the company was 
merged with Nokia, a wood-pulp/papermill founded in 1865. In the early 1970s 
Nokia began producing computers and digital telephone exchanges. The produc­
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tion of computers was a major part of Nokia until the computer division was sold 
to ICL-Fujitsu in 1991. The electronics division did not become profitable until 
1971 and it did not contribute significantly to Nokia’s net sales until the late 
1980s. The company’s main emphasis shifted to electronics only in the 1990s. 
(Häikiö, 2002)
Finland was not as fast in utilizing information technology as it was in adopt­
ing telecommunications technology, but today it is generally regarded as one of 
the leading information societies. For example, it ranks seventh in IDC’s (2006) 
Information Society Index which measures the ability of 53 countries to partici­
pate in the information revolution. The country’s telecommunications manufac­
turing industry is also competitive in the world market, Nokia’s share of the 
global mobile phone market being about 35 per cent.
6.3 Growth accounting methodology
Information and communications technology193 affects economic growth both as 
a component of aggregate output in the form of ICT production and as a compo­
nent of aggregate input in the form of ICT capital services. Therefore, the aggre­
gate production function is expressed in the form of the production possibility 
frontier as formulated by Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2003):
y (y ,ct (o, yG to ) = m n * , c r  (o , *o  to , m ) , (6. i )
where at any given time t, aggregate value added Y is assumed to consist of the 
production of ICT goods and services YICT as well as of other production Y0 .196 
These outputs are produced from aggregate inputs consisting of ICT capital ser­
vices K(ct, other capital services K0 and labour services L. The level of technol­
ogy or multi-factor productivity is represented in the Hicks neutral or out- 
put-augmenting form by parameter A.
Assuming constant returns to scale in production and competitive product 
and factor markets, growth accounting gives the share weighted growth of out­
puts as the sum of the share weighted inputs and growth in MFP:
AlnY = wICTAInY[CT + wJ0AlnY0 = v,c rA1 nKICT + v0Al nfy, + v,AlnL + AinA , (6.2)
where A refers to a first difference, i.e. Ax = %(f) -  x(t-J), and where the time in­
dex t has been suppressed for the economy of exposition. The weights w[CT and 
w0 depict the average nominal value-added shares of ICT and other production, 
respectively, and they sum to one. The weights v/CT, vQ and vL also sum to one 
and respectively represent the average nominal income shares of ICT capital, 
other capital and labour. All shares are averaged over the periods t and t—1.
195 Our definition of ICT goods and services is based on OECD (2004). ICT capital contains the 
ICT goods and software.
196 The approach in this chapter is different from Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2003) in that they in­
clude only ICT investment goods in the production of ICT.
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Equation (6.2) is used to show that information and communications tech­
nology can have an impact on economic growth via three channels. First, the 
most obvious effect on the total value-added generated in an economy is the di­
rect contribution of the production of ICT goods and services. This contribution 
-  wIcr AlnYiCT in eq. (6.2) -  is computed by multiplying ICT’s nominal 
value-added share by the growth rate of the volume of its production.
Secondly, ICT capital services contribute to economic growth as an input 
into production. In the United States, the benefits from ICT use even surpass the 
gains from its production in the post-1995 era (Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2003). 
The way to estimate the growth contribution of ICT capital services is to weight 
its rate of change with a coefficient that represents its share in nominal income: 
V Al n y. .
The third channel for information and communications technology to en­
hance economic growth is via the impact of ICT production on MFP:
Alm4 = üICTÀ1 ru4/CT + HqA1 ru40 , (6-3)
where Al nAICT is MFP growth in ICT production and Al nA0 is MFP growth in 
other production. The weights ü,CT and Üq applied in decomposing the aggre­
gate MFP growth are the ICT products’ output shares of GDP.
To estimate sectoral multi-factor productivity growth, the price dual method 
is employed. It uses data on the prices of inputs and outputs, rather than their 
quantities, to calculate MFP growth. The underlying idea is that decline in the 
relative prices of ICT goods reflects productivity growth in their production 
Al n /l(CT. Assuming that the aggregate share weighted price change of labour and 
capital is representative also at the disaggregated level, MFP growth in ICT pro­
duction can be calculated as the negative of the ICT output price change relative 
to the share weighted price change of labour and capital (Jorgenson, Ho and 
Stiroh, 2003). Multiplying this by the output share u,CT gives ICT’s contribution 
to the aggregate MFP growth. The contribution of non-ICT productivity growth 
«oAlnAQ is obtained from equation (6.3) as a residual.
To assess the contribution of ICT on the growth of labour productivity, the 
number of hours worked are denoted by H(t) and labour productivity by 
Y(i)/H(t). The basic growth accounting equation (6.2) can be rewritten as
AlnY -  AlnH = (6.4)
viCT(AlnK,CT -A lnH ) + v0 (AlnKo -A ln H )+  Vy(AlnL-AlnH) + Alm4
There are four sources of labour productivity growth. The first one is ICT capital 
deepening197, i.e. the income share weighted increase of ICT capital services per 
hour worked. The second source is the income share weighted increase of other 
capital services per hour worked. The third component is the improvement in la­
bour quality which is defined as the difference between the growth rates of la-
197 Capital deepening signifies an increase in the capital-labour ratio. That is, there are more capi­
tal services available per hour worked.
Statistics Finland 107
bour services and hours worked multiplied by labour’s income share. The fourth 
source is a general advance in multi-factor productivity which increases labour 
productivity point for point.
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) showed that it is important to account for 
substitution between capital and labour of different quality. Similarly as the ser­
vices provided by a truck built in 1968 differs from a truck of vintage 1998, also 
the hours worked by a high school dropout and by a holder of a Master’s degree 
are not equal. The aggregate capital service flow, which is assumed to be propor­
tional to the capital stock, is estimated by using asset-specific user costs to 
weight each heterogeneous asset and to account for substitution between them. 
Under competitive markets and equilibrium conditions, user costs reflect the 
marginal productivity of the different assets. They thus provide a means of incor­
porating differences in the productive contribution of heterogeneous invest­
ments as the composition of investments and capital changes. For example, as 
firms respond to fast declining ICT prices by substituting away from other capi­
tal equipment or structures and toward ICT equipment, a larger portion of in­
vestment will be in assets with relatively high marginal products, and the aggre­
gate capital service flow increases. This can also be interpreted as an increase in 
the quality of capital.
The user cost of ICT capital services is also needed in estimating the share of 
nominal income accruing to ICT capital. It is obtained as
ricr = Pict + d[CT — Al npicr ) ,  (6-5)
where pICT is the asset price of new ICT capital goods and Alnp,CT its rate of 
change, i is the internal rate of return and dICT denotes depreciation. ICT capital’s 
income share is then obtained as rICTSICT /  pYY where S,CT is the mid-year real 
stock of ICT capital and pY is the output price. The productive capital stock at 
year-end t for a homogeneous capital asset type is defined as the following per­
petual inventory equation:
S ( t ) = S ( f - l ) ( l - d )  + Jt = X ( l - d ) U ( t - r ) ,  (6.6)
T=0
where /  is investment. The symbol for asset type has been left out for notational 
simplicity.
For labour the difference between labour quantity and labour services (hours 
worked adjusted for labour quality) is distinguished. The hours worked are 
cross-classified by educational level and by age. The average wages and salaries of 
each group are assumed to represent their marginal productivity. Labour quality is 
defined as the ratio of labour services to hours worked. The variable AlnL -A lnH  
measures its rate of change in equation (6.4). Labour quality increases as firms hire 
relatively more skilled and highly compensated workers.
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6.4 The data
The basic computational framework is the balance of aggregate supply and de­
mand. GDP at market prices plus imports equals private and government con­
sumption expenditure plus investment plus changes in inventories plus exports:
GDP + Imports = Consumption + Investment + AInventories + Exports. (6.7)
When imports are moved to the right-hand side of the identity, GDP is calcu­
lated using the expenditure approach.
The official investment asset breakdown is further refined here by separating 
from machinery and equipment computers and communications equipment. 
ICT capital is defined as: computers, communications equipment and software.
To obtain data on nominal ICT investment, the detailed annual supply and 
use tables of Statistics Finland for the years 1995-2003 were used.198 O f the 
grand total of almost 1,000 goods and services those pertaining to ICT were de­
lineated. To compute investment in hardware and communications equipment 
in current prices for 1975-94 a series on investments into electrical machinery 
and optical equipment obtained from Statistics Finland was used to extrapolate 
the 1995-2005 series backwards.199
Traditionally price indexes are compiled by comparing the same product’s 
prices in adjacent periods. In the case of ICT’s rapid technological advances, the 
situation is more complex. Products appear and disappear at a rapid pace. That is 
why so called hedonic indexes should be used instead of the traditional 
matched-model indexes. Hedonic functions are relations between the prices of 
characteristics, such as computer speed, to the prices of the goods themselves.
Unfortunately hedonic indexes do not exist for Finnish ICT products, which 
is why the paper turned to data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The methodology utilized is broadly that of Schreyer (2000). The annual 
changes in the BEA’s price index for private non-ICT fixed investments were 
contrasted with the annual changes in the BEA’s price indexes for computers, 
software and communication equipment, respectively. The three series thus ob­
tained were first smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter, after which 
they were multiplied with the implicit Finnish aggregate investment deflator to 
obtain the Finnish quality adjusted ICT deflators.
The drastic differences in the new computer deflator (and new communica­
tions equipment deflator) vis-à-vis the official machinery and equipment price 
index can be clearly seen in figure 6.2. The new software index is also compared 
with the official one. In addition to investments, the ICT deflators were also ap­
plied to imports and exports of information and communications products. The 
result is that the GDP measure used here differs from the official one. The qual­
ity adjusted average GDP growth for 1995-2005 is 4.06 per cent, as will be seen
198 As the detailed supply and use tables are only available at a significant lag we used the ratio of 
hardware and communications equipment, respectively, to machinery and equipment in 2003 
also for the years 2004 and 2005.
199 For software an official time series existed.
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Figure 6.2 Price indexes for ICT and National Account's price index for machinery and equipment, 
1976-2005, 2000=LN(100)
in the next section. Since the revised official estimate is 3.56 per cent, it can be 
concluded that the impact of quality adjustment is significant.
Productive capital stocks for each homogeneous asset type were calculated 
with the perpetual inventory method utilizing geometric depreciation rates. The 
depreciation rates used were: 0.012 for dwellings, 0.025 for non-residential 
buildings and civil engineering constructions, 0.25 for transportation equipment, 
0.13 for non-ICT equipment, 0.33 for mineral exploration and originals, 0.012 
for transfer of ownership of land, 0.315 for computers, 0.11 for all communica­
tion equipment, and 0.315 for software. No rate of depreciation was applied to 
cultivated assets.200 The user costs were used as weights to aggregate the stocks 
into a measure of capital services. For the internal rate of return i contained in 
the user cost formula (6.5), the realized rate of return derived from national ac­
counts was used.
The labour input and its remuneration were divided into 36 classes. Labour 
was cross-classified by three age groups (15-29 years, 30-49 years and 50 years 
and older), six educational classes (lower secondary education or less, upper sec­
ondary education, first stage of tertiary education (i-iii) and second stage of ter­
tiary education) as well as by occupational status (employee or self-employed). 
The labour compensations were used as weights in aggregating the labour hours 
per class into a measure of labour services. Labour compensation for the self-em­
ployed was imputed by multiplying their hours worked with the employees’ 
average hourly compensation.
200 Cultivated assets encompass only livestock for breeding and dairy in Finland. The European 
practice is to include a so called culling discount -  the difference between the value of a pro­
duction animal less its slaughter value -  on this investment item as a proxy for depreciation. 
Hence using the PIM on cultivated assets is out of the question.
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6.5 The results
The upper panel of Table 6.1 shows the impact of the production of ICT goods 
and services as well as other products on the Finnish economy in the years 
1995-2005. The first column contains the nominal value-added shares and the 
second column the volume growth of production. In the third column are the 
contributions201 to GDP growth. It can be seen that ICT production’s GDP share 
is 5.10 per cent and its volume growth 17.74 per cent.202 The growth contribu­
tion is 0.87 percentage points. The manufacture of television and radio transmit­
ters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy (a crude proxy for the 
Nokia-effect), had a ratio of value-added to GDP of 4.1 per cent and boasted a 
volume growth of 19.73 per cent per annum 1995-2005. Approximately 
one-fifth (21%) of the 4.06 per cent GDP growth stemmed from ICT produc­
tion, which encompasses the production of computers, software, communica­
tions equipment and telecommunications services, and as much as 19 per cent of 
the growth could be traced to the Nokia phenomenon.203
Table 6.1 Average growth of GDP and its components, 1995-2005
S h a re  o f  G D P
m
V o lu m e  g ro w th  
( I n #  '
Co n trib u tio n  
(In % )
GDP at m arket prices 100.00 4.06 4.06
Production of goods and services
ICT products 5.10 17.74 0.87
Other products 94.90 3.36 3.19
Capital services 34.62 3.05 1.07
Dwellings 9.92 2.34 0.25
ICT capital 3.27 15.14 0.50
Other capital 21.42 1.51 0.32
Labour services 65.38 1.41 0.92
M ulti-factor productivity 2.07
Capital quality 34.62 0.73 0.25
Capital quantity 34.62 2.32 0.82
Labour quality 65.38 0.22 0.14
Labour quantity 65.38 1.19 0.78
N um be rs m a y  not add to  to ta ls  due  to  round ing.
201 The Törnqvist index is used throughout the chapter in aggregations and computations of 
growth contributions. The volume growth is thus weighted with the average t and t-1 nominal 
shares. The implication of using the Törnqvist index for GDP calculations with the expenditure 
approach is that the term for changes in inventories (which occasionally is negative) had to be 
distributed to the other expenditure items. This was calculated in relation to each other expen­
diture item's relative size.
202 ICT production is also deflated with the quality-adjusted deflators.
203 Contribution 0.78 percentage points (of 4.06 per cent GDP growth). These are the direct ef­
fects; the indirect spillover effects are not caught by this methodology. An anonymous referee 
is thanked for suggesting that the Nokia-effect be explicitly reported.
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The panel in the middle of Table 6.1 reports the results of growth accounting 
on the input side. On average, ICT-capital contributed 0.50 percentage points to 
GDP growth. This means that 12 per cent of growth was due to ICT invest­
ments. The contribution of total capital services was 1.07 percentage points. In­
formation and communications technology alone thus stood for almost half the 
contribution although its share of the nominal mid-year capital stock in 2005 
was still less than 3 per cent. The big contribution is explained by the rapid 
growth of ICT capital services at the average rate of 15.14 per cent.
The estimate presented here for the growth contribution of ICT capital is 
quite close to other estimates. Using unofficial ICT-data Jalava and Pohjola 
(2002) and Jalava (2003) estimated the contribution to be 0.6 percentage points 
in the years 1995-2001 in the non-residential market sector. In their comparison 
of EU countries, Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003) ended up at 0.7 percentage 
points for Finland in the same period. These earlier studies were not based on the 
best-available data, i.e., the official supply and use tables.
Capital quality rises when capital services grow faster than capital quantity. As 
reported in the lower panel of Table 6.1, capital quality grew on average by 0.73 
per cent in 1995-2005. As capital’s income share was one third, the contribution 
of quality was 0.25 percentage points. Consequently, capital quality contributed 
one-quarter and capital quantity three-quarters of the total contribution of capital 
services at the rate of 1.07 percentage points. As can be further seen from Table 
6.1, 0.92 percentage points of GDP growth can be attributed to labour services. 
Labour quality contributed 0.14 and quantity 0.78 percentage points.
The combined growth effect of the inputs was 1.99 percentage points which 
is half (49 per cent) of the GDP growth. Of the inputs 0.39 percentage points 
were traced to quality improvements. The residual or MFP term, i.e., the esti­
mate for technological change broadly defined, contributed the remaining 2.07 
percentage points.
Table 6.2 shows the decomposition of labour productivity growth. As already 
seen in Table 6.1, GDP grew at the pace of 4.06 per cent and the hours worked 
at the rate of 1.19 per cent. Hence, labour productivity increased on average by
Table 6.2 Average growth of labour productivity and its components, 1995-2005
S h a re  o f  6 D P  (% ) V o lum e  g ro w th  (In  % } C o n trib u t io n  (In % )
market prices 100.00 4.06 4.06
Hours worked 1.19 1.19
Labour productivity 2.87 2.87
Capital deepening 34.62 1.86 0.66
Dwellings 9.92 1.15 0.13
ICT capital 3.27 13.95 0.46
Other capital 21.42 0.01 0.07
Labour quality 65.38 0.22 0.14
Multi-factor productivity 2.07 2.07
I Q  related contribution 1.41
Other contribution 0.66
N u m b e rs m ay not sum  to  totals d u e  to ro und ing.
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2.87 per cent a year. The contribution of ICT capital deepening was 0.46 
whereas dwellings and other capital contributed 0.13 and 0.07 percentage 
points, respectively.
The culprit behind the recent shift to a slower gear in labour productivity 
growth is the low contribution of other capital deepening. The volume of other 
capital per hour increased by only 0.01 per cent annually, whereas the volume of 
ICT capital deepening increased by 13.95 per cent each year. The contribution of 
labour quality was 0.14 percentage points and that of MFP 2.07 percentage points.
Although the contribution of ICT capital deepening is the strongest among 
the components of capital, it is smaller than in the US and in the UK. The contri­
bution was 0.78 percentage points in the US in 1995-2004 (Jorgenson, Ho and 
Stiroh, 2006).
In the last two rows of Table 6.2, the aggregate multi-factor productivity 
growth is decomposed into ICT related and other contributions in the way speci­
fied in equation (6.3). O f the total increase at the rate of 2.07 per cent, 1.41 per­
centage points came from ICT production and 0.66 percentage points from 
other production. Hence, almost 70 per cent of the aggregate MFP growth can 
be attributed to this new technology. The respective contribution was 0.43 per­
centage points in the US in 1995-2004 (Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2006).
ICT’s overall contribution to labour productivity growth is obtained by sum­
ming up the impacts of ICT capital deepening (0.46) and ICT-related multi-factor 
productivity growth (1.41). The result is 1.87 percentage points, i.e. 65 per cent 
of the observed growth of GDP per hour worked at the rate of 2.87 per cent.
6.6 Projections for the future and conclusions 
for policy
In this chapter, stock was taken of the impacts of information and communica­
tions technology on output and labour productivity growth in Finland between 
1995 and 2005. The results showed that one-fifth of the quality adjusted GDP 
growth at the rate of 4.06 per cent stemmed from ICT production. This is re­
markable as the share of ICT production of GDP was only 5 per cent. Nearly 
one-fifth of the growth was traced to the manufacture of electronics: Finland’s 
Nokia-phenomenon.
On the input side, the authors’ growth accounting results showed that ICT 
capital services contributed 0.50 percentage points to economic growth. The 
contribution of total capital services was 1.07 percentage points, so information 
and communications technology alone stood for almost one-half of the contribu­
tion. The inputs combined contributed 1.99 percentage points of growth and 
0.39 percentage points of this was traced to quality improvements.
Labour productivity increased on average by 2.87 per cent a year. The contri­
bution of ICT capital deepening was 0.46. Summing this up with the ICT-re- 
lated multi-factor productivity growth, ICT accounted altogether for 1.87 per­
centage points of the improvement in GDP per hour worked. This amounts to 
65 per cent of the observed labour productivity growth.
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But what are the future prospects of the Finnish economy? A simple projec­
tion can be made on the basis of the growth accounting analysis of labour pro­
ductivity. Assuming that the economy will be in a steady-state where output and 
capital services grow at the same rate, equation (6.4) turns into
AlnY -  AlnH = AlnL -  AlnH + AlnH /  vL . (6.8)
Jalava and Pohjola (2004) estimated that the growth of labour quality 
AlnY -  AlnH is likely to turn negative and may lie in the range between -0.10 
and -0 .15 per cent in the coming years. This follows from the adverse effects of 
an aging population on labour productivity. Assuming that labour’s income share 
and multi-factor productivity growth will be the same in the future as in 
1995-2005; equation (6.8) predicts that labour productivity will grow at a rate 
of approximately 3 per cent.
This projection may be on the optimistic side, although the historical evi­
dence in figure 6.1 shows that it is not completely unrealistic, because MFP 
growth might have been exceptionally high in the 1995-2005 period as the 
economy was recovering from the deep recession of the early 1990s and reaping 
the fruits of the Nokia phenomenon. But even if MFP growth were to decline to 
more modest numbers, the growth prospects of the Finnish economy are not as 
gloomy as often claimed in public debate.
However, given the large dependency on the ICT-producing sector, the ongo­
ing outsourcing of ICT production to low wage countries provides a threat to 
productivity performance in the future. Finland may have to restructure its 
economy once again in the digital era. How should the policy-makers react to 
this threat?
It was shown in Section 6.2 that Finland was one of the leading countries in 
adopting the telephone. For political reasons, a competitive telecommunications 
market was created whereas in most other countries the telephone was a state 
monopoly. It took however a long time, about 100 years, until Finland’s compet­
itive advantage in the production of telecommunications equipment and services 
was revealed. Admittedly, the chapter has not been able to prove that a causal 
link exists between the decisions made by policy-makers more than one hundred 
years ago and the success of the present-day Finnish economy. But it is hard to 
think how such success would have been possible without being close to the 
frontier in the use of this technology.
The lesson learnt is that the output and productivity impacts of the new tech­
nologies can be long-delayed. Consequently, current policy-makers should con­
sider whence will come the next wave of productivity growth.
As shown, ICT has already contributed to economic growth by improving 
productivity in the industries producing ICT equipment. It has also enhanced la­
bour productivity in the rest of the economy through capital deepening, i.e. 
through the substitution of ICT capital for other forms of capital. However, the 
effects on MFP from the re-organization of production and work are yet to come 
(see, e.g., Pohjola, 2006).
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ICT is expected to increase productivity by standardizing, automating and 
outsourcing white-collar work in basically the same way as the assembly line 
mechanized manufacturing. The on-going digitalization and outsourcing of busi­
ness processes will result in the restructuring of white-collar work at the global 
level and, consequently, may bring about a new wave of productivity growth. 
Various business information systems, such as Enterprise Resource Planning soft­
ware, play here much the same role as the assembly line did in the 
transformation of industrial work.
Digitally stored information (R&D, financing, insurance services, accounting, 
payroll, etc.) can already be generated away from the office. Intelligent use of in­
formation is a source of increased productivity, just as natural resources were in 
the 20th century. The difference is that natural resources are tied to a certain 
place, whereas information has no such restrictions. It can be produced just as 
well in India, China, Russia or Estonia as in Finland. Geography is no longer of 
essence, as everyone has equal access to global information networks. The new 
restructuring of the economy may be as great as the one witnessed over 100 
years ago when electricity and the telephone were invented.
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The roles of electricity and ict in growth 
and productivity: Case Finland204 205
Jukka Jalava and Matti Pohjola
7
Abstract: This chapter takes a quantitative look at electricity and ICT as engines 
of growth in the process of Finland’s transformation from a backward agricultural 
nation into a modern high-tech country. Finland was one of the leading countries 
in the electrification of mechanical drive in industry in the early 20th century. To­
day the country is generally regarded as one of the leading information societies. It 
is shown that ICT’s contribution to GDP growth in 1980-2004 was almost twice 
as large as electricity’s contribution in 1920-1938. The improvement of multi-fac­
tor productivity in production accounted for 90 per cent of ICT’s contribution 
but only one third of electricity's. Finland has thus been far more successful as an 
ICT producer than a producer of electricity. The contributions of both electricity 
and ICT have been somewhat smaller in Finland than in the United States. For 
electricity, the main source of the difference is the multi-factor productivity 
spillovers associated with the use of electricity. They were much larger in the 
United States than in Finland. Regarding ICT, capital deepening has been impor­
tant for the United States, improvement of productivity in ICT manufacturing for 
Finland. No evidence is found for spillovers arising from ICT use.
7 .1 Introduction
Economic theory explains how economic growth is driven by advances in tech­
nology, that is, in ideas about how to combine inputs to produce outputs. Eco­
nomic history teaches that growth is not a smooth process but is subject to epi­
sodes of sharp acceleration and deceleration which are associated with the ar­
rival, diffusion and exhaustion of new general purpose technologies (GPTs). 
These are technologies that affect the whole economy by transforming both
204 This chapter first appeared as: Jukka Jalava and Matti Pohjola (2007b): "The Roles of Electric­
ity and ICT in Growth and Productivity: Case Finland", Pellervo Economic Research Institute, 
Working Papers No. 94, April.
205 We are most grateful to Timo Myllyntaus and Pekka Tiainen for sharing some unpublished data 
with us and to Antti Kauhanen for help with statistical estimations. Without implicating them 
for any remaining errors, we also wish to thank Paul David, James Foreman-Peck, Mika 
Maliranta, Hans-Joachim Voth and seminar participants in Florence, Helsinki, Istanbul, 
Jyväskylä and Stanford for helpful comments. Jukka Jalava's research is partly supported by the 
EU KLEMS project "Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach", 
funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 6th Frame­
work Programme, Priority 8, "Policy Support and Anticipating Scientific and Technological 
Needs". Matti Pohjola gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Yrjö Jahnsson Foun­
dation.
116 Statistics Finland
household life and the ways in which firms conduct business (for a survey, see 
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2006). Steam, electricity and information and commu­
nications technology (ICT) are the most important examples.
The empirical literature applying the growth accounting approach usually 
sees the productivity effects of a new technology as coming in three stages. 
Firstly, there are significant improvements in multi-factor productivity (MFP) in 
the industries producing the new technology due to rapid advances in technolog­
ical knowledge. Secondly, the industries using the new technology experience 
positive labour productivity impacts as they increase their capital intensity by in­
vesting in new capital goods. Thirdly, the industries using the new technology 
experience a boost in multi-factor productivity growth as they introduce new 
modes of operation and continually improve the technology by incremental 
product and process innovations. Such spillovers may result from the re-organi- 
zation of production that the new GPT makes possible.
Crafts (2002, 2004b) has recently applied growth accounting in assessing and 
comparing the overall impacts of the three GPTs. In his 2004 study on the con­
tribution of steam to British economic growth in the 19th century, he found that 
the output and productivity impacts were modest and long-delayed. Steam con­
tributed very little (0.01-0.02 percentage points per year) to the growth of la­
bour productivity before 1830. The peak impact occurred in the period 1850-70 
and amounted to 0.4 percentage points per year. These numbers are much 
smaller than what we have come to expect from a GPT on the basis of many re­
cent studies measuring the effects of ICT.
In his 2002 paper, Crafts also studied the impacts of electricity and ICT in 
the United States over comparable periods of time. The total contribution of 
electricity to GDP per person growth was about 0.6 percentage points per year 
in 1899-1929 and one percentage point in 1919-29. MFP spillovers resulting 
from the reorganization of factory work accounted for most of the impact (0.7 
%-points) in the latter period. This estimate is based on David’s (1990, 1991) 
and David and Wright’s (1999) analyses of the impact of the adoption of the 
electric unit drive on multi-factor productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing. 
The shift from steam to electric power reduced the energy required to drive ma­
chinery but also, as DuBoff (1964: 143-8) and Devine (1983) show, it more im­
portantly permitted substantial improvements in factory design. This increased 
flow of production, made working environment better, improved machine con­
trol and made plant expansion easier. Consequently, the electricity using indus­
tries were able to obtain greater output per unit of capital and labour input.
David and Wright (1999, 2003) show that capital productivity increased in 
U.S. manufacturing in the 1920s and that this increase was directly associated 
with the diffusions of the electric unit drive which they measured by the capac­
ity of secondary electric motors. Contrary to what one would expect using a sim­
ple factor substitution model, the growth of capital productivity was associated 
with rising labour productivity.
The interesting difference between steam and electricity lies in the growth 
contribution of MFP spillovers. These seem to have been small for steam but 
very substantial for electricity. One explanation may be that such spillovers are 
more difficult to measure for steam than for electricity. Crafts (2004b) does not
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even try to identify them but concludes that it is unlikely that they have been 
significant. This is confirmed by Devine’s (1983) study which argues that the 
shift from steam power to electricity was fundamentally different from the pre­
vious transition from water power to steam. Electrification was accompanied 
with new methods of power transmission and distribution as well as improve­
ments in factory design and machine organization whereas steam power was 
adopted by manufacturers primarily for reasons of locational and seasonal avail­
ability and of direct cost benefits.
The overall impacts of steam are not, however, easily measurable in a growth 
accounting framework and may be underestimated. As Rosenberg and 
Trajtenberg (2004) have shown, the Corliss steam engine served as a catalyst for 
the massive relocation of industrial activity into larger urban centers in the 
United States, thus fueling agglomeration economies, attracting further popula­
tion and fostering economic growth. These relationships may have been different 
in Britain, but the link between technology and population growth is not ac­
counted for in growth accounting.
Comparing the growth contributions of electricity with Oliner and Sichel’s 
(2000) findings on the impacts of ICT in 1974-2000, Crafts concluded that ICT 
has had at least as large an impact on economic growth as electricity. ICT’s overall 
contribution to GDP per person growth rose from 0.7 percentage points in 
1974-1990 to 1.9 in 1996-2000. The notable difference between electricity and 
ICT is that the latter has not yet generated any measurable MFP spillovers in the 
ICT using industries. The growth impact has been achieved through the capi­
tal-deepening effect. In principle at least, ICT could generate re-organization effects 
in offices in the service sector in ways parallel to the experience of the factory.
Edquist and Henrekson (2006) rightly point out, however, that the output 
and productivity contributions from steam and electricity may be underesti­
mated in comparison to ICT because hedonic prices have been used in measur­
ing the quality of ICT products but not in measuring the quality of either steam 
engines or electric motors.
With this reservation, the existing cliometric evidence can be said to indicate 
that the contribution to economic growth of information and communications 
technology outweighs the contributions of the other two general purpose tech­
nologies. Crafts analyzed the impacts in those countries where the GPTs were 
discovered: steam in Great Britain and electricity and ICT in the United States. It 
might be interesting to see if the conclusion holds for countries which are not 
technology leaders but are followers, i.e. countries which have adopted technol­
ogies developed by others.
David and Wright (2003) show that the experience of delayed and then ac­
celerated MFP growth associated with electrification was not a uniquely Ameri­
can phenomenon. They found similar patterns for the United Kingdom and Ja­
pan in the opening third of the 20th century. This they take to confirm the fact 
that factory electrification was indeed a GPT. In Britain, the diffusion of electric 
power lagged behind the U.S. in the beginning of the century but matched it al­
ready by the end of the 1930s. In Japan, the age of steam power was historically 
compressed by the rapid process of factory electrification. The transition to the 
new power regime was already underway before the mechanization of manufac­
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turing plants had been completed. David and Wright conclude that the follower 
countries can in fact adopt a well-developed technology from abroad relatively 
quickly without having to go through the learning processes that had occurred in 
the pioneering country.
Edquist and Henrekson [2006] demonstrate that also Sweden adopted electric­
ity swiftly and that labour productivity in manufacturing accelerated in the 1920s. 
However, they were not able to establish a clear correlation across industries be­
tween labour productivity growth and the increased use of electric motors.
It will be shown in Section 7.3 that the diffusion of electricity was as rapid in 
Finland as in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. The contribution to eco­
nomic growth of this GPT was however somewhat smaller in Finland (0.59 per­
centage points per year) than in the United States (0.98 percentage points) over 
comparable periods of time. The main source of the difference is the multi-fac­
tor productivity spillovers associated with the use of electricity. They were much 
larger in the United States than in Finland.
Section 7.4 demonstrates that the diffusion of ICT was slower in Finland than 
in the U.S. in 1975-2005. To assess its contribution to productivity growth, esti­
mates based on non-hedonic and hedonic ICT prices are provided. The first ones 
make it possible to compare the impacts of ICT with the effects of electricity 
which are not derived using hedonic prices for electric motors. The second set of 
estimates allows comparisons between Finland and the United States for which 
only estimates based on quality-adjusted ICT prices are available.
It is shown that ICT’s contribution to GDP growth in 1990-2004 (1.07 per­
centage points per year) was almost twice as large as electricity’s contribution in 
1920-1938 (0.59 percentage points). These GPTs also differ with respect to the 
relative importance of the sources of the growth contributions. The improve­
ment of multi-factor productivity in production accounted for 90 per cent of 
ICT’s contribution but only one third of electricity’s. No evidence for spillovers 
from ICT use is found.
ICT’s contribution to GDP growth has been somewhat higher in the United 
States than in Finland. The main sources of the contribution are different. ICT 
capital deepening has been important for the United States, MFP in ICT manu­
facturing for Finland.
Before going into the details of the growth accounting results, a brief history 
of Finnish economic growth is presented in Section 7.2. Section 7.5 concludes.
7.2  Output growth and its proximate sources
The growth rate of GDP per capita was in Finland among the highest in Western 
Europe in the 20th century. According to Maddison’s (2003) data, the compound 
annual growth rate was 2.5 per cent in the period from 1900 to 2003. Given that 
the growth rate in the United States was 1.9 per cent per year, the Finnish GDP 
per capita increased from 41 per cent of the U.S. level in 1900 to 71 per cent in 
2003. It reached the British level in the 1980s. This rapid convergence is dis­
played in Figure 7.1.
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----Finland “  -  United Kingdom *—  United States
Figure 7.1 GDP per capita, 1900-2003 (logarithmic scale, 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)
Source: Maddison (2003), revised and updated data available on
http://www.ggdc. net/maddison/.
Finland developed from a relatively backward agricultural society to a mod­
ern Nordic welfare state during the 20th century. The advancement in prosperity 
was initially based on the successful utilization of natural resources by the forest 
and basic metal industries in the wake of the second industrial revolution. The 
information and communication technology sector has recently become the lead­
ing industry in terms of the contribution to labour productivity and GDP 
growth. In 2001, labour productivity as measured by value added per hour 
worked was in Finland higher than in any other EU-15 member country or in the 
United States in the following four manufacturing industries: pulp and paper, 
wood and wood products, basic metals, and telecommunications equipment.206 
To account for the sources of output growth, the aggregate production function
Yt =A,F[K, ,L t ) (7.1)
is used as a starting point. Flere, at any given time f, the aggregate gross value 
added Y is produced from aggregate inputs consisting of capital K and labour L. 
The level of technology or multi-factor productivity is represented in the Hicks 
neutral or output-augmenting form by parameter A. The basic growth account­
ing equation gives the growth of output as the sum of the share weighted inputs 
and the growth in multi-factor productivity
AlnY = vKAlnK + vLAlnL-i- Alru4 , (7-2)
where the A-symbol refers to a first difference, i.e. Ax = x(t) -x ( r  - / ) ,  and where 
the time index t has been suppressed for the economy of exposition. The weights 
vK and v, sum to one and represent the nominal income shares of capital and la­
bour, respectively. All shares are averaged over periods t and t—1.
206 Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, ICOP Database 1997 Benchmark, 
http://www.ggdc.net
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The first two rows of Table 7.1 decompose output growth into the contribu­
tions from labour input and labour productivity for the period from 1900 to 
2005. O utput is measured by the real gross valued added. Instead of looking at 
the total economy, the analysis is confined to the non-residential market sector 
where the volume of output was 26 times higher at the end of our observation 
period than at its beginning/0' Over the whole period, 90 per cent of output 
growth stemmed from increases in labour productivity and 10 per cent from in­
creases in the number of hours worked. Labour input’s contribution was at its 
highest (about 30%) in the first two sub-periods. It was negative in the last two 
sub-periods. The beginning and endpoints of the periods have been chosen in 
such a way that the economy is at similar stages of the business cycle at them. 
This is done to eliminate the impact of cyclical factors on productivity measures.
Using equation (7.2), output growth is decomposed in the last three rows of 
Table 7.1 into the share weighted contributions of the capital stock, hours 
worked and the growth in multi-factor productivity, obtained as the residual.“os 
Over the whole observation period the combined inputs contributed one third 
and MFP two thirds to the growth of output. In the pre-WWI era two thirds of 
the growth at the rate of 2.9 per cent came from capital and labour and one third 
from the residual. The years from 1900 to 1913 formed the only period during 
which capital’s contribution was the largest. In the interwar epoch the MFP 
growth rate more than doubled to 2.3 per cent which meant that over half of ag­
gregate growth stemmed from the residual. The contributions of capital and la­
bour were 1.3 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively.
In the 1950s and 1960s, capital accounted for one fifth and MFP four fifths of 
the growth, labour’s contribution being zero. In 1973-90, labour’s contribution 
turned negative (-0.5 percentage points annually), capital was the source of 0.7 
percentage points, and MFP contributed 2.8 percentage points to output growth 
at the rate of 3.0 per cent. The last sub-period covers the severe depression of
Table 7.1 Growth accounting results for the Finnish non-residential market sector, 1900-2005
1900-2005 1900-1913 1920-1938 1952-1973 1973-1990 1990-2005
Labour input, ln% 0.3 1.0 1.4 0.0 -0 .6 - 0 .8
Labour productivity, ln% 2.8 1.9 3.1 4.5 3.6 3.4
Output, ln % 3.1 2.9 4.5 4.5 3.0 2.6
Contributions, ln% -points:
Capital 0.9 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.4
Labour 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.0 -0 .5 -0 .7
MFP 2.1 1.0 2.3 3.7 2.8 2.9
Source: Own calculations, data from Hjerppe (1988), Tiainen (1994), Statistics Finland.
Numbers may not sum to totals due to rounding.
207 The share of the non-residential market sector in GDP at basic prices stayed rather constant at 
about 90 per cent in the period from 1900 to 1950. It has subsequently gradually declined to 
73 per cent in 2005.
208 The Appendix describes how the series are compiled.
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the early 1990s and the rapid recovery from it. The average growth rate over the 
whole period was 2.6 per cent with MFP contributing 2.9, capital 0.4 and labour 
-0.7 percentage points.
In the next two sections of the chapter, the basic growth accounting equation 
(7.2) will be used in measuring the output growth contributions of a general pur­
pose technology -  electricity in section 7.3 and ICT in section 7.4. To do this, three 
modifications are made to this equation. First, a distinction is made between two 
types of capital -  GPT capital, KCPT, and other capital, KQ. Second, two channels are 
introduced for multi-factor productivity growth -  one arising in the manufacturing 
of the GPT, Agpt, and the other in the rest of the economy, AQ. Finally, following 
Crafts (2002), a term is included to capture the possible spillovers from the use of 
the GPT capital. The modified equation can be written as
AlnY = vKCFrMnKcrr + vK0AlnK0 + v LAlnL
(7.3).+ McpT-AlmAcpj- + Mq AIiVIq + yAlnK CPT .
Flere, vKGPT and vQare the income shares of GPT and other capital, respectively. 
Variables uCFr and uQ denote the ratios of output in the GPT manufacturing and 
other industries, respectively, to aggregate value added. If a non-zero y can be identi­
fied, then the last term captures the spillovers associated with the use of the GPT.
7.3 Electricity as a source of output growth 
in 1900-1938
7.3 .7 Electrifying Finnish production
Electric lighting was first demonstrated in Finland in 1877. Five years later the 
Finlayson cotton mill in Tampere installed incandescent lights. This was the fifth 
permanent installation in Europe. In 1888, the city of Tampere installed its own 
street lighting plants, and by the autumn of 1914 all 38 Finnish towns had one or 
more electric utilities (Myllyntaus, 1991).
At the turn of the century, mining and manufacturing formed a small sector 
of the economy but consumed most of the electricity generated in the country. 
The growth of the energy intensive forest and metal industries enhanced the de­
mand for electricity by Finnish manufacturing. In the saw-milling industry, four 
mills installed electric lighting in 1882/3; by 1900 the number increased to more 
than 40 (approx. 7 per cent of the saw-milling firms). The electrification of mo­
tive power was slower as electrical engines accounted for only 0.3 per cent of the 
motive power in the saw-milling industry in 1900. The share slowly increased to 
9 per cent in 1910 and to 36 per cent by 1920. In metal-working, the first ma­
chine shops used electric lighting by 1884, and at the turn of the century one 
third of the enterprises had electric lighting. The electrification of motive power 
proceeded rapidly from 4 per cent of total motive power in 1898 to 47 per cent 
in 1913, reaching 75 per cent by 1920. In the pulp and paper industry, electric 
lighting was first used in the late 1880s. The electrification of motive power in­
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creased from 6 per cent of total motive power in 1900 to 20 per cent in 1910 
and to 38 per cent by 1920 (Myllyntaus, Michelsen and Herranen, 1986).
The volume index of motive power grew at a compound average annual rate of
7.5 per cent in the Finnish manufacturing industry in the period from 1900 to 1938 
(Hjerppe, Hjerppe, Mannermaa, Niitamo and Siltari, 1976). Before the Second 
World War, the industry was very energy intensive: in 1890-1938, an increase in in­
dustrial volume growth by one per cent required a growth in electricity use by 3.5 
per cent. In the interwar period, the industry actually used 70-85 per cent of all 
electricity output in Finland. The rise in the electricity-intensity slowed down in the 
1949-67 period when increases of industrial output by one per cent were accompa­
nied by a growth of electricity use by 1.3 per cent (Myllyntaus, 1991).
In an international comparison, Finland was not a latecomer but was in fact 
one of the leading countries in the electrification of mechanical drive in industry. 
To see this in greater detail, Figure 7.2 compares the diffusions of electricity in 
manufacturing between Finland and the United States. It displays the shares of 
electricity in total motive power capacity. It is seen that the electrification of 
manufacturing was very rapid in the United States from 1900 to 1939. The share 
of electric power increased from 5.6 to 85.5 per cent. But electrification was 
equally rapid in Finland. Electricity’s power share went up from 7.0 in 1900 to
87.3 per cent in 1939.
Industrialization started late in Finland. Agriculture accounted for 70 per cent 
of employment in 1913. Industry’s share was 10 and services’ 20 per cent. In 
Britain, the respective employment shares were 12, 44 and 44 per cent 
(Broadberry, Federico and Klein, 2005). Much like in Japan, the age of steam 
power was in Finland historically compressed by the rapid process of the electri­
fication of manufacturing. The transition to the new power regime happened at 
the same time as productive resources shifted from agriculture to manufacturing. 
One of the factors which contributed to the rapid adoption of electricity in a
Figure 7.2 Shares of electricity in total motive power in the U.S. and Finnish manufacturing, 
1900-1939 (per cent)
Source: US data from DuBoff (1964) table 15 (intermediate years interpolated), Finnish data
from Myllyntaus (1991) for years 1900-1920 and from Teollisuustilastoa SVT XVIII A 
(i.e. the annual industry statistics publications) for years 1920-1939.
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technologically backward country must have been the fact that there was not 
much existing manufacturing capacity based on old technology. The coexistence 
of older and newer forms of capital is known to have restricted the scope for ex­
ploiting electricity's potential in the United States (David and Wright, 2003).
7.3.2 Electricity's growth effect
The growth accounting framework (7.3) is here applied to assess the contribu­
tion of electricity to the growth of the Finnish GDP in the periods 1900-1913 
and 1920-1938. The war years have been left out from the analysis. As shown in 
Table 7.1, the average output growth rate was 2.9 per cent in the first period and
4.5 per cent in the second.
Table 7.2 summarizes the findings.209 Electricity’s total contribution was 
rather low, 0.18 percentage points, in the first period. It picked up to 0.59 per­
centage points in the second period. The total contribution is obtained as the
Table 7.2 Electricity's contribution to the output growth of the Finnish non-residential market 
sector, 1900-1913 and 1920-1938
1900-13 1920-38
Growth of real gross value added at basic prices (less dw ellings)1 2.91 4.53
Total contribution2 from electricity 0.18 0.59
Contributions from capital Electric utilities' capital 0.07 0.29
Electrical capital goods 0.04 0.03
Contributions from MFP Electric utilities 0.05 0.19
Electrical machinery 0.01 0.01
Spillovers from the use of electrical capital goods 0.07
Memoranda
Income shares1 Electric utilities capital 0.76 3.64
Electric capital goods 0.47 0.48
Volume grow th1 Electric utilities' capital 9.30 8.00
Electrical capital goods 9.21 7.22
Output shares3 Electric utilities 0.51 2.24
Manufacture of electrical machinery 0.24 0.31
Volume grow th1 MFP of electric utilities 8.20 9.00
MFP In the manufacture of electrical machinery 3.19 2.64
1 In per cent.
2 In p e rce n ta g e  points.
3 per cent.
Sources: Own calculations; electric utilities income share and volume growth data from Tiainen
(1994), electric capital goods volume growth data from Hjerppe, Hjerppe, Mannermaa, 
Niitamo and Siltari (1976) and income share from BEA applied on own capital stocks, 
electric utilities' and electrical machinery's output shares and MFP growth data from 
Tiainen (1994).
209 The results are expressed in two decimal digits to minimize the impact of the rounding error, 
not to emphasize their accuracy.
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sum of the impacts arising from increases in electrical capital, from multi-factor 
productivity improvements in the production of electricity and electric machin­
ery as well as from the multi-factor productivity spillovers resulting from electri­
cal capital.
The capital contribution is estimated as in Crafts (2002) by breaking electri­
cal capital into two components: electric utilities’ capital stock and the stock of 
electrical capital goods. The data sources are documented in a footnote to Table 
7.2. As information on the income shares of the two components of electricity 
capital is not available, it is assumed that the income shares correspond to the 
capital stock shares. This means that the profits from owning these new forms of 
capital are assumed to be competitive rather than supernormal.
The problem that information about electrical machinery’s capital stock share 
is not available for Finland was solved by resorting to the US data provided by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. It is assumed that the share of electrical ma­
chinery in equipment was the same in Finland as in the United States in the pe­
riod considered.210 This can be justified by referring to Figure 7.2 which shows 
that the diffusion of electricity was as rapid in the Finnish as in the US manufac­
turing. Data on equipment’s capital share was obtained from Hjerppe, Hjerppe, 
Mannermaa, Niitamo and Siltari (1976) and from the Finnish National Ac­
counts. As shown in Table 7.2, the use of these two types of electrical capital 
goods contributed altogether 0.11 percentage points to output growth in 
1900-13 and 0.32 percentage points in 1920-38.
As explained in Section 7.2, a general purpose technology contributes to 
multi-factor productivity through its manufacturing and through the possible 
spillovers arising from its use. To estimate the first contribution, the multi­
factor-productivity growth rates of electric utilities and of the manufacturing of 
electrical machinery where multiplied by their shares in total output. For reasons 
of data availability, the valued-added shares were used instead of the gross out­
put shares. The combined contribution was 0.06 percentage points in the first 
period and 0.20 percentage points in the second. The contribution from the pro­
duction of electrical machinery was very small (0.01 percentage points) in both 
periods reflecting its small share in output (about 0.3 per cent.)
David and Wright (1999) have shown that large spillovers resulted from the 
widespread adoption of the electric unit drive in the US manufacturing in the 
1920s. Electrification was accompanied by new methods of power transmission 
and distribution as well as improvements in factory design and machine organi­
zation. David and Wright estimated the spillovers for a cross-section of manufac­
turing industries by regressing the observed acceleration of MFP growth on the 
increase in the share of aggregate direct factory drive represented by the capacity 
of secondary electric motors. Their regression results imply that the spillovers 
contributed 2.4 percentage points per year to total manufacturing MPF growth. 
Crafts (2002) multiplied this number by the manufacturing sector’s GDP share 
(0.3) to obtain an estimate that electricity’s MFP spillover contribution was 0.7 
percentage points per year in the United States in the 1920s. As his estimate for
210 BEA's Fixed Assets Tables are available on www.bea.gov. As the first year in this data is 1925, this 
year's share was used for the earlier years as well. This creates an upward bias to the estimate.
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electricity’s total contribution to GDP growth is one percentage points per year, 
this means that spillovers accounted for 70 per cent on the total contribution.
To estimate the spillovers for Finland, the multi-factor productivity growth 
rate was regressed on the increase in the capacity of electric motors and on year 
dummy variables using panel data from 15 manufacturing industries in 1921-38. 
The relationship is positive, although statistically rather weak, and imply that the 
spillovers contributed 0.33 percentage points to the annual MFP growth in man­
ufacturing.211 Multiplying this by manufacturing’s average GDP share in 
1921-38 (21.7 per cent) gives the 0.07 percentage point MFP contribution dis­
played in Table 7.2.
This contribution is quite small compared to the US estimate. The weak rela­
tionship may indicate that the spillovers were indeed weaker in Finland than in 
the United States or it may just reflect the problems with the data. The spillovers 
may have been small because Finland was a latecomer to industrialization. There 
was not much existing industrial work that could be reorganized using electricity 
as the source of motive power.212
The first data problem is the fact that only MFP growth rates based on 
value-added output measures are available. This may result in an underestima­
tion of the spillover effects simply because the MFP growth rates are not ad­
justed to take account of purchased energy inputs. The second problem is that 
the data do not allow a distinction between power generated by the primary and 
secondary electric motors. Consequently, it is not possible in the analysis to cap­
ture the cross-section variation in the pace of diffusion of the group drive and 
unit drive systems. As David and Wright (1999) argue, the spillovers arose from 
changes in the internal power transmission arrangements within plants which the 
unit drive made possible.
To sum up, electricity’s overall contribution to GDP growth was 0.59 per­
centage points per year in 1920-38. Its capital contribution was 0.32, MFP con­
tribution in production 0.20 and MFP spillover contribution 0.07 percentage 
points. These can be compared with Crafts’ (2002) estimates for the United 
States in 1919-29. The total contribution was 0.98 percentage points of which 
0.70 resulted from spillovers. Capital contribution was 0.23 and MFP contrib­
uted 0.05 percentage points. The largest difference is in the spillovers.
211 The relationship was estimated in the form AlnAiFP,, = PAlnX,, + X, + u , , where X denotes 
the capacity of electric motors measured in horsepower, X is a dummy variable, u the residual, i 
refers to industry and t denotes time. The point estimate of P is 0.039 with p-value 0.144. Mul­
tiplying the value of P by the average value of X (0.08445) gives the estimate of 0.33 ln-per- 
centage points for the contribution of the spillovers.
212 Edquist and Henrekson (2006) were not either able to find a clear correlation between labour 
productivity growth and the use of electric motors for different manufacturing industries in 
Sweden.
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7.4 ICT as a source of output growth in 1980-2004
7.4.1 Digitalizing Finnish production
As was pointed out above, Finland was one of the leading countries in adopting 
electricity. This holds for telecommunications as well. The first telephone line 
was built in Helsinki in December 1877, only 18 months after the telephone was 
patented in the United States (Turpeinen, 1981). The Helsinki Telephone Cor­
poration was established in 1882. There were already 3.3 telephone lines per 
100 inhabitants in Helsinki in 1900, making it one of the major telephone cities 
in the world.
According to historians (e.g., Turpeinen, 1981), politics was one of the fac­
tors explaining the rapid adoption of the new communication technology.213 
When the telephone was invented, Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy of 
the Russian Empire. The Finnish Telegraph Office was operated by the Russian 
authorities, but it was not clear who should grant permissions for operating the 
telephone. Upon application, the Senate of Finland decided that it has the right 
to do so. This decision was endorsed by Czar Alexander III, and it resulted in the 
establishment of private, regional telephone corporations all over the country. 
The statute the Senate issued made a sharp distinction between telephone and 
telegraph regulation and created a competitive telecommunications market. Just 
before World War II there were 815 telephone companies in Finland. In most 
other countries, the telephone was considered to be a successor to the telegraph 
and thereby a state monopoly.
In 1961, the Helsinki Telephone Corporation started experimenting with 
data transmission systems. The first commercial connection was installed in a re­
tail group in 1964 (Häikiö, 1995). The Finnish era of information technology 
had started a few years earlier when the first computer was purchased by the 
government-owned Post and Savings Bank in 1958 to oversee entries in savings 
accounts (Pukonen, 1993). The first Finnish computer was built in 1960 under 
the auspices of the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines (Andersin 
and Carlson, 1993).
In the early 1960s, a cable factory, Finnish Cable Works, with its 30 plus 
years of experience in manufacturing telecommunications cables, launched itself 
into the production of telecom equipment. Its long-term plan was to eventually 
start constructing computers. It also set up a computing centre, which was the 
foundation of Nokia’s electronics department, when in 1966 the company was 
merged with Nokia, a wood-pulp/papermill founded in 1865. In the early 1970s 
Nokia began producing computers, which was a major part of Nokia until the 
computer division was sold to ICL-Fujitsu in 1991, and digital telephone ex­
changes. The electronics division did not become profitable until 1971 and it did 
not contribute significantly to Nokia’s net sales until the late 1980s. The com­
pany’s main emphasis shifted to electronics only in the 1990s (Häikiö, 2002; 
Jalava, 2004a).
213 Castells and Himanen (2002: 56-57) provide a summary in English.
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Finland is generally regarded as one of the leading information societies. For 
example, it ranks seventh in ID C’s (2006) Information Society Index which 
measures the ability of 53 countries to participate in the information revolution. 
The country’s telecommunications manufacturing industry is also competitive in 
the world market, Nokia’s share of the global mobile phone market being about 
35 per cent. This industry’s share of non-residential market production was 5.9 
per cent and share of exports 19.9 per cent in 2004.214
However, as displayed in Figure 7.3, the diffusion of ICT has been slower in 
Finland than in the United States when measured by the share of computer soft­
ware in private, non-residential fixed assets. This measure is more relevant for 
output and productivity growth comparisons than mere headcounts of computer 
or Internet users. It is also one for which official data for both countries exist. 
Comparing this diagram with Figure 7.2, one is inclined to conclude that Finland 
has not adopted ICT as rapidly as it adopted electricity. Consequently, the con­
tribution of ICT use to output growth should be smaller in Finland than in the 
leading ICT-using countries.
Figure 7.3 Share of computer software in private, non-residential fixed assets, 1975-2004 (per cent)
Source: US data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, NtPA Table 2.1; Finnish data from
Statistics Finland.
7.4.2 ICT's growth effect
Table 7.3 displays the results obtained by applying growth accounting to assess 
the contributions of information and communication technology to GDP growth 
in the non-residential market sector. The year 1990 divides the overall period to 
two sub-periods in such a way that the latter period covers both the depression 
and the recovery from it.
Two sets of estimates are presented. The first set in column (a) contains the 
results obtained using the official national accounts data for Finland which are
214 For comparison, the respective shares for the paper and pulp industry were 4.4 per cent of pro­
duction and 14.6 per cent of exports.
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Table 7.3 Id 's  contribution to the output growth of the Finnish non-residential market sector, 
1975-1990 and 1990-2005 ((a) estimates based on non-hedonic I d  prices,
(b) estimates based on hedonic ICT prices)
■ (a)
1980-1990
(b)
1990-2004
(a) (b)
Growth of real gross value added at basic
prices (less dwellings)1 3.08 3.15 2.73 2.53
Total contribution2 from ICT 0.29 0.63 1.07 1.07
Contribution from ICT capital 0.08 0.44 0.10 0.43
Contributions from MFP in ICT production 0.21 0.19 0.97 0.64
Memoranda
Income share of ICT capital3 0.92 2.62 1.63 4.62
Volume growth of ICT cap ita l1 8.68 17.00 4.99 7.83
Output share of ICT production3 3.67 4.16 8.55 7.17
MFP growth in ICT production’ 5.78 4.61 11.14 8.84
1 In per cent.
2 In p e rce n ta g e  points.
3 per cent.
Sources: Column (a): own calculations based on the Finnish National Accounts (see Appendix),
column (b): EU KLEMS Database, March 2007, http://www.euklems.net.
not based on any hedonic price indexes for ICT investment. These results are 
here used to compare the growth impacts of ICT and electricity. As mentioned 
earlier, hedonic price indexes are not available for electricity. Using such prices 
for one GPT and not for the other would create a measurement bias. The second 
set in column (b) is derived from the EU KLEMS database which has been cre­
ated for analyses of growth and productivity in the European Union. The Finnish 
ICT investment data contained in this database were created by using the 
hedonic price indexes derived by Jalava and Pohjola (2007a). These estimates 
are here used first to assess the impact of the quality adjustment on ICT’s growth 
impact and, second, to compare the Finnish numbers with those obtained for the 
United States whose estimates are based on hedonic prices. The GDP growth 
rates differ somewhat between columns (a) and (b) because of the slightly differ­
ent definitions of the market sector in the two datasets.
According to the estimates based on the official national accounts (column 
(a)), ICT’s overall contribution to GDP growth was 0.29 percentage points in 
1980-1990 and 1.07 percentage points in 1990-2004. The largest contribution 
resulted from the improvement of multi-factor productivity in ICT production 
which here includes both the manufacturing of ICT equipment (industries 30 
and 32) and the provision of telecommunication services (industry 642) and in­
formation technology services (industry 72). The MFP contribution increased 
from 0.21 percentage points in the first sub-period to 0.97 points in the second. 
The contributions of ICT capital were about 0.1 percentage points in both 
sub-periods.
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To estimate the spillovers from ICT use, the total non-residential market 
economy was divided into 15 industries. Industry-level multi-factor productivity 
growth rates were then regressed on the changes in the ICT capital stocks and, 
alternatively, on the changes in the software capital stocks as well as on year 
dummy variables. The results were disappointing in the sense that no statistically 
significant impacts were found for the whole period 1980-2004 or any of the 
two sub-periods. The finding is not, however, surprising as any strong evidence 
for ICT spillovers does not exist for the United States either (Stiroh, 2002).
Comparing Table 7.3 with Table 7.2, it is seen that ICT’s contribution to GDP 
growth in 1990-2004 was almost twice as large as electricity’s contribution in 
1920-1938. The GPTs also differ with respect to the relative importance of the 
sources of the growth contributions. The improvement of MFP in production ac­
counted for 90 per cent of ICT’s contribution but only one third of electricity’s.
The estimates in column (b) of Table 7.3 are derived using ICT investment 
series based on hedonic prices. The contribution from ICT use is four times 
higher than in column (a) in both periods. This does not, however, increase the 
total ICT contribution in the latter period as the MFP component is smaller in 
(b) than in (a) reflecting the fact that ICT output series are not adjusted for qual­
ity in the EU KLEMS database.
ICT’s contribution to GDP growth has been somewhat higher in the United 
States than in Finland. According to the EU KLEMS database, the total contri­
bution was 0.90 percentage points in 1980-1990 and 1.24 percentage points in 
1990-2004. The sources of the contribution are different from those in Finland 
in the sense that the share of ICT capital is large (60%). For Finland, MFP in ICT 
production dominates reflecting its specialization in the production of telecom­
munications equipment and services.
7 .5  Conclusions
This paper took a quantitative look at electricity and ICT as engines of growth in 
the process of Finland’s transformation from a backward agricultural nation in 
1900 into a modern high-tech country with GDP per capita nowadays compara­
ble to Western Europe. Although being relatively poor, Finland was not a late­
comer but was in fact one of the leading countries in the electrification of me­
chanical drive in industry in the early 20th century. Today, the country is gener­
ally regarded as one of the leading information societies. Its telecommunications 
manufacturing industry is competitive in the world market and one of the key 
drivers of economic growth. Interestingly, however, the diffusion of ICT has 
been slower in Finland than in the United States when measured by the share of 
computer software in private, non-residential fixed assets.
It was shown that ICT’s contribution to GDP growth was almost twice as 
large as electricity’s contribution over comparable periods of time. The improve­
ment of multi-factor productivity in production accounted for 90 per cent of 
ICT’s contribution but only one third of electricity’s. Finland has thus been far 
more successful as an ICT producer than a producer of electricity.
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The contributions of both electricity and ICT have been somewhat smaller in 
Finland than in the United States. Regarding electricity, the main source of the 
difference is the multi-factor productivity spillovers associated with the use of 
electricity. They were much larger in the United States than in Finland. Regard­
ing ICT, capital deepening has been important for the United States, improve­
ment of productivity in ICT manufacturing for Finland. No evidence was found 
for spillovers from ICT use.
During the period considered in this paper, Finland switched from re- 
source-based to ICT-based growth. However, given the large dependency on the 
ICT-producing sector, the ongoing outsourcing of ICT production to low wage 
countries provides a threat to productivity performance in the future. Finland 
may have to restructure its economy once again in the digital era.
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Appendix
Description of data sources used:
GDP. Aggregate gross value added at basic prices less the public sector and the let­
ting and operation of dwellings. The current price series of GDP and dwellings for 
the years 1900-59 from Hjerppe (1988), for the years 1960-74 from Finnish Na­
tional Accounts base year 1980 (FNA80) series and for the years 1975-2005 from 
Finnish National Accounts chain-linked Laspeyres type series with reference year 
2000 (FNA2005)215. The constant price series was constructed so that the level of 
the latest series was extrapolated with the changes in the other two series. I.e., the 
1975 figure in chain-linked reference year 2000 prices was continued backwards 
with the volume changes in the FNA80 and Hjerppe (1988) series.
Labor. Total hours worked less hours worked in public sector and owning and 
letting of dwellings. The series for the years 1900-59 from Hjerppe (1988) lacks 
hours worked information hence work-years data was used, for the years 
1960-74 hours worked from FNA80 series and for the years 1975-2005 hours 
worked from FNA2005. The series were constructed so that the level of the 
most current series was extrapolated with the changes in the other two series. 
I.e., the 1975 FNA2005 hours worked figure was continued backwards with the 
changes in the FNA80 and Hjerppe (1988) series.
Investment and Capital Data. Data on current price gross fixed capital formation 
for the years 1860-1959 from Hjerppe (1988), for the years 1960-2005 in cur­
rent and constant prices from FNA2005 for the non-residential market sector 
(the breakdown of current price investments in computers, communications 
equipment and other machinery and equipment in 1970-2004 from Jalava and 
Pohjola (2007a); for 2005 same structure as in 2004 assumed).216 The volume 
series was obtained by extrapolating the year 1960 figures in year 2000 prices 
backwards by the volume changes obtained when deflating the current price in­
vestments in non-residential buildings and civil engineering and other structures 
with the building cost index and the current price investments in machinery and 
equipment with the wholesale price index.
The capital stocks were calculated using the perpetual inventory method 
with the assumption of geometric age-efficiency profiles:
oo
K ( = K !_1( i - j ) + /t = £ ( i - ^ r / (_T ,
T =0
where K denotes year-end real capital stock, /  is investment, d  is the rate of de­
preciation and t is time. The rates of depreciation used were: 0.025 for non-resi-
215 Version: January 2007. Chain-linked volume figures (1975-2005] made additive by switching 
to additive previous years prices and deducting general government's and letting & operation of 
dwellings' gross value added from aggregate value added and thereafter switching back to 
chain-linked volumes. Finnish NA is using a Laspeyres type volume index at previous years 
prices in accordance with Eurostat’s recommendation from March 2006 onwards.
216 NB. In contrast with Jalava and Pohjola (2007a] the official deflator for machinery and equip­
ment used on hardware and communications equipment -  and not a hedonic index.
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dential structures, 0.025 for civil engineering and other structures, 0.25 for 
transportation equipment, 0.315 for computers, 0.11 for communications 
equipment, 0.13 for other machinery and equipment, 0.012 for transfer of own­
ership of land, 0.33 for mineral exploration, 0.315 for computer software and 
0.33 for originals.
Electric utilities’ capital’s contribution was calculated by multiplying its capi­
tal stock growth (from Tiainen, 1994: Industry Electricity, gas and water, Net 
Capital Stock at 1980 prices) by its income share (Tiainen, 1994: Industry Elec­
tricity, gas and water, share of capital stock multiplied with capital’s income 
share). Electrical capital good’s capital contribution was calculated by multiply­
ing its capital stock growth (Hjerppe, Hjerppe, Mannermaa, Niitamo and Siltari, 
1976: index of installed power in large and medium scale manufacturing indus­
try) by its income share (the share of electric machinery (the share of electrical 
machinery in equipment in the United States) in the share of machinery and 
equipm ent (less transportation equipment) in total non-residential market sec­
tor’s capital stock from our capital stock calculations times the income share of 
capital).
Income shares. Labor’s income share contains wages, salaries and employers’ so­
cial contributions plus imputed wages of self-employed. Wages imputed for 
self-employed by multiplying average employees’ hourly wage by number of 
hours worked by the self-employed. Data for the 1900-1959 period from 
Tiainen (1994), for the years 1960-74 from FNA80 and for the years 
1975-2005 from FNA2005. Capital’s income share is obtained by subtracting la­
bor’s share from unity, with the share of labour constrained to a maximum of 
unity.
O utput shares. The share of electric utilities and the share of the manufacture 
of electrical machinery of total non-residential gross valued added from unpu­
blished figures of Tiainen (1974). The output share of ICT comprises industries’ 
30, 32, 642 and 72 gross value added of total nonresidential GVA.
MFP. The MFP growth of electric utilities and manufacture of electrical machin­
ery from unpublished figures of Tiainen (1994). The MFP change of ICT pro­
duction calculated by computing the geometric average of ICT production’s (in­
dustries 30, 32, 642 and 72) labour productivity growth and capital productivity 
growth using FNA2005 data. The weights used were the income shares of ICT 
production’s labour input (labor’s income share contains wages, salaries and em­
ployers’ social contributions plus imputed wages of self-employed) and capital 
input (capital’s income share is obtained by subtracting labor’s share from unity, 
with the share of labour constrained to a maximum of unity).
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Concluding remarks
Jukka Jalava
8
In his magnum opus John Kendrick wrote: "The story of productivity, the ratio 
of output to input, is at heart the record of man’s efforts to raise himself from 
poverty."217 In this thesis we have strived to tell the story of how Finland raised 
itself from poverty. Key in this endeavour was productivity. And the major en­
gines of productivity growth were the macroinventions electricity and ICT. This 
was of course linked to the unique historical Finnish situation with the sufficient 
institutional, political, social, etc. settings in place. Had the same macro­
inventions been introduced at another time (or in another country) the same 
positive outcomes might not have ensued. A new GPT builds on previous 
knowledge, yet often in an uncertain, punctuated, fashion.218
Economic history, as well as the Finnish data analyzed in this thesis, teaches 
that growth is not a smooth process but is subject to episodes of sharp accelera­
tion and deceleration which are associated with the arrival, diffusion and exhaus­
tion of new general purpose technologies. These are technologies that affect the 
whole economy by transforming both household life and the ways in which firms 
conduct business. Steam, electricity and information and communications tech­
nology are the most important examples. Looking at figure 1.3 we saw that the 
interwar era, as well as the post-1995 period were the periods to scrutinize with 
particular attention; they were times where both labour productivity and capital 
productivity growth were positive in Finland. They were times when two GPTs 
made their mark on the Finnish economy.
So what were the research questions? Were they answered and what is the 
contribution of this thesis to our understanding of the Finnish historical eco­
nomic development. The first research question of this thesis was to ascertain 
whether the classical view of structural change219 is sufficient in explaining the 
Finnish growth record? The role of manufacturing as the proverbial engine of 
growth was in particular analyzed. The second research objective of this thesis 
was to find out what new insights on Finnish growth could be gained, by using 
state-of-the-art neoclassical growth accounting on Finnish historical national ac­
counting data, on the impacts of electricity and ICT on Finnish economic growth 
and productivity. Especially the production, use and productivity of these tech­
nologies was analyzed. As the third research question the Artto-Pohjola paradox, 
that is, how capital has influenced recent Finnish economic history was tackled.
217 Kendrick (1961).
218 Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005).
219 Clark (1940), Kuznets (1966) and Hartwell (1973).
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The answer to the first research question was a corroboration of the findings of 
previous research that Finnish economic growth exhibited late industrialisation 
and significant structural changes. Yet, it was not solely a story of manufacturing 
and structural change was more the effect of than the cause for economic growth. 
Hence, more research was necessary to better understand the dynamics of Finnish 
economic growth. Regarding research question number three we offered an em­
pirical resolution to the Artto-Pohjola paradox as we showed that a high rate of re­
turn on capital was combined with low capital productivity growth. This result is 
important in understanding Finnish economic growth 1975-90.
The main contribution of this thesis was the growth accounting results on the 
impact of ICT on growth and productivity, as well as the comparison of electric­
ity and ICT.220 It was shown in this thesis that ICT’s contribution to GDP 
growth was almost twice as large as electricity’s contribution over comparable 
periods of time. Finland has thus been far more successful as an ICT producer 
than a producer of electricity. Unfortunately in the use of ICT the results were 
still more modest than for electricity. During the end of the period considered in 
this thesis, Finland switched from resource-based to ICT-based growth. How­
ever, given the large dependency on the ICT-producing sector, the ongoing 
outsourcing of ICT production to low wage countries provides a threat to pro­
ductivity performance in the future. For a developed country only change is con­
stant and history teaches us that it is likely that Finland is obliged to reorganize 
its economy once again in the digital era.
220 One implicit outcome of our research was also that we initiated improvements to the content 
and usability of national accounts.
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The R e s e a rc h  R e p o r ts  s e r ie s  d e s c r ib e s  F in n ish  s o c ie t y  in  
th e  lig h t  o f  u p -to -d a te  re se a rch  re su lts . S c ie n t if ic  s tu d ie s  
th a t a re  c a rr ie d  o u t  a t  S ta t is t ic s  F in la n d  o r  a re  b a s e d  
o n  th e  d a ta s e ts  o f  S ta t is t ic s  F in la n d  a re  p u b l is h e d  in  
th e  se rie s .
This study examines Finnish economic growth, 1860- 
2005. The key driver of economic growth was produc­
tivity. And the major engine of productivity growth was 
technology, especially the general purpose technologies 
(GPTs) electricity and ICT. A new GPT builds on previ­
ous knowledge, yet often in an uncertain, punctuated, 
fashion.
Economic history, as well as the Finnish data analyzed in 
this study, teaches that growth is not a smooth process 
but is subject to episodes of sharp acceleration and de­
celeration which are associated with the arrival, diffusion 
and exhaustion of new general purpose technologies.
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